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Abstract. This thesis deals with the debate that opposes two 
metaphysical views: Haecceitism and anti-Haecceitism. 
Roughly speaking, according to anti-Haecceitists everything 
about reality is determined by the qualitative character of 
reality itself, while Haecceitists deny that this is the case.  
The thesis has two main goals. The first is to formulate and 
defend a novel way to understand the two views in question. 
The second is to defend a form of Haecceitism that I call 
‘Austere Haecceitism’.  
The first goal provides the focus of the first four chapters of the 
thesis. In Chapter 1, I consider two arguments for anti-
Haecceitism that I take to be emblematic of the typical rationale 
behind such a view. This rationale has it that if Haecceitism is 
true then what I call cases of primitive identity can possibly 
arise and that said cases are for some relevant reason 
unacceptable. Roughly, cases of primitive identity occur 
whenever the qualitative character of reality fails to ‘fix’ some 
non-qualitative feature of reality.  
In Chapter 2, I lay out two desiderata that a form of anti-
Haecceitism may or may not satisfy. I then argue that a form of 
anti-Haecceitism about the Ks (i.e., the things of a certain class) 
that satisfies both must rule it out that any of the Ks possibly 
has primitive, non-qualitative thisness. That is, it must hold 
that given every single K, for something to be that very K in 
particular is for it to be qualitatively a certain way. I also 
contend that (i.) the present debate – if correctly framed – is 
equally accessible to realists and nominalists about properties 
and relations; (ii.) the notion of a primitive thisness is not to be 
confused with that of a Scotusian haecceitas.  
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In Chapter 3, I distinguish the debate on metaphysical 
Haecceitism that is my topic from one it is at times mistaken 
with – i.e., the one on modal Haecceitism. I then address the 
question whether the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism can 
still (as the one about its modal ‘counterpart’) be stated in terms 
of supervenience. After providing reasons for a negative answer, 
I introduce two alternative takes on the present debate. The 
first one was set forth by Shamik Dasgupta: it is phrased in 
terms of a distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative 
facts and of a relation of grounding holding between them. The 
second strategy is the one I myself defend: it has it that to be 
an anti-Haecceitist about the Ks one must deny that any such 
thing may have primitive thisness. Since if something fails to 
have primitive thisness it must have what I call a ‘qualitative 
minimal individual essence’, anti-Haecceitism about the Ks in 
my sense entails that every K has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence. This entails, in turn, that the Ks respect a 
strong version of PII, the Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles.  
If Dasgupta’s strategy is legitimate then this is not the case: the 
anti-Haecceitist can guarantee that the Ks do not possibly give 
rise to cases of primitive identity without committing to strong 
PII. The aim of Chapter 4 is to prove that strategy unviable. Its 
upshot is that a proper framing of the present debate must 
indeed characterize anti-Haecceitism as a view that claims that 
at least the fundamental entities must fail to have primitive 
thisness.  
Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to my case against anti-
Haecceitism and for Austere Haecceitism.  
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In Chapter 5, I argue that anti-Haecceitism about the Ks is 
indeed committed to the claim that such things respect strong 
PII. After discussing such a commitment, I cast doubts on some 
further strategies that the anti-Haecceitist may attempt in order 
to avoid it – strategies that appeal, in particular, to non-
qualitative individual essences, irreducibly plural 
individuation, or some form of eliminativism. 
In Chapter 6, I develop and defend what I call a form of ‘Austere 
Haecceitism’. Any view that holds that some Ks have no 
qualitative minimal individual essence and that no K has a 
haecceity is a form of Austere Haecceitism about the Ks. My 
own position is that Austere Haecceitism is true about at least 
some Ks. Moreover, I hold that some such entities have strongly 
primitive thisness. That is, their being the very things they are 
does not consist in and is not determined by anything else at 
all. After recollecting the main tenets of my view, I defend them 
and the tenets of a weaker form of Austere Haecceitism, which 
they include, from some objections that may be raised against 
it. 
 
Keywords. Haecceitism, Primitive Identity, Individual Essence, 
Individuation, Essentialism, Qualitativism.  
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Résumé. Cette thèse a pour sujet le débat entre deux théories 
métaphysiques : l’haeccéitisme et l’anti-haeccéitisme. En 
substance, l’anti-haeccéitiste pense que tout ce qui est le cas 
est déterminé par la nature qualitative de la réalité, ce que 
l’haeccéitiste nie.  
La thèse comporte deux buts principaux. Le premier consiste à 
formuler et défendre une nouvelle manière de comprendre les 
deux théories en question. Le deuxième consiste à défendre une 
version de l’haeccéitisme que j’appelle ‘haeccéitisme austère’.  
Les chapitres 1-4 se focalisent sur le premier but. Dans le 
chapitre 1, je considère deux arguments en faveur de l’anti-
haeccéitisme. J’explique que ces arguments sont représentatifs 
de la raison principale pour laquelle certains sont amenés à 
embrasser l’anti-haeccéitisme. Selon les philosophes en 
question, si l’haeccéitisme est vrai alors ce que j’appelle des cas 
d’identité primitive peuvent se produire, et ces cas sont 
indésirables. En substance, un cas d’identité primitive se 
produit à chaque fois qu’une caractéristique non-qualitative de 
la réalité n’est pas fixée par le qualitatif.  
Dans le chapitre 2, j’énonce deux desiderata qui sont satisfaits 
par certaines versions de l’anti-haeccéitisme. Ensuite, je 
défends l’idée qu’une version de l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet des 
K (les entités appartenant à une certaine catégorie) doit éliminer 
la possibilité que des K aient identité primitive ou non-
qualitative afin de satisfaire les deux desiderata. En somme, 
selon ces versions de l’anti-haeccéitisme, pour chaque K, être 
tel K en particulier consiste à posséder un certain profil 
qualitatif. J’affirme aussi que (i.) ce débat, si défini 
correctement, est accessible indifféremment aux nominalistes 
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comme aux réalistes au sujet des propriétés et de relations ; (ii.) 
avoir identité primitive n’est pas la même chose qu’avoir une 
haeccéité telle que Duns Scotus le conçoit.  
Dans le chapitre 3, je fais la distinction entre l’haeccéitisme 
métaphysique – qui est le sujet principal de ma recherche – et 
une différente théorie qu’on appelle l’haeccéitisme modal. 
Ensuite, j’explore la question de savoir si l’haeccéitisme 
métaphysique peut être défini en termes de survenance. A cet 
effet, je fournis des raisons en faveur d’une réponse négative et 
je présente deux manières alternatives de définir le débat 
concernant l’haeccéitisme métaphysique. La première 
alternative – défendue par Shamik Dasgupta – est formulée en 
termes de faits qualitatifs, faits non-qualitatifs, ainsi que d’une 
relation de fondation métaphysique. La deuxième alternative 
est celle que je défends. Selon cette dernière, l’anti-haeccéitisme 
au sujet des K doit soutenir qu’aucun K ne puisse avoir identité 
primitive. Or, une entité qui n’a pas d’identité primitive est une 
entité qui possède ce que je définis comme une ‘essence 
individuelle qualitative minimale’. Donc, l’anti-haeccéitisme au 
sujet des K implique que chaque K a une essence individuelle 
qualitative minimale. Une deuxième conséquence est qu’une 
version forte du principe de l’identité des indiscernables (PII) au 
sujet des K est vraie. 
En revanche, si la version de l’anti-haeccéitisme de Dasgupta 
est défendue, elle n’implique pas de souscrire à une version 
forte du PII. Dans le chapitre 4, je montre qu’une telle version 
de l’anti-haeccéitisme n’est pas viable. Une définition correcte 
du débat doit caractériser l’anti-haeccéitisme comme une 
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théorie qui affirme qu’au moins les entités fondamentales ne 
peuvent pas avoir d’identité primitive.  
Les chapitres 5 et 6 sont quant à eux dédiés à mes arguments 
contre l’anti-haeccéitisme et en faveur de ce que je définis 
comme l’haeccéitisme austère.  
Dans le chapitre 5, je montre que l’anti-haeccéitisme au sujet 
des K est contraint de souscrire à l’idée selon laquelle les K 
satisfont le PII fort. Je discute les avantages et les inconvénients 
de cette obligation et je mets également en doute les différentes 
stratégies que l’anti-haeccéitiste peut adopter pour l’éviter.  
Dans le chapitre 6, je mets au point et je défends une version 
de l’haeccéitisme austère. L’haeccéitisme austère au sujet des 
K soutient notamment qu’il y a des K qui n’ont pas d’essence 
individuelle qualitative minimale et qu’aucun K ne possède une 
haeccéité. Je défends l’idée que l’haeccéitisme austère est vrai 
au sujet de certaines catégories d’entités. De plus, je soutiens 
qu’il y a des entités qui ont identité primitive au sens fort. C’est 
à dire, leur identité n’est pas déterminée par autre chose : il 
s’agit de faits bruts que ces entités sont ces qu’elles sont. Je 
conclus en répondant de manière systématique aux principales 
objections et difficultés qui sont avancées contre l’haeccéitisme 
austère.  
 
Mots-clés. Haeccéitisme, identité primitive, essence 
individuelle, individuation, essentialisme, qualitativisme. 	
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Non chiederci la parola che squadri da ogni lato 
l'animo nostro informe, e a lettere di fuoco 
lo dichiari e risplenda come un croco 
Perduto in mezzo a un polveroso prato. 
 
Ah l'uomo che se ne va sicuro, 
agli altri ed a se stesso amico, 
e l'ombra sua non cura che la canicola 
stampa sopra uno scalcinato muro! 
 
Non domandarci la formula che mondi possa aprirti 
sì qualche storta sillaba e secca come un ramo. 
Codesto solo oggi possiamo dirti, 
ciò che non siamo, ciò che non vogliamo.  
 
(Eugenio Montale, Ossi di Seppia) 
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Introduction 
 
Among the many things that have populated our world, there 
is Richard Burton. Richard Burton was a famous movie star 
who married twice another famous movie star who got married 
eight times. So, among the many things that have populated 
our world there is one that falls under the predicate ‘is a famous 
movie star who married twice another famous movie star who 
got married eight times’. Call this complex predicate, for the 
sake of convenience, ‘F’. As far as I know, Richard Burton is the 
only entity that meets the conditions for falling under F. 
Suppose this is the case. It seems that we could still not express 
all we say by claiming that Richard Burton exists (or, which is 
the same, that there is a thing that is identical to Richard 
Burton) by saying that there is a thing that falls under F. For 
to start, it seems quite compelling to think that though there is 
actually none, there could have been things that fall under F, 
and still such that they are not identical to Richard Burton. 
Hence, the two predicates we are considering – ‘is (identical to) 
Richard Burton’ and F – fail to have, we may say, one and the 
same modal profile.  
Yet suppose we were told absolutely everything about how 
Richard Burton was from a qualitative point of view. Suppose 
we were also able to put all those data into words – possibly by 
means of an extraordinary language that would include some 
incredibly eloquent predicates. One of them would be the 
predicate G – it would convey a complete description of how 
Richard Burton was, from a qualitative point of view, and 
thereby exhaust Richard Burton’s qualitative profile. Would we 
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then be able to say that Richard Burton exists by saying that a 
thing (and as a matter of fact only one) that falls under G exists? 
Note that semantic considerations will not be my focus here. 
Rather, my main concern in this dissertation will be with a 
particular metaphysical question that may lie behind one’s 
answer to the questions above and to related ones. Roughly, the 
question may be put as follows. Given a certain entity, is it the 
case that for something to be that entity is for it to be 
qualitatively a certain way? One of my main aims in what 
follows will be to support the claim that, for at least some 
entities we may ask it about, the answer to that question must 
be negative. My primary reason will be the following. In order 
for us to rightly provide a positive answer to that question – 
when asked about any entity whatsoever – it should be the case 
that given every entity, there is a certain qualitative profile such 
that, for something to be that entity, it is necessarily both 
necessary and sufficient that it satisfies such a qualitative 
profile. At least under a certain understanding, such a 
qualitative profile would represent an individual essence of that 
entity (given some understandings of the notion of essence, 
these conditions would instead be necessary, but may fail to be 
sufficient, for something to qualify as an individual essence of 
something else. Such worries will be considered in due course). 
Hence, the claim that given a certain entity, for something to be 
that entity is for it to be qualitatively a certain way, and that 
this is the case for every entity whatsoever, commits one to the 
claim that every entity has a qualitative individual essence 
(under the minimal construal of an individual essence I just 
considered at least). Such a claim commits one, in turn, to the 
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idea that no two entities can have one and the same qualitative 
profile. For if something numerically different from me could 
have the same qualitative profile I have, then clearly no part of 
my qualitative profile would be necessarily both necessary and 
sufficient for being the entity that I am. There would be things 
(either actual or merely possible) that would be qualitatively 
exactly as I am, and that would still be numerically different 
from me. Hence, nothing about having the qualitative profile I 
do have would be sufficient for being the entity I am – for some 
things would have exactly the same qualitative profile I have 
without being the entity I am.  
Thus, the claim that given any entity, for something to be that 
entity is for it to be qualitatively a certain way commits one to 
a particularly strong version of the Identity of Indiscernibles – 
PII, henceforth. Such a version of PII has it that, necessarily, no 
two things can be qualitatively indiscernible from one another. 
(As is well known, weakest forms of the Principle dictate that 
no two things can be indiscernible yet allow that the only 
feature distinguishing two things is that one is related to a 
certain thing in particular in a way that the other is not. Some 
such versions of PII are compatible, for instance, with there 
being two qualitatively indiscernible objects as long as one is in 
spacetime region R while the other is in spacetime region R1).  
 
It may strike as surprising that I introduce a dissertation about 
Haecceitism in terms of the questions considered above. For 
typically, the view that is discussed under the label 
‘Haecceitism’ concerns worries of a different, though in some 
ways related, sort – it is, roughly, a view concerning whether or 
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not maximal possibilities may differ in what they represent de 
re without also differing qualitatively. As per David Lewis’s 
insight, they may thus differ, according to the Haecceitist, while 
the Anti-Haecceitist has it that maximal possibilities can differ 
in what they represent de re only if they differ in their 
qualitative character as well.1  However, although I will also 
consider these two doctrines, my main concern is with a 
different topic – one that Kit Fine has labelled ‘the issue of 
metaphysical (anti-)Haecceitism’, thereby differentiating it from 
that of ‘modal (anti-)Haecceitism’ (i.e., roughly, from the one 
defined by Lewis).2  In a paper that was originally written in 
1984, Fine declares:  
 
In contrast to the modal doctrine, metaphysical Anti-
Haecceitism is a doctrine concerning the identity of 
individuals. It states that the identity of individuals – or, 
at least, of certain individuals – is to be explained in terms 
of their purely qualitative features or in terms of their 
qualitative relations to other individuals.3 
 
I am interested in the debate between metaphysical 
Haecceitism and anti-Haecceitism as doctrines that may be, 
albeit only roughly, thus defined. I take that debate to have one 
of its main contemporary references in Robert Merrihew 
Adams’s Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity – an article 
	
1 See Lewis (1986): 220-247.  
2 See Fine (2005): 19-39.  
3 Ibid.: 31.  
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that famously starts by raising the following question (‘Adams’s 
question’, henceforth):   
 
Is the world – and are all possible worlds – constituted by 
purely qualitative facts or does thisness hold a place 
beside suchness as a fundamental feature of reality?4   
 
However, I also think that a thoroughly accurate definition of 
such doctrines is yet to be found in the literature. A significant 
part of this dissertation will then be devoted to the elaboration 
and defence of my own conception of such doctrines. As I will 
argue, the present debate may significantly gain in clarity and 
completeness once such a conception is assumed.  
In order to see that the debate has not yet been satisfyingly 
framed, consider a further bit of what Fine wrote in this 
concern: 
 
Very roughly, metaphysical anti-Haecceitism is a version 
of the bundle theory (‘there is nothing to a particular over 
and above its properties’), while metaphysical Haecceitism 
is a version of the doctrine of ‘basic particulars’.5  
 
Now on the face of it, it seems that Fine himself did not take 
very seriously the association of Haecceitism to a doctrine of 
bare particulars and of anti-Haecceitism to some sort of bundle 
theory. As a matter of fact, Adams had already disentangled 
such an association as follows:  	
4 Adams (1979): 5.  
5 Fine (2005): 31.  
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To deny that thisnesses [i.e., properties of being identical 
to a certain individual in particular] are purely qualitative 
is not necessarily to postulate ‘bare particulars’, substrata 
without qualities of their own, which would be what was 
left of the individual when all its qualitative properties were 
subtracted. Conversely, to hold that thisnesses are purely 
qualitative is not to imply that individuals are nothing but 
bundles of qualities, for qualities may not be components 
of individuals at all.6 
 
However, I think that the association also arises from a further 
assumption that has so far dominated the debate about 
metaphysical Haecceitism. The assumption I have in mind in 
some sense precedes the one that was thus rightly disclaimed 
by Adams. For it has it that asking whether or not every 
thisness is purely qualitative – and hence whether or not 
thisness “holds” no “place beside suchness as a fundamental 
feature of reality”7  – is to ask whether or not only qualities exist 
at the fundamental level of reality, so that the existence of 
individuals is in some sense derivative on the existence of 
qualities.8   
I think that the assumption is wrong – I actually think that 
assuming a fundamental ontology of qualitative properties 	
6 Adams (1979): 7.  
7 Ibid.: 5. As will be clear in due course, the claim that all thisnesses are 
purely qualitative and the claim that reality is fundamentally qualitative may 
as well be identified under Adams’s own reading of them two. 
8 I will have remarks to make about how the notion of an individual is 
employed in the context as well but let me for now use the term as (or, 
rather, as if it was) unproblematic. 
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alone is neither necessary nor sufficient in order to make sure 
that reality is fundamentally qualitative in one’s metaphysics.9  
As a matter of fact, if I am right, then reality may be held to be 
fundamentally qualitative, in the sense that is relevant for the 
present debate, even in a metaphysics that is utterly 
nominalistic about properties (be they qualitative or otherwise). 
But if this is the case, then the question whether qualitative 
properties are components of individuals (however such a 
question is to be understood) not only is independent from the 
question whether thisnesses are purely qualitative: it may even 
fail to arise in the context of the latter issue – for the latter issue 
may be answered either way in a framework that has it that 
properties in general simply do not exist.  
As I shall be arguing, we will have a lot to gain, theoretically, 
from acknowledging this point – i.e., by appreciating that the 
assumption I just mentioned is ill-founded. First, we will get 
much clearer on what the question about metaphysical 
Haecceitism authentically is. Second, we will be in a better 
position for evaluating theories that purport to answer it. For 
instance, it will be clear that ruling out any kind of nominalism 
about properties cannot be merely motivated by a need to 
	
9  I am assuming that the term ‘quality’ in the quote of Adams’s I am 
considering can legitimately be taken as a plain synonym of ‘qualitative 
property’. In fact, I fail to see what else than a qualitative property a quality 
can possibly be – unless, perhaps, a qualitative feature of some entity that 
is not taken to be an entity itself, in turn. Yet in the quoted passage Adams 
is considering two views that take qualities to be components of individuals, 
in some relevant sense – the bare particular theory and the bundle theory. 
And however the notion of a quality as a component of an individual is to be 
understood, it seems unlikely that it can be understood in such a way that 
the quality in question does not turn out to be an entity at all.   
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defend some form of metaphysical anti-Haecceitism – however 
effectively such a need is supported.   
A related assumption has it that, roughly, when it comes to 
Haecceitism something significant hinges on those allegedly 
special entities that are taken to deserve the label of individuals, 
in at least the following two, interconnected ways. i. Only (so-
called) individuals are taken to be relevant as the scope of an 
(anti-)Haecceitist theory, so that either defending or rejecting 
metaphysical Haecceitism is to take a certain stance as 
concerns how (if at all) the identity of such things, and only of 
them, is qualitatively determined. ii. Such things alone – 
individuals – may give rise (so the thought goes) to those 
differences that, as will be clear in due course, the anti-
Haecceitist typically aims to exclude, that is, to differences in 
the identity of the entities involved in some situations that are 
not accompanied by any qualitative difference.  
I will argue that the widespread acceptance of such a twofold 
assumption has historical reasons (some of which are not even 
actually relevant to the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism, 
directly relating to modal Haecceitism instead), and that no 
substantive theoretical motivation lies behind them.  
In view of this, my definition of metaphysical Haecceitism and 
related theses will in a sense be a quite general one. I will 
characterize the main tenet of Haecceitism as a claim about ‘the 
Ks’ – where ‘K’ stands for a predicate that singles out a given 
class of entities still yet to be specified. Given that basis, and 
by taking the Ks to be all and only those entities that are taken 
to be the individuals, I maintain that we can reach a sound 
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understanding of what Haecceitism in its metaphysical variant 
has (or, rather, should have) traditionally been taken to be.  
Now, curiously enough, I will get to provide my definition of 
Haecceitism only indirectly – by contrast to what I will first 
suggest to be the best way to understand anti-Haecceitism. 
This may indeed strike as odd – at least in view of the respective 
labels: Haecceitism has, so to speak, a label of its own, so that 
we would expect that it be stated in its own right, while we 
would rather assume anti-Haecceitism to be defined as the 
negation of Haecceitism.  
However – for reasons that will be clear in due course, and that 
will actually be among the most interesting parts of the story – 
I think that the best strategy for framing the issue is to start by 
considering what exactly the theoretical rationale behind anti-
Haecceitism is. To make a long story short, I will argue that 
such a rationale consists in the aim to exclude cases of 
haecceitistic difference and of primitive identity.  
I take haecceitistic differences to be but primitive identities of a 
special sort. Since the former notion is somewhat easier to 
characterize without facing technical difficulties, though, I will 
presently sketch only that one. Roughly, two situations differ 
haecceitistically in the relevant sense if and only if they differ 
merely as concerns the identities of some of the things that are 
involved in them, respectively.   
After having appreciated this point, some theoretical work will 
need to be done in order to understand how the aim of the anti-
Haecceitist may properly be fulfilled. I will argue that in order 
to effectively exclude every case of primitive identity while 
respecting a series of quite widely accepted desiderata, the anti-
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Haecceitist will need to exclude there being primitive thisnesses 
in Adams’s sense (modulo some definitional worries). And given 
what is meant by ‘primitive’ in the context (that is, 
approximately, ‘primitive with respect to the qualitative’), this 
will be the same as arguing that every thisness is qualitative – 
or, at least, that it is in some relevant sense determined by the 
qualitative.  
Already here it can be appreciated that Haecceitism, the direct 
opponent of anti-Haecceitism, may be stated as a negative 
claim – i.e., as the claim that it is not the case that all thisnesses 
are purely qualitative or somehow determined by the 
qualitative.  
Furthermore, I will argue that the question whether all 
thisnesses are purely qualitative may as well be directly 
translated into the following question – incidentally, the one I 
set forth from the beginning: is it the case that for something to 
be identical to a certain entity is for it to be qualitatively a 
certain way – and is this the case for every entity (of a certain 
category at least) whatsoever?  
While properly assessing all the notions I am making mention 
of, I will argue that a positive answer to this question is what 
the anti-Haecceitist needs to provide and defend. By contrast, 
a Haecceitist will be, under my approach, someone who 
answers no to that question. (Here again, there seem to be 
reasons for thinking that – if I am right of course – the main 
tenet of Haecceitism may conveniently be defined as a negative 
one).  
Now, as I have – albeit briefly – argued above, a positive answer 
to that question commits one to the claim that every entity (that 
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is, every K, where the Ks are the entities one is focusing on) has 
a purely qualitative individual essence. Or, at least, it commits 
one to the idea that given every K, a certain qualitative profile 
is such that, for something to be that K in particular, it is 
necessarily both necessary and sufficient that it has such a 
qualitative profile – again, relevant worries concerning whether 
or not essentialist notions in general, and that of an individual 
essence in particular, can be effectively understood in merely 
modal terms will be handled in due course.  
In the light of all this, I will first characterize metaphysical anti-
Haecceitism about the Ks as the claim that, necessarily, every 
K has a purely qualitative individual essence (at least under the 
modal definition considered above), and then define 
metaphysical Haecceitism about the Ks as the denial of the 
corresponding anti-Haecceitist tenet.  
The formulation and defence of my own way to frame the debate 
about metaphysical Haecceitism will be the focus of the first 
four chapters of this dissertation. 
In Chapter 1 I will introduce the notion of a case of primitive 
identity and consider two arguments for anti-Haecceitism that 
I take to be emblematic of the typical rationale behind such a 
view. As I said, such arguments have it that if Haecceitism is 
true then cases of primitive identity can possibly arise and that 
said cases are for some relevant reason unacceptable. Roughly, 
cases of primitive identity occur whenever the qualitative 
character of reality fails to ‘fix’ some non-qualitative feature of 
reality. The notions of qualitativeness and non-qualitativeness 
will then be characterized in the light of what they are supposed 
to convey within cases for anti-Haecceitism.   
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Diverse views have been supported by appeal to the rationale 
for anti-Haecceitism. In Chapter 2 I will lay out two desiderata 
that a form of anti-Haecceitism may or may not satisfy. I will 
argue that a form of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks that satisfies 
both must rule it out that any of the Ks possibly has primitive, 
non-qualitative thisness, and duly define such a notion. As I 
mentioned, I think that the present debate – if correctly framed 
– is equally accessible to realists and nominalists about 
properties and relations. After making this point, I will argue 
that the notion of a primitive thisness is not to be confused with 
that of a Scotusian haecceitas. I will also define the notion of 
strongly primitive thisness and argue that while if a thing has 
strongly primitive thisness then it must also have primitive, 
non-qualitative thisness, the converse does not hold.  
As I said, the debate on metaphysical Haecceitism that is the 
topic of my work is not to be identified with the one on modal 
Haecceitism. After making this point, in Chapter 3 I will address 
the question whether the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism 
can still (as the one about its modal ‘counterpart’) be stated in 
terms of supervenience. After providing reasons for a negative 
answer, I will introduce two alternative takes on the present 
debate. The first one was set forth by Shamik Dasgupta: it is 
phrased in terms of a distinction between qualitative and non-
qualitative facts and of a relation of grounding allegedly 
holding, or failing to hold, between them. The second strategy 
– the one I myself defend – is phrased in terms of qualitative 
individual essences instead. According to my strategy, to be an 
anti-Haecceitist about the Ks is not only to rule it out that any 
K may give rise to primitive identities and haecceitistic 
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differences; it is also to deny that any such thing may have 
primitive thisness. After defining the notion of a qualitative 
individual essence that is relevant for my framework, I will 
argue that if something fails to have primitive thisness then it 
must have a qualitative individual essence of that sort – that is, 
what I will call a ‘qualitative minimal individual essence’. As a 
result, anti-Haecceitism about the Ks in my sense entails that 
every K has a qualitative minimal individual essence. As I said, 
this entails, in turn, that no two Ks can perfectly resemble one 
another – i.e., that the Ks respect the strong version of PII 
mentioned above.  
As will be clear in due course, if Dasgupta’s strategy is 
legitimate then this is not the case: the anti-Haecceitist can 
guarantee that the Ks do not possibly give rise to cases of 
primitive identity without accepting that each one of them has 
a qualitative minimal individual essence – hence, without 
committing to strong PII. Since my main charge against the 
anti-Haecceitist is exactly that her view has such a 
commitment, it is then crucial that I prove Dasgupta’s strategy 
to be unviable, or at least highly problematic. This will be the 
aim of Chapter 4. The upshot will be that a proper framing of 
the present debate must appeal to the notion of primitive 
thisness. More precisely, it must characterize anti-Haecceitism 
as a view that claims that at least the fundamental entities 
must fail to have primitive thisness.   
Chapter 5 and 6 will be devoted to my case against anti-
Haecceitism and for a certain form of Haecceitism.  
In Chapter 5, I will argue that anti-Haecceitism about the Ks – 
at least under my construal, which turned out to be the best 
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one so far achieved – is indeed committed to the claim that such 
things respect strong PII. After discussing the merits and faults 
of such a commitment, I will then cast doubts on some further 
strategies that the anti-Haecceitist may attempt in order to 
avoid it – strategies that appeal, in particular, to non-qualitative 
individual essences, irreducibly plural individuation, or some 
form of eliminativism. I will argue that inasmuch as they do 
satisfy the rationale for anti-Haecceitism, all such views must 
ultimately commit to strong PII.   
Finally, I will take the above to give contrastive support to the 
form of metaphysical Haecceitism I will develop and defend in 
Chapter 6. As any view that holds that (i.) there are entities that 
fail to have qualitative individual essences, and (ii.) none of 
such entities has a haecceity – i.e., a literally existing property 
that it would depend upon for its identity, my view is what I call 
a form  of ‘Austere Haecceitism’. More precisely, a view that 
holds that some Ks have no qualitative minimal individual 
essence and that no K has a haecceity is a form of Austere 
Haecceitism about the Ks.  
My own position is that Austere Haecceitism is true about at 
least some Ks. Moreover, I hold that some such entities have 
strongly primitive thisness. That is, roughly: there is at least an 
entity, a, such that for something to be a not only does not 
consist in and is not determined by its being F, where to be F is 
to have a given qualitative profile; it does not consist in and is 
not determined by anything else at all. After recollecting the 
main tenets of my view, I will defend them and the tenets of a 
weaker form of Austere Haecceitism, which they include, from 
some objections that may be raised against it. In particular, I 
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will argue that my view is not undesirably expensive, that it 
does not openly contradict any unquestionable interpretation 
of contemporary physics, and that, contrary to what some may 
contend, individuality is not excluded in the metaphysics I 
endorse.  
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Chapter 1 
Haecceitistic Differences and the Case for Anti-
Haecceitism 
 
As I said, my aim in this dissertation is to characterize and 
defend a form of metaphysical Haecceitism. As I also 
anticipated, I think that in order to properly understand what 
Haecceitism is, we would better start by looking at the main 
reason that some have taken to tell against it. More precisely, 
we should first consider the typical case that anti-Haecceitists 
present for their view, define anti-Haecceitism on that basis, 
and then construe Haecceitism as the negation of anti-
Haecceitism.  
A reason for thus proceeding is, in a nutshell, the following. 
Once it is acknowledged that the issue about metaphysical 
Haecceitism is distinct from the one about modal Haecceitism 
(a point I will argue in Chapter 3), there is still the problem of 
precisely characterizing the former debate. The attempts 
towards such a task have taken, to this day, at least two very 
different directions. First, there is the suggestion we got from 
Kit Fine. Very roughly, an anti-Haecceitist about some entities 
would in this sense be someone who claims (while a Haecceitist 
about those same entities would be someone who denies) that 
the identity of such entities is to be explained away in terms of 
their qualitative profiles. (I am presently ignoring Fine’s 
suggestion, which I see as wrong-headed, that anti-Haecceitism 
is some form of bundle theory while Haecceitism is a theory of 
bare particulars).  
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Second, there is a strategy that has been recently pursued by 
Shamik Dasgupta. Given this second approach, a Haecceitist 
claims (while an anti-Haecceitist denies) that at least some facts 
are neither qualitative nor grounded in qualitative ones.  
But the theoretical oppositions that may respectively be defined 
in terms of such approaches – the two Haecceitisms and the 
two anti-Haecceitisms, so to speak – are significantly different 
from one another. So much so that some have attempted to 
defend anti-Haecceitism in the latter sense without committing 
to anti-Haecceitism in the former.  
Still there is a common aim behind both (and, I argue, all) forms 
of anti-Haecceitism: it is the aim to exclude what I have called 
cases of primitive identity, in general, and cases of haecceitistic 
differences, in particular – as will be clear shortly, cases of the 
latter sort should be taken to be but special cases of the former. 
By contrast, it is not easy to make a clear sense of what the 
Haecceitist is up to in either of those terms without turning her 
view into one that it is not – or, at least, into one that it fails to 
mandatorily be.  
Thus, on the one hand, against what the latter strategy I 
mentioned seems to suggest, the Haecceitist is not committed 
to there being some class of fundamental facts at all. She is not 
even committed to there being facts simpliciter, for that matter! 
On the other hand, the most important development of the 
former strategy had been provided by Robert Adams, who 
famously phrased the issue about Haecceitism as the question 
whether all thisnesses – where a thisness is a property of being 
identical to a given individual in particular – are purely 
qualitative or at least equivalent to qualitative properties. But, 
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as will be clear in due course, one may be either a Haecceitist 
or an anti-Haecceitist without taking there to be any properties 
at all. That is, both views are compatible with nominalism about 
properties – a point that easily goes unforeseen if they are 
phrased along the lines that Adams suggests without a previous 
understanding of what the issue about them exactly is. Again, 
such an understanding should be drawn, I suggest, from the 
typical purpose of the anti-Haecceitist – i.e., to stress once 
more, that of excluding cases of primitive identity.  
In this chapter, I will start by introducing the notion of a case 
of primitive identity along with some important clarifications (§ 
1.1, § 1.2). Having set such a background, I will then consider 
two arguments that I take to be emblematic of the typical 
rationale for anti-Haecceitism (§ 1.3, § 1.4). Both arguments 
contend that cases of haecceitistic differences are to be ruled 
out in view of certain considerations. Such cases possibly arise 
– so the thought goes – if anti-Haecceitism (in some form or 
another) is not true. As I said, I take haecceitistic differences to 
be cases of primitive identity of a particular sort. Cases of both 
primitive identity and haecceitistic difference are typically 
characterized in terms of the distinction between qualitative 
and non-qualitative items of reality of some sort: very roughly, 
they are cases in which the qualitative character of reality fails 
to determine or ‘fix’ the non-qualitative. Still in the light of what 
this amounts to according to the rationale for anti-Haecceitism, 
I will conclude by characterizing the qualitative–non-qualitative 
distinction (§ 1.5).   
Before proceeding to that, though, a preliminary clarification is 
in order. While introducing primitive identity, I will speak of the 
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identity of entities, in general, while others typically speak of 
that of individuals, in particular. This is because (as I 
mentioned in the Introduction) there is a tendency to assume 
that the quarrel about primitive identity gets its relevance only 
inasmuch as facts of the matter concerning the identity of 
individuals (and not of entities of any kind) are investigated. As 
I also already announced, I will try to prove this assumption 
wrong. Until then, I will have to just keep on using this ‘mixed 
phrasing’ – in terms of individuals, when I quote others, and in 
terms of entities more generally, when I provide my own 
conception. I will not make any special remark about this 
unless an actual risk of theoretical confusion arises. After all, 
we may as well state the point in neutral terms, and only 
afterwards raise questions of scope – for instance, by asking 
whether only the entities of some particular category should be 
thought to possibly give rise to cases of primitive identity, and 
if this is the case, whether such a category is that of individuals. 
Or, at least, this may be done unless the scope of an (anti-
)Haecceitist claim is presupposed in the way that claim is 
phrased – a point I will have to touch upon shortly.    
 
1.1. Primitive Identity  
 
When I talk about a case of primitive identity, I mean a case in 
which there is a fact of the matter as concerns the identity of 
the entities involved in some given situation, and such a fact of 
the matter cannot be made to rest on further features of reality 
that may as well be characterized without making reference to 
the identity of any entity at all. In slightly different terms, we 
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have a case of primitive identity whenever there is a fact of the 
matter as concerns which entities are involved in some given 
situation, and such a fact of the matter cannot be made to rest 
on further features of reality that may as well be characterized 
without making reference to which entities are involved in that 
given situation at all.  
 
Note that when I use the phrases ‘fact of the matter’ and 
‘situation’ I do not mean to introduce any unfamiliar notions. 
Take any truth concerning a given entity in particular – say, the 
truth that Richard Burton is divorced. For any such truth, there 
is indeed a fact of the matter as concerns the identity of the 
entities involved in some given situation in the sense I mean. 
For instance, in the example given, it is Richard Burton that is 
involved in the situation of his being divorced – the identity of 
the entity in question matters for the content of the truth we 
are considering.10 The same does not hold for, say, the truth 
that a famous actor is divorced.  
 
More precisely, consider a situation in which some entities are 
involved. There are two possible cases.  
1. It is determinate which entities are involved in the 
situation, or:  
2. It is not determinate which entities are involved in the 
situation.  
In turn, (1.) divides into two sub-cases:  
	
10 Instances of the phrase ‘the identity of x’ may sound confusing; what I 
mean by them will be clear shortly.  
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1.1. That exactly those entities are the ones involved in the 
situation is determined by some features of reality that 
do not involve any entities in particular, and:  
1.2. That exactly those entities are the ones involved in the 
situation is not determined by some features of reality 
that do not involve any entities in particular.  
Only if (1.2) is the case the situation at issue faces us with a 
case of primitive identity.  
As an example, consider the following scenario. 
Consider the ship of Theseus and let me assume, for the sake 
of simplicity, that artefacts such as ships are enduring entities. 
Suppose the ship of Theseus is in the Piraeus at time t. All its 
wooden planks simultaneously rot away at t1. However, 
something else happens at t1: a magician replaces all the rotten 
planks at once with new planks. The new planks perfectly 
resemble the ones that were composing the ship of Theseus at 
t. Call the resulting ship Theseus I. Suppose Theseus I perfectly 
resembles the ship of Theseus as well.  
Moreover, suppose at t1 a second magician builds a ship from 
the now rotten planks that were composing the ship of Theseus 
at t – suppose she places each plank exactly in the position it 
was occupying in the ship of Theseus. Call the resulting ship 
Theseus II.  
At t2, both Theseus I and Theseus II are in the Piraeus.  
Which one is identical to the ship of Theseus?  
For the sake of simplicity, let me consider only some possible 
answers.  
a. There is no fact of the matter. This is not to say that one 
of them is identical to the ship of Theseus, but it is 
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indeterminate which. Rather, it is indeterminate 
whether, at t2, something is identical to the ship of 
Theseus at all.  
b. Theseus I is identical to the ship of Theseus. Since at t2 
there is a ship that perfectly resembles the ship of 
Theseus, such a ship is the ship of Theseus.  
c. Theseus II is identical to the ship of Theseus, because it 
is composed of the same planks that once composed the 
ship of Theseus. Although Theseus II’s planks are less 
similar to the ones that used to compose the ship of 
Theseus than Theseus I’s are, they are the ones that used 
to compose the ship of Theseus. Being composed of them 
is what counts for being identical to the ship of Theseus.   
 
Consider the situation that one might describe as two ships that 
have been labelled Theseus I and Theseus II are in the Piraeus 
at t2; call it S. If it is determinate that one of the things involved 
in S is the ship of Theseus, then there is a fact of the matter as 
to which (at least some of) the entities involved in S are – we are 
in one of the cases that I described as (1.) above. This is not so 
if (a.) is true. It is, though, if either (b.) or (c.) is true. S does not 
face us with a case of primitive identity unless (c.) is the right 
answer to the little puzzle above. For if (b.) is the right answer, 
then there is a fact of the matter as to whether the ship of 
Theseus is involved in S. The ship of Theseus is involved in S. 
Yet this is made the case by some features of reality that do not 
rest on the identity of any things in particular, but only on 
issues of qualitative similarity between two ships. By contrast, 
if (c.) is true, then the ship of Theseus’s being involved in S is 
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explained in terms that appeal to the identity of some things – 
i.e., of the planks that once composed the ship of Theseus. This 
all will be clearer in due course.  
 
1.2. Clarifications  
 
Before going on to introduce more examples and clarifications, 
two caveats are in order.  
The first is simply this: when I talk about primitive identity in 
this sense, what I have in mind has nothing to do with whether 
the concept of identity is or is not analysable in terms of some 
other concept. Rather, I am using the term ‘primitive’ as one 
that is meant to apply to some features of reality with respect 
to others. For example, I can easily define ‘grandparent’ in 
terms of ‘parent’, but that does not mean that my parents are 
metaphysically more primitive than my grandparents. Vice 
versa, one might even think that grandparents are more 
primitive than parents – even if it turned out that the latter 
cannot be defined in terms of the former. Thus, when I say that 
some feature of reality is primitive simpliciter in the sense that 
is relevant here, what I mean is that it is a brute one – nothing 
metaphysically determines it.11 
The second caveat is more substantive. When I consider facts 
of primitive identity, what I have in mind is not merely an issue 
of the formal properties that govern the identity relation. For 
such formal properties do not tell us anything about which 
entities are the ones involved in any given situation. Nor is it 
	
11 For a related point, see Fine (2016); see in particular fn. 1.  
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the case that its material properties – i.e., the extension that 
such a relation happens to have – tell us everything that is 
relevant for issues of identity in the sense that is at stake here.  
For example, consider a situation S1 where two coins a and b 
that have previously been tossed are in the following 
configuration:  
- a: heads; b: tails.  
Suppose nothing else than a and b exists in S1.  
The extension that the identity relation happens to have in S1 
do tell us which things are there in S1. Yet as soon as we aptly 
complicate the scenario, questions that are relevant for the 
present debate and that are left unanswered by the material 
properties of the identity relation may arise. To see this, 
consider a situation S2 where the same two coins a and b have 
been tossed and are in the following configuration:  
- a: tails; b: heads.  
Suppose nothing else than a and b exists in S2.  
While the identity relation has the same extension in S2 that it 
has in S1, that is:  
- {<a, a>; <b, b>}  
the two situations differ as to which coin lends heads and which 
one lends tails. And this difference, too, is one that according 
to the anti-Haecceitist must somehow be settled by the 
qualitative character of S1 and of S2 or of reality more generally.  
 
In other words, as will be clear in due course, issues of mere 
numerical identity with oneself and numerical difference from 
anything else are still purely qualitative issues about the 
entities one is considering. Or, at least, they count as such 
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under the notion of ‘qualitative’ that I will be advocating. But I 
will be working under the assumption that the anti-Haecceitist 
is someone who rejects fundamental, irreducible non-
qualitative features of reality precisely in order to exclude cases 
of primitive identity in the sense I am trying to characterize. 
Hence, the features of reality that she aims to prove non-
primitive cannot be such that they involve identity-issues in a 
merely qualitative fashion, so to speak.12   
Moreover, the facts that are at issue when Haecceitism is 
discussed are not limited to cardinality facts – i.e., to issues 
concerning how many things are there, in general, or are 
involved in some given situation, in particular.  
The point will be clear when I expose the typical anti-Haecceitist 
contention against those particular cases of primitive identity 
that I call haecceitistic differences. As we will see, the targeted 
difference will in each case be a difference as to which entities 
are involved in some given situation – while no difference as to 
how many entities are involved in the situations that are 
compared will be contemplated. But there are further ways to 
get to appreciate the same point, and I will but briefly sketch 
some of them now.  
Consider, first, the familiar distinction between qualitative 
identity, on the one hand, and numerical identity, on the other. 	
12 Thus, points such as the one made in Lewis (1986): 192-193 and in 
Salmon (1987), roughly to the effect that something’s identity with itself and 
difference from anything else do not ask for explanation, can be equally well 
accepted by the Haecceitist and by the anti-Haecceitist as I suggest that we 
construe their views. See also Williamson (2013): 145. By the same token, 
the problem of whether identity is fundamental as addressed in Shumener 
(2016) does not touch the issue of Haecceitism. For Shumener investigates 
whether there are fundamental facts of identity and distinctness simpliciter 
– with no special focus on non-qualitative ones.  
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However the notion of ‘qualitative’ is to be specified, qualitative 
identity is a binary relation that holds both between a thing and 
itself and between any two things that are qualitatively just 
alike – if such pairs there be. Numerical identity is a binary 
relation too, but it does never apply to two things: it is precisely 
that equivalence relation that every thing has to itself, and to 
nothing else.  
But we may wish to characterize a further sense in which we 
talk about identity – as a matter of fact, the one I am appealing 
to while using such phrases as ‘the identity of a certain thing’. 
As opposed to numerical identity – the relation that, given any 
thing, only can hold (and, it is standardly thought at least, must 
hold) between that thing and itself, identity in this sense may 
rather prima facie look like a property: the property of being 
identical to a certain thing in particular. (That exactly one thing 
can have such a property obviously follows from the logic of the 
identity relation). Thus, the notion may be directly connected 
to that of a thisness so as it was characterized by Robert Adams:  
 
A thisness is the property of being identical with a certain 
particular individual – not the property that we all share, 
of being identical with some individual or other, but my 
property of being identical with me, your property of being 
identical with you, etc.13  
 
Clearly, the notion should not be mistaken for that of self-
identity, either. For, inasmuch as it is construed as a property 
	
13 Adams (1979): 6.  
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at all, being self-identical will turn out to be one that we all 
share – just as being identical to a certain individual or another, 
Adams says, is.14  
More about Adams’s notion of a thisness, and about my own 
construal and treatment of such a notion, will be said in the 
next chapter. I am appealing to the notion here mainly to give 
an idea of the sorts of questions that are at issue when identity 
in the sense that is presently relevant – we may call it ‘identity 
in the sense of thisness’ – is. Such issues are at times referred 
to as questions about ‘which is which’, but it is not easy to see 
what they are up to without considering particular cases. The 
ship of Theseus-case presented above is one. 
An example may also be drawn from the wide-ranging definition 
of Haecceitism that David Kaplan provided in his (1975) “How 
to Russell a Frege-Church”. According to Kaplan, accepting 
Russellian propositions is to commit to a form of Haecceitism – 
where ‘Russellian’ or ‘singular’ propositions are those that “are 
about a particular individual in virtue of having that individual 
as a direct constituent”. 15  The first reason he presents to 
support this point is that “if propositions, attributes, etc. are 
represented in the usual way by functions on possible worlds, 
then in representing a singular proposition that contains an 
individual x we would want to assign truth to those possible 
worlds in which x has whatever property is attributed to him. 
But this presupposes that, for each world, it is a determinate 
question which, if any, of its individuals is x.”16 By contrast, “[i]f 
	
14 Cf. Rosenkrantz (1993): 3-4. 
15 Fitch and Nelson (2018). 
16 Kaplan (1975): 724.  
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we are only asked to represent general propositions, we can 
confine our attention, in each possible world, to considerations 
internal to the life of the world, and the external question, ‘But 
is it x?’ need never arise”. 17  The questions that Kaplan is 
considering here are, again, questions of identity in the sense 
of thisness.  
It is important to see that such questions need not only arise 
when issues of transworld identity are considered. We face 
questions of this sort whenever we consider one or more 
arbitrary entities and raise what Kaplan would call ‘external’ 
questions as to whether it is the case that numerical identity 
holds between one of them and a given entity in particular that 
we have previously focused on and we are now, as it were, 
‘holding fixed’.  
For instance, we may hear that so-and-so a ship is in the 
Piraeus and wonder whether that ship is the ship of Theseus. 
Analogously, we may hear that this and that is going on with 
so and so a person – say, that an expensive divorce is 
threatening a famous movie star – and wonder whether that 
person (that famous movie star) is or is not Richard Burton.  
Or, which is the same, we may in the same context ask whether 
or not identity holds between the soon to be divorced movie star 
we are told about and Richard Burton.  
Further examples of ‘which is which’-questions may help 
appreciate the point at issue. The ‘identity-questions’ that one 
is to consider in these cases are precisely the sort of queries 
	
17 Ibid. 
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that stand at the heart of the cases for anti-Haecceitism I will 
examine in the next two sections.  
First, given a certain entity, we may wonder whether or not it – 
as opposed to any other entity of the same kind – exists, or is 
accepted as an element of a given domain. A concern of this 
sort must be among the ‘external questions’ that Kaplan 
mentions in the passage I quoted above. For if a Russellian 
proposition that contains a certain individual, x, faces us with 
the problem of ascribing a definite answer to questions as to 
which individual of a given world is x, it by the same token 
commits us to the idea that, for every possible world, there is a 
definite answer to the question whether x is an individual that 
exists (in some sense) in that possible world.  
Second, given a certain entity, we may wonder whether or not 
it – as opposed to any other entity of the same kind – is involved 
in a given situation, fact, or observation. The question I 
considered above, as to whether Richard Burton is the famous 
movie star threatened by the expensive divorce one is getting to 
know about, would be one of this sort.  
All the questions I have considered so far are questions as to 
whether something is the case – in a nutshell, whether it is the 
case that identity holds between something and a certain entity 
in particular. The question of what makes that be the case – 
and of whether something does make that be the case at all – 
lies at the heart of the whole debate about Haecceitism.  
As a final means to appreciating what identity in the sense of 
thisness consists in, we may turn to the long-standing problem 
of providing principles of individuation for entities of a given 
sort. According to a well-established tradition (one that is 
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endorsed, among others, by Lowe, 2005), the task that a given 
principle of individuation is supposed to fulfil is twofold. On the 
one hand, under this approach whatever individuates (in the 
metaphysical sense) a given entity is meant to be what makes 
it be one entity of its kind. On the other, what individuates a 
given entity is also what makes it be the very entity it is, in 
particular – say, depending on the case, Richard Burton, you, 
or me.  
Issues of identity in the sense I am investigating properly 
concern the latter, and not the former, point. It may be thought 
that this is problematic inasmuch as it presupposes that the 
two tasks can be kept apart from one another – which may look 
contentious in the light of Lowe’s claim that “given that 
something does indeed qualify as a single object of some kind, 
it is hard to see how what makes it the very object that it is 
could fail to be what also makes it one object, for such an entity 
could not be the very object that it is without thereby being one 
object.”18  
There are details that need not worry us here, for Lowe is mainly 
concerned with principles of individuation for individual objects, 
which he does take to fulfil the two tasks at once. Yet again, my 
present aims are broader: they do not confine to questions 
about the thisness of entities of any particular kind.  
Even ignoring this aspect, it should be noted that Lowe’s point 
is hardly mandatory: after all, it could be that what makes an 
entity the very entity it is also makes it be one entity – but 
redundantly so, because something else (or, perhaps, nothing 
	
18 Lowe (2005): 76.  
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at all) independently makes it be one entity. Moreover, even if 
sound, Lowe’s point need not conflict with what I am claiming 
here – i.e., that issues as to what provides something with a 
certain thisness (so to speak) are issues about what makes that 
thing be the very thing it is and not about what makes it be one 
thing.  
For I do not need to exclude that what makes something be the 
very entity it is also makes it be one thing – as Lowe takes it to 
be the case. It may by contrast seem that what I do need to 
deny, if anything, is that whatever makes something be one 
thing also, by the same token, makes it be the very entity it is, 
in particular. Yet as a matter of fact, I may even concede that 
this is the case. Maybe, given each entity, the question as to 
what makes it be one and the question as to what makes it be 
the very thing it is must be given one and the same answer. My 
point is simply that the two questions are distinct, and that the 
issue of what makes something have a given identity (in the 
sense of thisness) are questions of the latter, and not of the 
former, sort.  
The general point that should be kept in mind is that all the 
‘which is which’ questions I have considered above are 
questions as to which thisness a given entity has. Or, at least, 
they are as long as it is understood that a thing’s thisness need 
not be conceived as a literally existing property at all – a point 
I will make in the next chapter (§ 2.2).  
In what follows, it should then be intended that, unless 
otherwise indicated, when I use such phrases as ‘the identity 
of’ something I aim to refer to the thisness of that thing – that 
is, to that thing’s being the very entity it is.  
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A further point I have touched upon, but not thoroughly 
justified so far, is that given the entities of a certain category 
(the Ks), issues of cardinality about them – issues of how many 
Ks there are, in a certain domain or context – do not exhaust 
issues about their identity in the sense of thisness. But this will 
be most clearly appreciated by looking at some cases against 
primitive identities.  
 
1.3. A Case from Modern Physics  
 
This section and the next one will present two arguments that 
I take to be emblematic of the typical rationale behind anti-
Haecceitism. Each one of them faces us with what I take to be 
a genuine case of primitive identity concerning entities of a 
given kind and contends that such cases are for some relevant 
reason unacceptable. Interestingly enough, as will be clear 
shortly, the two arguments are respectively meant to motivate 
the acceptance of two very different forms of anti-Haecceitism. 
More precisely – and in line with the construal I am advocating 
– each one of them is presented as a reason to accept one of the 
two forms of anti-Haecceitism that I mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, that is, respectively: the view that the identity 
of the relevant entities is to be explained away in terms of their 
qualitative profiles, in one case, and the view that all 
fundamental facts are purely qualitative, in the other.  
First, there is an argument that is due, in the form I will 
consider, to Dasgupta. However, the case has its ancestry in 
other arguments that were discussed at length in the 
philosophy of physics at least since Schrödinger and, more 
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generally, in the wider context of a certain contention that has 
broadly empiricist roots.19  
Roughly, the idea is that facts of the matter that merely concern 
the identity of some entities lie beyond the limits of our 
knowledge, either in general or in the light of our best physical 
theories.  
In the case I will consider, in particular, the aim is to support 
what Dasgupta calls ‘Qualitativism’, and I shall call a form of 
anti-Haecceitism – i.e., the view that has it that all fundamental 
facts about material reality are purely qualitative. His 
contention to this end stems from the idea that the opposite 
view – ‘Individualism’ in his own terms – entails that some non-
qualitative (in his own terms, ‘individualistic’) facts fail to be 
grounded in the qualitative. And if this is the case – so the 
thought goes – then some aspects of reality turn out to be 
danglers: they are empirically undetectable and explanatorily 
redundant – in the light of physics from Newton Gravitational 
Theory (NGT) to this day.  
Consider, first, Dasgupta’s case to the effect that such 
differences are explanatorily redundant. We are asked to take 
into account “the following system”: 
 
[A] primitive individual called Peter is at an initial time t0 
propelled up in the air by a slingshot, only to fall by gravity 
back to Earth. And now consider a different system whose 
initial state at t0 differs only in the fact that a different 
primitive individual, Paul, is slung. By hypothesis, we are 	
19  Morganti (2008) emphasizes the influence of Russell’s Principle of 
Acquaintance on such an attitude. See Russell (1912): chapter 5.  
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to suppose that Peter and Paul have the same mass, 
shape, charge and so on. (…) [I]f the two systems both obey 
NGT, then Paul will make exactly the same trajectory 
through space as Peter. According to NGT, the identity of 
each particle makes no difference to how the slingshot or 
the Earth's gravitational field affect it. (…) [I]t is a 
straightforward consequence of NGT that mere differences 
in individualistic facts at an initial time do not give rise to 
differences in the future evolution of inter-particle 
distances or any other difference (…).20 
 
(The argument for the claim that primitive individuals are 
undetectable is more complicated, but the point I am about to 
make applies to it as well. In that case, Dasgupta asks us to 
consider a situation where there is an individual – e.g., a chair, 
in front of us, and to compare it with one where a numerically 
different chair is in front of us, but everything is exactly the 
same from a qualitative point of view. 21  Here, too, mere 
differences in the identity of entities are what is singled out as 
problematic – because, if the point goes through, empirically 
undetectable). 
 
The relevant details and, in particular, the notion of a ‘primitive 
individual’ will be discussed later on, when I directly engage 
with Dasgupta’s particular form of anti-Haecceitism.22 What is 
worth noting, for the present aim, is that what is said to be 
	
20 Dasgupta (2009): 41.  
21 See ibid.: 42.  
22 See in particular § 3.2, § 4.1, and § 4.2 below.   
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unacceptable, in the light of physics from NGT onward, is a case 
of what I shall call ‘haecceitistic difference’. That is, it is a case 
of difference merely as concerns which entities are involved in 
some given situations. In other words:  
 
Situation S1 and situation S2 differ haecceitistically =df 
S1 and S2 differ merely as concerns the identity of some of 
the entities they involve, respectively.   
 
Hence, whenever two situations S1 and S2 differ 
haecceitistically there are some entities x, x1, …, xn that are 
involved in S1 but not in S2, and there are some entities y, y1, 
…, yn  that are involved in S2 but not in S1 – and there is no 
further difference between S1 and 21. 
I take cases of haecceitistic difference to be but cases of 
primitive identity of a special sort.  
They are cases in which there is a fact of the matter as concerns 
which entities are involved in some given situation – and such 
a fact of the matter is, so to speak, a ‘contrastive’ one: there is 
a fact of the matter as to whether some given entities, as 
opposed to some other ones, are involved in some given 
situation.  
Also, such a fact of the matter is merely one with respect to 
such a difference in the identity of some entities. Hence, it 
cannot be said to rest on – because it is not even accompanied 
by – any further difference that may be characterized without 
mentioning the identity of any entity at all.  
In other words, nothing can play the role of a difference-maker 
for the difference at issue, because, apart from that very 
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difference, everything is exactly the same in the two situations 
that thus differ. (In the case advanced by Dasgupta, the two 
situations happen to be two physical systems).  
Therefore, a view that is motivated by appeal to such cases 
being unacceptable is a view that is motivated by appeal to what 
I am claiming to be the typical reason that moves some to anti-
Haecceitism.  
Now, Dasgupta’s argument is explicitly phrased in terms that 
appeal to the distinction between the qualitative and the non-
qualitative – in particular, inasmuch as such a distinction is 
thought to apply to facts. That is, cases of haecceitistic 
differences are singled out as unacceptable in the light of post-
Newtonian physics, and since such cases are characterized as 
cases of non-qualitative facts that are not grounded in 
qualitative ones, the argument against them is taken to be an 
argument for the idea that all facts are either qualitative or 
grounded in qualitative facts. Under the assumption that a 
fact’s being fundamental is tantamount to its being 
ungrounded (which Dasgupta himself implicitly accepts), this 
entails that no non-qualitative fact is fundamental.23 It may 
then strike as odd that I introduce the notions of primitive 
identities and of haecceitistic differences by considering, among 
other things, Dasgupta’s argument before duly characterizing 
that distinction.  
However, I think that this is the right way to proceed. That is, I 
think that we should understand what cases of primitive 
identity are in order to get clear on what we are trying to capture 	
23 I will say more on the available views about qualitative and non-qualitative 
facts – more precisely, about the grounding relations between them, in § 3.2.  
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with the ‘qualitative distinction’ as far as metaphysical 
Haecceitism is concerned. (I borrow the label ‘qualitative 
distinction’ from Sam Cowling, who uses it as applied to 
properties and relations. The label should be read as shorthand 
for ‘the qualitative versus non-qualitative distinction’).24  
To mention but a reason for this, I think that there is some 
circularity – or at best a petitio principii – in the way the point 
is usually cashed out. More precisely, the notion of 
primitiveness that is relevant for defining primitive identity is 
commonly phrased in terms of the qualitative distinction – as 
we shall see in detail below, the cases that are targeted are 
cases of non-qualitative aspects of reality that are primitive with 
respect to the qualitative. Alongside with this, the distinction is 
usually characterized in terms that crucially appeal to the 
entities of a certain category – i.e., to those entities that, it is 
assumed, are at least in principle apt to give rise to cases of 
primitive identity. Those entities are usually taken to be (all and 
only) individuals – as we shall see, Dasgupta’s approach is no 
exception.  
But such a move is – I will argue in due course – yet to be clearly 
motivated. And taking this whole approach may well be to put 
the cart before the horse, unless the question of which entities 
are apt to give rise to cases of primitive identity is faced before 
characterizing the qualitative distinction – and the notion of 
primitiveness here at issue – the way it has been so far.  
In other words, both the circularity and the petitio principii may 
be avoided, I suggest, if we reverse the order – that is, if we first 
	
24 See Cowling (2015).  
		 57 
get an understanding of what is wrong with cases of primitive 
identity by the anti-Haecceitist’s lights (without presupposing 
that some entities in particular as opposed to others are apt to 
give rise to such cases), and then define the qualitative 
distinction in such a way as to capture the point about that.  
 
1.4. A Case from God’s Will and the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason  
 
The second case for anti-Haecceitism I will consider is an 
argument for PII that was set forth by Leibniz in his 
correspondence with Clarke. The argument draws on the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) as applied to God’s will in 
creating the world – that is, in making a certain possible world 
actual. The underlying assumption is that since when God wills 
that a certain possible world be made actual She chooses that 
world that is the best among all possible ones, there must be a 
sufficient reason for God’s choosing a certain world over 
another – i.e., God’s will in creating the actual world must 
respect PSR.  
The point against indiscernibles is, in the context I am 
considering, presented by Leibniz as a step in a broader 
argument against the claim that space is absolute in the actual 
world. The idea is that if space were an absolute being – if it 
were a further existent with respect to its occupants, then there 
would be indiscernible individuals: points of space (when 
considered in themselves, independently from what occupies 
them) would be. But this would lead us to accept that God’s will 
violates PSR because – so Leibniz has it – if there actually were 
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indiscernible individuals then there would be worlds that are 
indiscernible from the actual one, and God would have had no 
sufficient reason for choosing between them, as She did choose 
when creating the actual world.  
It should be noted in passing that Leibniz does not state this 
part of his case in exactly these terms – but I side with the very 
neat reading of the argument in Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999) and, 
in particular, with the idea that, “[s]ince God’s objects of choice, 
when creating, are possible worlds,” the point may as well be 
restated “by saying that absolute space entails the existence of 
different worlds between which God could have no reason to 
choose”.25   
More precisely, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra Leibniz makes 
the point rest on the premise that for any world w1 containing 
indiscernible individuals there is a world w2 that is 
indiscernible from w1 and “spatially permuted” with respect to 
w1. Two worlds are spatially permuted, in this perspective, if 
and only if they “have exactly the same particulars and differ 
only as to their spatial positions”.26 This would be the idea 
behind Leibniz’s contention that points of space, if absolute and 
hence indiscernible, would conflict with PSR because:  
 
[I[t is impossible there should be a reason why God, 
preserving the same situations of bodies among 
themselves, should have placed them in space after one 
certain particular manner and not otherwise – why 
	
25 Rodriguez-Pereyra (1999): 431-432.  
26 Ibid.: 434.  
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everything was not placed the quite contrary way, for 
instance, by changing east into west. (L III, 5.)27 
 
And something similar goes, I argue, for claims such as the 
following:  
 
It is an indifferent thing to place three bodies, equal and 
perfectly alike, in any order whatsoever, and consequently 
they will never be placed in any order by him who does 
nothing without wisdom. But then, he being the author of 
things, no such things will be produced by him at all, and 
consequently there are no such things in nature. (L IV, 3)28 
 
For the relevant ‘indifferent options’ are options between which 
God would have no sufficient reason to choose. And possible 
worlds are the object of God’s choice. 
However, Rodriguez-Pereyra says, the premise at issue fails – it 
is not the case that, for any world w1, if w1 contains 
indiscernible individuals then there is a world w2 such that w1 
and w2 are indiscernible and spatially permuted. A world such 
as the one that was infamously depicted in Black (1952) 
contains two indiscernible spheres (and nothing else). However, 
if such spheres are mereologically simple and if space is relative 
(as it is in Black’s characterization) then there is no way to 
obtain an indiscernible and spatially permuted world by merely 
modifying the positions of the spheres.  
	
27  The present translation is from G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke: 
Correspondence, edited by Roger Ariew (2002): 15.  
28 Ibid.: 22.  
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For the positions of the spheres may be effectively modified only 
by modifying their spatial relations, which can be done, in turn, 
only by modifying the mutual distance between the spheres. (By 
simply switching the positions of the two spheres we would 
obtain one and the same world we have started with – wb1, 
henceforth). Yet a world containing two spheres that are more 
or less distant than the spheres in wb1 are is a world that is not 
indiscernible from wb1. And spatially permuted worlds, in order 
to conflict with PSR in the desired way, must be indiscernible 
from one another.  
There is actually something slightly paradoxical here: wb1 (as 
any variation on Black’s world) provides a violation of PII – the 
very principle Leibniz is defending. But the premise that space 
is relative (which is what Leibniz is ultimately arguing for in this 
context) would make Black’s world acceptable inasmuch as the 
dialectic of the present argument – so as it is presented at least 
– is concerned. For it would make that world be one that 
contains indiscernibles without conflicting with PSR in the way 
that is at issue here: even on the hypothesis that She have 
made wb1 actual, God would not have been forced to choose 
between wb1 itself and any world that is indiscernible yet 
spatially permuted with respect to it!  
Still, as Rodriguez-Pereyra rightly remarks, the problem for 
God’s will respecting PSR arises from there being worlds of any 
sort that are indiscernible from the actual one – whether or not 
those are also spatially permuted with respect to it. In the light 
of this, Rodriguez-Pereyra says, the notion that Leibniz should 
turn to in order to escape the counterexample is that of what 
he calls ‘alien-duplicated worlds’.  
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Any two worlds are alien-duplicated in case they are 
indiscernible but differ as to which individuals exist in them or, 
if they do not thus differ, they differ as to which individual has 
which property in them. For instance: supposing only spheres 
a and b exist in wb1, a world wb2 that is indiscernible from it 
but inhabited by spheres c and d instead (where c and d are, 
respectively, numerically different from both a and b) is an 
alien-duplicated world of wb1. Furthermore, a world w3 whose 
only denizens are a sphere a1 that is red and a sphere b1 that 
is blue – where a1 and b1 are otherwise indiscernible – and a 
world w4 that is indiscernible from w3 and also has a1 and b1 
as its only denizens but is such that a1 is blue and b1 is red in 
it, count as alien-duplicated as well.29  
It must be noted that there are technicalities here I am not 
taking into account – in particular, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s 
analysis does appeal to the qualitative distinction, but I once 
again ignored this detail since I have not yet duly characterized 
the distinction myself. I will also not focus on the fact that, if 
his argument is right, then the need to take into account alien-
duplicated worlds actually makes Leibniz’s own case fail.  
What is worth noting for the sake of my present purpose is that 
the cases that Leibniz presents as unacceptable in the light of 
PSR are yet further cases of haecceitistic differences – and the 
same goes for the cases that, if the argument considered is 
sound, he should instead consider. They are cases in which the 
options (i.e., the worlds) that God is faced with, and between 
which She must choose, differ merely as to:  	
29 Melia (2003): 61 presents an example of alien-duplicated worlds (without 
employing the label) in order to introduce the issue of modal Haecceitism.  
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a. which entities exist in them (this is the case for wb1 and 
wb2), or:  
b. which entities has which property (this is the case for w3 
and w4), or:  
c. which points of space are occupied by which entities (as 
in the conjecture of God’s being able to change East into 
West. Similarly for that of God’s having to arrange in 
some order – as opposed to others that are indiscernible 
from the one She does choose – three indiscernible 
particles).30 
 
Before proceeding to further points, a clarification is due. I 
proposed to call the ones that are targeted by such arguments 
as Leibniz’s and Dasgupta’s ‘cases of haecceitistic differences’. 
But the notion should not be mistaken for the one in terms of 
which David Lewis characterized the modal doctrines of 
Haecceitism and anti-Haecceitism.31 I will duly expound this 
point in Chapter 3. 
 
In the light of the two arguments for anti-Haecceitism 
considered above, it may now be more clearly appreciated in 
what sense the facts of the matter that are relevant as far as 
cases of primitive identity are concerned do not boil down to 
cardinality issues. For, in each case of haecceitistic difference 	
30 Yet it should be noted that the latter conjecture, as opposed to the former, 
would be unacceptable by Leibniz’s own lights even under the assumption 
that space is relative. For in this case the problem does not properly arise 
from the fact that space-points are taken to be indiscernible (because 
considered independently from their occupants), but from the fact that their 
occupants are taken to be.  
31 See Lewis (1986): 220-248.  
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such as the ones just seen, the difference – between systems, 
in Dasgupta’s argument, and between possible worlds, in 
Leibniz’s – has nothing to do with how many entities are 
involved in the situations at issue: the difference that is pointed 
out as problematic is one merely as to which entities are 
involved – respectively – in the situations one is comparing. So 
much so, that no difference at all in the number of entities 
involved is contemplated.32    
 
1.5. The Qualitative and the Non-Qualitative 
 
In the light of the considerations above, my approach towards 
the qualitative distinction may now be set forth.  
As a preliminary caveat, it should be kept in mind that my 
attitude towards the distinction is merely, so to speak, 
instrumental: I am interested in that particular distinction that 
I take to be relevant for defining the issue about metaphysical 
Haecceitism, and exclusively in that. Providing a 	
32 This may seem imprecise inasmuch as, in the case about alien duplicated 
worlds such as wb1 and wb2, views may differ as to how many entities there 
are – not in each world, respectively, but when entities in both wb1 and wb2 
are considered. More precisely, if one aims to reject alien duplicated worlds, 
then, when faced with the case at issue, one may argue that the things that 
exist in wb1 are numerically identical to the things that exist in wb2. If so, 
there would then be two entities in all, as opposed to four – as is assumed 
in the considerations above instead. Yet, first, this is not the sort of 
difference in cardinality that I am claiming not to arise here: my point is, 
rather, that no difference between how many things there are in wb1 and in 
wb2, respectively, is contemplated (this is crucial for Leibniz because, as I 
stressed above, possible worlds are the object of God’s choice). Second, the 
claim that in the predicament at issue there are only two entities is not 
consistent with Leibniz’s modal metaphysics (for he is famously taken to 
endorse a doctrine of world-bound individuals), nor is it the least desirable 
in the context of his case against indiscernibles: if wb1 and wb2 do not even 
differ as to which individuals they contain, then a fortiori, how could the 
Leibnizian God possibly choose between them without violating PSR?  
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characterization that can do justice to every way the term 
‘qualitative’ was used for further theoretical purposes (for 
instance, as employed in contrast to the notion of ‘quantitative’) 
is no part of my aims.  
Moreover, I will not get into the question whether a proper 
analysis of the distinction may be provided – what cannot be 
done, for instance, according to Cowling (2015).  Yet the 
distinction is crucial for the topic I am treating, and it is 
important that I give an idea of how I think it should be stated.  
Given what I have been saying so far – given, in particular, the 
way I characterized the anti-Haecceitist rationale in terms of 
primitive identities and of haecceitistic differences, it should be 
clear, at least approximately, what sort of distinction I have in 
mind. Roughly, the distinction would tell apart, among the 
items of some relevant class, those that involve the identity of 
some given entities (the non-qualitative)33 from those that do 
not (the qualitative).34 Usually, the class of properties or that of 
attributes (i.e., of properties and relations) is identified as the 
relevant one.  
 
Since, modulo a worry that I will focus on shortly, the 
distinction I have in mind is very close to the one adopted by 
Adams, I will start by introducing the latter.  
According to Adams, all those properties such that having them 
consists in being related in some way to a given individual in 
particular are non-qualitative; every other property is 
	
33 Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) for the notion of a ‘property of identity’. 
34 Some call the distinction I have in mind one between the pure and the 
impure; cf. Rosenkrantz (1979); Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006); Cowling (2015).  
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qualitative. So, for example, the property of having married 
twice an actress that got married eight times would be a 
qualitative one, while the property of having married Liz Taylor 
twice would be a non-qualitative one.  
There is a further attempt to the distinction that Adams 
considers, but does not pursue. The thought is that:  
 
[w]e might try to capture the idea by saying that a property 
is purely qualitative – a suchness – if and only if it could 
be expressed, in a language sufficiently rich, without the 
aid of such referential devices as proper names, proper 
adjectives and verbs (such as ‘Leibnizian’ and ‘pegasizes’), 
indexical expressions, and referential uses of definite 
descriptions.35  
 
There is an extensive literature on such attempts to draw the 
distinction in linguistic terms.  I will not get into the details of 
that debate here. 
As I said, I think that the first suggestion by Adams that I 
considered above is very close to the one I need. But I will need 
to make some amendments to that. I will now briefly consider 
them and suggest that, if we take the motivations behind them 
seriously, then there are reasons to think that the distinction 
would better be drawn as one that applies to predicates instead 
of properties or attributes. 36  However, since there are also 
	
35 Adams (1979): 7-8. Cf. Lewis (1986): 221 and Stalnaker (2012): Ch. 3 § 5 
and Appendix C.  
36 For the idea that PII should be formulated and discussed in terms of 
predicates, see Ayer (1954): Ch. 2.  
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reasons to be dissatisfied with a distinction that applies to 
predicates, I will also provide two alternatives to that.  
First, my aim is more general than Adams’s. While Adams 
investigated whether individuals have primitive, non-qualitative 
thisness, my query is into whether some entities do – with no 
particular focus on individuals as opposed to other things.37  
Relatedly, suppose that a thing, say, a, is not primitively 
individuated because for something to be a is for it be related 
in some way to n further things, say, b1, b2, …, bn, in such a 
way that a depends on b1, b2, …, and bn for its identity.38 If so, 
I contend, we may still wish to deny that for something to be a 
is for it to be qualitatively so and so – even supposing, mind, 
that b1, b2, …, bn are not themselves individuals but, say, 
properties.  
This may strike as surprising, but I argue that it is much less 
odd than it looks prima facie. For instance, if properties are 
tropes, then the claim that neither they nor the things they 
compose or pertain to – i.e., concrete particulars – are 
qualitatively individuated should not sound surprising at all. 
Many trope theories do hold that tropes are primitively 
individuated.39 If so, then it may well be the case that the 
identity of concrete particulars is determined by that of the 
tropes that compose them, but not by the qualitative profile of 
those tropes.  
	
37 I will duly define the notion of a thing’s having non-qualitative thisness in 
§ 2.1. For the sake of the present claims, the reader can rely on Adams’s 
characterization as mentioned in the Introduction and in § 1.4. 	
38 Cf. Introduction above.  
39 Cf. for instance Campbell (1990), Ehring (2011). For an overview, see 
Maurin (2016).  
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For if tropes are primitively individuated, then numerically 
different tropes may in principle be indiscernible from one 
another by being perfectly similar or by making the concrete 
particulars they compose perfectly similar under a given 
respect. Ditto for pluralities of tropes, which under the views at 
issue would be what provides concrete particulars with their 
qualitative profiles.  
I think that analogous considerations hold, mutatis mutandis, 
about theories of individuation via haecceities à la Scotus, and 
also about Aristotle’s thesis that an individual substance is 
individuated by its being composed of a given chunk of matter, 
in particular.40  
The point about trope theory also suggests a parallel: 
something very similar may be claimed even if universals, and 
not tropes, are what confers concrete particulars their 
qualitative profile – and possibly also what ‘composes’ them, as 
in a bundle theory. For as a matter of fact, it is far from clear 
that what is commonly taken to differentiate particulars (in this 
case, tropes) from universals – i.e., their spatiotemporal 
behaviour – would make for a sufficient difference in this 
regard.  
In the light of this, I think that not only the scope of (anti-
)Haecceitism, but also the qualitative distinction should be 
generalized: it should not be taken to be one that mandatorily 
appeals to individuals.  
A first attempt would consist in amending Adams’s definition 
as follows: all and only those properties such that having them 
	
40 More on this in § 2.3, § 3.3.2, and § 4.1 below. 
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consists in being related in some way to a given entity in 
particular are non-qualitative.  
But this faces us with an obvious problem: the definition may 
seem to trivialize the qualitative distinction by turning every 
property into a non-qualitative one. For virtually any property 
may be understood as a property of being related in a certain 
way to – i.e., by instantiating – a given entity, that is, a property, 
in turn. For example, the property of being wise may be 
construed as the relational property of instantiating wisdom – 
one that fulfils the definition just suggested. Yet the property of 
being wise, one would wish to say, is a paradigmatically 
qualitative one.  
Even worse, it seems that if, by adopting the definition, we take 
instantiating wisdom to be non-qualitative, albeit sticking to the 
idea that being wise is qualitative, we do not any more have the 
option of holding the property of being wise to be the property 
of instantiating wisdom. Yet the whole point of accepting such 
an entity as wisdom in one’s ontology, and to hold that such a 
thing may be instantiated, is exactly that this should allow one 
to explain what it is for something to be wise!  
Yet this problem is avoided if, as I suggest, the qualitative 
distinction is drawn at the level of predicates. For then the 
predicate ‘instantiates wisdom’ may be classified as non-
qualitative, and ‘is wise’ as qualitative, although the two are 
taken to refer to one and the same entity – i.e., wisdom.  
A further reason to draw the distinction at the level of 
predicates is the following. Given the qualitative distinction I 
am considering and given that thisnesses are understood as 
properties of being identical to a certain thing in particular, it 
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would seem that such properties would by default qualify as 
non-qualitative. For being identical to a certain thing is to be 
related in a certain way (i.e., via the identity relation) to that 
very thing.  
But this seems to beg the question against someone who may 
wish to argue that every thisness is a qualitative property 
instead. For instance, one may wish to claim that Richard 
Burton fails to have primitive identity not only because being 
so-and-so is what makes something be Richard Burton, but 
because being Richard Burton and being so-and-so are one and 
the same.  
The issue is raised by Adams, who ascribes to Leibniz the idea 
that thisnesses are nothing but complex suchnesses.41 He tries 
to solve the problem by characterizing basic suchnesses first, 
and by claiming that every property obtained by logical or 
epistemic operations out of basic suchnesses will itself be 
purely qualitative – a complex suchness.42  
However, the problem is as elegantly solved under my 
approach. For if the qualitative distinction is drawn at the level 
of predicates, we can take ‘is Richard Burton’ to be non-
qualitative and still hold that being Richard Burton and some 
appropriate, purely qualitative being so-and-so are one and the 
same entity – i.e., the same property.  
Finally, the choice of drawing the distinction at the level of 
predicates fits most naturally with my general approach – in 
particular, with my claim, which I will support in § 2.2, that the 	
41 Cf., e.g., § 8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics, where Leibniz refers to the 
purely qualitative complete individual concept of Alexander the Great as his 
haecceitas.  
42 Adams (1979): 8-9.  
		 70	
present issue should be phrased in terms that are compatible 
with nominalism about properties and relations.  
Here is a proposal for how to characterize the notion of non-
qualitativeness as applied to predicates:  
 
P is a non-qualitative predicate =df For some designators 
b1, b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary predicate R, the 
predicate P and the predicate R_, b1, …, bn are 
synonymous.  
 
Since it is understood that the distinction between the 
qualitative and the non-qualitative is mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive of the class it applies to, every predicate that 
is not non-qualitative in this sense will therefore count as a 
qualitative one.  
As I mentioned, however, one might well be dissatisfied with a 
qualitative distinction that applies to predicates – and, in 
particular, with the idea that two predicates can fall on different 
sides of the distinction although standing for the same property 
or feature. For this might seem to deprive the qualitative 
distinction itself of its metaphysical significance.  
Moreover, one might contend that there may be more ways for 
things to be than are expressed in our language, or in any 
language.43 Here is then an alternative in terms of properties:  
 
	
43 See Stalnaker (2012), Appendix C, for an attempt to develop “a mighty 
language” that would provide all the needed tools for exhaustively defining 
the qualitative distinction.  
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P is a non-qualitative property =df  For some things b1, 
b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary relation R, the property 
lx Px is identical to the property lx R(x, b1, …, bn).  
 
Under this alternative, some problems I mentioned above 
threaten: instantiating wisdom would seem to count as non-
qualitative, and so would all thisnesses.  
However, one may solve the latter issue by taking this definition 
to capture basic non-qualitative properties alone, and then 
follow Adams’s strategy in allowing that thisnesses may be 
qualitative properties – albeit not basic ones.  
And there are presumably ways to take care of the former worry 
too. Although seemingly ad hoc, one would be to exclude that 
the n+1-ary relation R in question may be instantiation. A 
further one may be to argue that instantiating wisdom does not 
count as non-qualitative anyway inasmuch as wisdom is taken 
to be a universal – i.e., not a thing of the sort we would refer to 
by means of an individual constant.44  
Moreover, I do think that even the property of being wise might 
be construed in such a way as to make it count as non-
qualitative for the sake of the present debate.  
Suppose, for instance, that being wise is the same property as 
agreeing with the wisest man on everything – where a is the 
wisest man.  
Suppose, now, at a subsequent time a is not the wisest man 
anymore: b is.  
	
44 Cf. the form of nominalism defended in Goodman (1956).  
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I ask: is the property of being wise still the same as the property 
of agreeing with a on everything? Or is it the property of 
agreeing with b now? If the latter is the case, then being wise is 
qualitative indeed. But if the former is the case, I argue that 
being wise should count as non-qualitative for the sake of the 
present debate.  
For if the former is the case, then the claim that being wise is 
what makes something be c commits to the idea that c’s identity 
depends on the identity of a. In effect, c is the thing it is by 
virtue of agreeing on everything with a – not just with any thing 
that happens to be the wisest man. If a is not the wisest man 
anymore, agreeing with the (new) wisest man does not make 
one wise anymore – and it is not a sufficient condition for 
making one identical to c.  
To make a more general point, let us assume that being wise is 
qualitative. The idea that this being so, instantiating wisdom 
must also be qualitative rests on several assumption. Among 
them, I argue, is the idea that there is exactly one thing that is 
wisdom and that every wise thing instantiates that one thing – 
so that issues like the one about the once wisest man a and the 
now wisest man b above cannot possibly arise. But this is 
hardly mandatory. If there were indiscernible universals, it 
might be that Abram instantiates one universal of wisdom while 
King Solomon instantiates a numerically different one.  
And while the notion of indiscernible universals might seem 
exotic, this is exactly what happens, mutatis mutandis, 
according to trope theories.   
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In view of this, and for further reasons I will expound in § 2.1, 
I take it that a qualitative distinction that does suit my present 
aims must be hyperintensional.45   
 
Two further worries should be considered before moving on.  
First, a problem may seem to stand still with such expressions 
as ‘Leibnizian’ or ‘pegasizes’, which do not clearly count as non-
qualitative predicates according to my definition, and yet are 
commonly taken to stand for paradigmatically non-qualitative 
properties. In this concern, my approach will have to count on 
the idea that whenever an expression of this sort does stand for 
some non-qualitative way for something to be, it is indeed 
synonymous with a predicate of the form ‘R _, b1, b2, …, bn’, for 
some n+1-ary predicate R and some designators b1, b2, …, bn.  
For instance, ‘is Leibnizian’ will count as non-qualitative 
inasmuch as it is understood as synonymous with, e.g., ‘was 
first thought by Leibniz’ or some other predicate that something 
satisfies if and only if it is related some way or another to 
Leibniz. By contrast, one may doubt that ‘pegasizes’ should 
count as non-qualitative because there is no such thing as 
Pegasus to be related to. Unless perhaps ‘pegasizes’ is 
synonymous with a predicate such as ‘is called Pegasus’ and 
being called ‘Pegasus’ is a way to be related to the very name-
type ‘Pegasus’. I leave the option open that someone who holds 
this to be the case may wish to count ‘is called ‘Pegasus’’ as 
non-qualitative after all.  
	
45 See also Hoffmann-Kolss (forthcoming).  
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Second, one may argue that if stating the distinction at the level 
of predicates is a problematic move, then it is not true that the 
debate about Haecceitism may be phrased in nominalistic-
friendly terms after all.  
But there may be other strategies. For instance, although I will 
not explore the proposal in detail here, one may appeal to a 
primitive notion of resemblance so as it is employed in 
developing resemblance nominalism.46  
A further proposal employs second-order non-committal 
notions as per the approach set forth in Rayo and Yablo (2001) 
in order to introduce a nominalistic-friendly qualitative 
distinction that does not apply to predicates.  
An example is the following.  
 
P is a non-qualitative way for something to be (or, 
formally: FP, where ‘F’ is an operator that takes a 
predicate to form a sentence) =df  For some things b1, b2, 
…, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary R, P @ is R-related to b1, b2, 
…, bn (in this order).  
 
In the definition above:  
- ‘R’ is a second-order variable;  
- ‘F’ is a third-order operator;  
- ‘for some n+1-ary R’ is a second-order quantifier that 
must be read as non-objectual. As a result, ‘R’ need not 
stand for an entity at all;  	
46 See, in particular, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002). The idea that something, 
say, a, has primitive thisness may then presumably be stated, for instance, 
as the claim that it is not the case that for something to be a is for it to 
exactly resemble a. Cf. § 2.1, § 2.4 below.  
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- ‘P’ is a second-order predicate that also expresses a way 
for something to be without standing for a literally 
existing entity at all;  
- ‘@’ is an equivalence operator that takes a pair of 
predicates to make a sentence. The intuitive meaning of 
‘F @ G’ is that ‘F’ and ‘G’ express the same way for 
something to be.  
 
While the equivalence operator ‘@’ expresses something like 
identity between ways for something to be, it does not express 
identity between any two things – for predicates do not stand 
for existing things under the present approach at all.  
This might strike as odd, but I think that some familiar 
metaphysical theories do rely on a similar notion as well. For 
instance, consider the view that there are tropes and that there 
are no universals. Consider two tropes of redness, Red1 and 
Red2. Red1 is instantiated by this hat while Red2 is instantiated 
by that shirt. (Let me ignore, for the sake of simplicity, how 
exactly the instantiation of tropes is to be conceived). If the hat 
and the shirt are of exactly the same shade of red, then Red1 
and Red2 are such that the things that instantiate them are the 
same way under a certain respect. Using a second-order non-
objectual quantifier, we could then say that there is a way for 
something to be such that the hat is that way because it 
instantiates Red1, and the shirt is that way because it 
instantiates Red2. In quite the same sense, the definition above 
appeals to the notion of a way for something to be such that 
two different predicates might express it.  
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Now, absent further qualifications, this would also count all 
thisnesses as non-qualitative. However:   
1. it counts being wise as a qualitative way for something to 
be (for of course there is no room for the notion of 
instantiation under a nominalistic reading of second-
order notions), which at least under a traditional view of 
such a feature is desirable;  
2. it seems that it would give the right result with cases 
such as being Leibnizian as well. For instance, suppose 
for that ‘is Leibnizian’ expresses the same as ‘was first 
thought by Leibniz’. Being Leibnizian would then rightly 
count as a non-qualitative way for something to be. 
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Chapter 2 
Identity as Thisness  
 
I singled out the aim to rule out cases of primitive identity as 
the main rationale for anti-Haecceitism. As anticipated, diverse 
views have been supported by appeal to such a rationale. In 
this chapter, I will lay out two desiderata that an anti-
Haecceitistic metaphysics may or may not satisfy. I will also 
argue that forms of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks that satisfy 
both desiderata are committed to the claim that no K has non-
qualitative thisness, and duly define such a notion (§ 2.1). I will 
then contend that the notion of non-qualitative thisness, and 
the present debate more generally, may well be stated in terms 
that are compatible with nominalism – i.e., with the view that 
there are no such things as properties or relations (§ 2.2). In 
particular, I will argue that claiming that a thing has non-
qualitative thisness is not to claim that such a thing has a 
haecceitas as per the view that is traditionally ascribed to John 
Duns Scotus (§ 2.3). Finally, I will introduce the notion of 
strongly primitive thisness (§ 2.4). While the claim that a thing 
has strongly primitive thisness entails that such a thing has 
non-qualitative thisness, the converse entailment, I will argue, 
does not hold.  
 
2.1. Cases of Primitive Identity and Things with Primitive 
Identity. Non-Qualitative Thisness 
 
As I said, the aim that is common to arguments for anti-
Haecceitism such as the two I considered in Chapter 1 and to 
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others along the same lines is that of excluding cases of 
haecceitistic differences and of primitive identity more 
generally.  
Yet as I already emphasized, significantly diverse versions of 
anti-Haecceitism have been defended in the light of such 
arguments – depending on which strategy one is to take as a 
means to rule out the targeted cases.  
In particular, Leibniz takes the violation of PSR that 
haecceitistic differences would give rise to as reason to defend 
PII – as applied to both worlds and individuals. By contrast, 
Dasgupta is eager to declare that the version of anti-
Haecceitism he defends – i.e., Algebraic Generalism – is not 
committed to PII and, in particular, that it can embed such 
possibilities as that of a world where nothing exists but two 
perfectly indiscernible individual objects, just as the one 
described in Black (1952).47  
More precisely, a stronger commitment to PII is part and parcel 
of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics – at least as it was presented 
in the Discourse on Metaphysics and in the correspondence 
with Arnauld. The idea would be not only that PII must hold as 
a general truth – that no world can be inhabited by numerically 
distinct individuals that are perfectly alike – but also that every 
instance of PII is true because, given an individual, a, a’s 
qualitative profile is such that nothing but a actually or 
possibly has that very qualitative profile, and that the same is 
	
47 See Dasgupta (2009): 47-50; (2014): 7; (2017): § 3.  
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true about every possible individual and its own qualitative 
profile.48  
This particular aspect of Leibniz’s commitment to PII does not 
follow from the argument I considered in the previous section. 
Leibniz argues for it, rather, from his theory of truth as 
containment and from his particular conception of what 
individuals – i.e., individual substances – are. Both lines of 
reasoning are set forth in the Discourse and further supported 
in the letters to Arnauld.  
More precisely, the complete individual concept that is 
associated with each individual substance conveys – at least 
under a widely accepted interpretation of Leibniz’s thought – an 
individual essence of the individual in question.49 If the relevant 
interpretation is sound, then Leibniz’s view is committed to 
anti-Haecceitism exactly in the sense I aim to single out and 
argue against: he is someone who holds, about the entities of a 
certain category (i.e., about individual substances) that each 
one of them has a purely qualitative individual essence.50  
But I will not presently attempt to support that interpretation, 
nor (yet) to cast doubts on such a form of anti-Haecceitism. 
	
48  The version of PII that Leibniz seems to have defended itself is also 
stronger than the one I just mentioned in the main text. In Rodriguez 
Pereyra’s words, “[t]he texts suggest that for Leibniz there cannot be two 
intrinsically perfectly similar things”, and since for him “quantitative 
differences are extrinsic differences”, this would entail “that no two things 
can differ in size alone”. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2014): 29, italics mine.  
49 See, for instance, Cover and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999); Di Bella (2005); 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). The point seems to be implicit also in Adams 
(1979) and Adams (1981).  
50 But see O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (1996) for how diverse strands of 
Leibniz’s thought – including his essentialism – relate to modal Haecceitism 
as defined in Kaplan (1975). See also Mondadori (1973) for the idea that 
Leibniz’s doctrine of complete individual concepts anticipates Lewis’s 
counterpart theory in significant respects.  
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Rather, I aim to remark that if the construal of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics I just mentioned is correct, then such a view is a 
form of anti-Haecceitism, also, exactly of the sort that Adams 
has in mind in the passages I have quoted in the Introduction. 
So much so, that Adams presents Leibniz as “the archetypal 
believer in a purely qualitative world” in the sense that he takes 
him to hold that each thisness is a complex suchness – that is, 
a purely qualitative property.  
To recall some more terminology from the Introduction, if 
Adams is right then Leibniz’s metaphysics has it that, given an 
arbitrary individual, for something to be identical to that very 
individual is for it to be qualitatively a certain way – i.e., it is for 
it to have a certain qualitative individual essence: the one that 
is conveyed by that individual’s complete individual concept.51  
By contrast, the same cannot be said about the form of anti-
Haecceitism that Dasgupta advocates. In this concern, I will 
now introduce two desiderata that a form of anti-Haecceitism – 
in the neutral sense of a view that endorses some given 
metaphysical claims in order to exclude cases of primitive 
identity – may or may not satisfy.  
I will call the first ‘identity-explanation’. Roughly, a form of anti-
Haecceitism fulfils such a requirement if and only if it gets rid 
of every case of primitive identity concerning the entities of a 
given kind (say, the Ks) by providing, also, a principle of 
individuation for all the Ks involved in a given situation.52 As a 
result, no fact as to which Ks are involved in a given situation 
fails to be determined by some further facts of the matter. Very 	
51 For more on the notion of an individual essence, see § 3.3 below.  
52 See § 1.2 above for the relevant notion of individuation.  
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roughly, this is because a situation involves some given Ks in 
particular precisely by involving those Ks that are so-and-so 
(where their being so-and-so is what makes them be the very 
things of their kind they are).  
As regrettably unrefined as this characterization is, there is no 
easy way to provide a clearer one without presupposing the 
second desideratum I shall set forth. I call this further 
requirement ‘distributiveness’. In a nutshell, distributiveness 
requires that cases of primitive identity are altogether excluded 
because each one of them is. No ‘which is which’-question is 
then left unanswered because each and every fact as to which 
entity is involved in a given situation can be made to rest on 
some further fact of the matter.  
In a view that satisfies both desiderata, each ‘which is which’-
question concerning some K is settled by the qualitative 
because each and every K is such that for something to be that 
very K is for it to have some qualitative profile. In other words, 
under such a view, for a given K – say, a – to be involved in a 
situation is for a thing that is F to be involved in that situation. 
The reason for this is that for something to be a is for it to be 
F, where being F conveys part of a’s qualitative profile. The 
same holds, mutatis mutandis, for each and every one of the Ks. 
If the interpretations of Leibniz I follow are right, then this is 
the case in his metaphysics – at least when the Ks are taken to 
be the individual substances.  
By contrast, if distributiveness alone is satisfied, then 
something about the qualitative reality always determines 
which Ks are involved in any given situation, but it may not be 
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the case that the Ks at issue are, by the same token, 
individuated by some purely qualitative means.  
We may then state the requirement set forth by distributiveness 
as follows:  
 
Distributiveness. There are no cases of primitive identity 
involving some Ks because each and every ‘which is 
which’-issue concerning a K is settled by the qualitative 
reality. Hence, not only all cases of primitive identity are 
excluded: they are excluded one by one – i.e., each one of 
them is.    
 
Finally, if identity-explanation is fulfilled, but distributiveness 
is not, the view in question is one that gets rid of all cases of 
primitive identity concerning the Ks by providing a qualitative 
principle of individuation for all of the Ks – but not for each one 
of them, or, which is the same, not for all of them one by one.  
Doubts may be raised as to whether this can as a matter of fact 
be done – as to whether, that is, some entities may be 
individuated as a plurality even if it is not the case that each 
one of them is individuated itself. I will not attempt to assess 
such a point here, although I will have to get back to it later on.  
We may define the requirement that identity-explanation (as 
considered independently, at least in principle, from 
distributiveness) faces us with as follows:  
 
Identity-explanation. There are no cases of primitive 
identity involving some Ks because the Ks are individuated 
by the way they are, qualitatively. As a result, a situation’s 
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involving some Ks in particular is always a matter of how 
the Ks involved in that situation qualitatively are. That is 
why ‘which is which’-issues concerning the Ks are always 
settled by the qualitative reality.   
 
Now, in slightly different terms, we may also say that a form of 
anti-Haecceitism that fulfils the two desiderata above does not 
merely exclude every case of primitive identity involving the Ks, 
but also denies that any of the Ks has primitive identity. That 
is, such a view also has it that no K has primitive thisness. (As 
will be clear shortly, ‘primitive’ here should be read as short for 
‘primitive with respect to the qualitative’). 
A given thing, b, has primitive thisness, in this sense, if and 
only it is not the case that for something, x, to be identical to b 
is for it to be G – for some qualitative G.  
 
To see why ruling it out that some entities may have primitive 
thisness in this sense is also to exclude that there may be cases 
of primitive identity, consider the following.  
The anti-Haecceitist has a problem with those facts of the 
matter that may be described as follows:  
 
i. a Fs; 
 
(Where a is a certain entity in particular, say: Richard 
Burton, and for a to F is for it, as opposed to any other 
entity, to be involved in a given situation – say, to be 
slung by a slingshot, as in Dasgupta’s case, or to exist 
in a given possible world, as in Leibniz’s).  
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More precisely, the anti-Haecceitist aims to claim that all such 
facts of the matter as the one described by i. may be made to 
rest on some further facts of the matter. Now, arguably, the 
situation described by i. is also one we may describe as: 
 
ii. the thing that is identical to a Fs 
 
But if a does not have primitive thisness, then there is some 
qualitative G such that for something to be identical to a is for 
it to G. Hence, the fact of the matter we described by i. and by 
ii. may be made to rest on a further one to the effect that:  
 
iii. the thing that Gs Fs.  
 
The anti-Haecceitist will then need to hold that the fact of the 
matter described in i. is determined by the one described in iii. 
– again, in a sense that will have to be duly characterized – and 
that the same holds, mutatis mutandis, in any predicament of 
the same sort. Or, she may be an eliminativist about thisness 
and which-issues altogether, and contend that in any such case 
the relevant fact of the matter that may be described along the 
lines of i. or ii. is nothing but a fact of the matter of the same 
sort as iii. is. If Adams is right about Leibniz – if Leibniz is 
someone who takes thisnesses to be complex suchnesses, then 
presumably he could have, at least in principle, delivered a 
claim along these lines.   
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We may define what it is for something to have primitive 
thisness by making appeal to properties as follows:  
 
a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisness* =df it is 
not the case that there is some qualitative property F such 
that for something to be a is for it to have F. 
 
However, since I want my framework of the debate to be 
nominalistic-friendly, this cannot be my own take on the 
notion. Hence, my official approach will assume the following 
definition instead:  
 
a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisness =df it is 
not the case that $F such that Q(F) and for something x to 
be a is for it to be the case that Fx.  
 
In the definition above, ‘F’ is a second-order variable and Q is a 
third-order condition that captures qualitativeness. As in the 
last qualitative distinction I proposed in § 1.5, the second-order 
quantifier must be read as non-objectual and the second-order 
predicate it binds must be read as expressing a ‘way for things 
to be’ without standing for a literally existent entity; see Rayo 
and Yablo (2001).   
Roughly, the definition would read as follows: a has primitive, 
non-qualitative thisness iffdf there is no qualitative way F for 
something to be such that for something x to be a is for it to be 
the case that x is F.  
One might even propose a definition in terms of predicates as 
follows:  
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a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisnesspred. =df it 
is not the case that for something to be a is for it to satisfy 
‘F’, where ‘F’ is a qualitative predicate.   
 
However, this would seem to undercut the link between the 
notion of thisness and that of individuation. For indeed, few are 
likely to maintain that a thing is individuated by its satisfying 
some predicate.   
  
The reason why I maintain that the qualitative distinction must 
be hyperintensional may now be appreciated by way of an 
example. Being identical to the number 2 should count as non-
qualitative, while being the smallest natural even number 
should count as qualitative, under my approach. Indeed, I do 
hold that since for something to be identical to the number 2 is 
for it to be the smallest natural even number, the number 2 (if 
such thing there be) does not have primitive thisness. The same 
conclusion cannot be reached by claiming that for something 
to be identical to the number 2 is for it to be identical to the 
number 2. 
 
As for the two desiderata considered above, it should by now be 
clear that a form of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks that aims at 
fulfilling both should commit to the claim that no K has non-
qualitative thisness. As will be clear in due course, various 
forms of anti-Haecceitism may be classified with respect to 
whether or not they engage with either desideratum.  
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As a matter of fact, some anti-Haecceitists have attempted to 
exclude cases of primitive identity while sidestepping issues of 
primitive thisness altogether – exactly by refusing to satisfy one 
or both desiderata. Since my main case against anti-
Haecceitism properly targets those forms of the view that hold 
that no K has primitive thisness, proving such attempts 
unsuccessful will be play a crucial role in my argumentation.    
 
2.2. Nominalism  
 
As I already mentioned, when I talk of a thing’s thisness this 
should not be taken to mandatorily stand for a property in an 
ontologically committing sense.  
More generally, I take there to be no reason why a nominalist 
about properties should not be eligible to take part in the 
present debate – which, I will be arguing, must be stated in 
terms that do appeal to the notion of primitive thisness.53 
By ‘nominalism’, here, I mean any view that holds that there 
are no such things as properties or relations. A nominalist in 
my sense is then someone who denies not only that there are 
universals, but also that there are tropes.54 
Indeed, I contend, one may deny there to be any literally 
existing property of being identical to a certain thing in 
particular – and any literally existing property whatsoever, for 
that matter! Still, as long as a certain entity – say, Richard 
Burton – is admitted as part of one’s ontology and is taken to 
be a possible value of an individual variable, and a possible 	
53 Cf. Chapter 4 below.  
54 See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2016) for an overview.  
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referent of an individual constant, in first-order logic with 
identity, one would want to be able to meaningfully say such 
things as ‘there is something that is identical to Richard Burton’ 
or, which is the same, ‘something is Richard Burton’. And one 
may at that point end up wondering whether such a truth and 
others of the same sort are among the ultimate, most basic ones 
about reality – again, even if one is not taking being Richard 
Burton to be a property in any ontologically committing sense. 
I take the rationale for anti-Haecceitism that I introduced in the 
previous chapter to be incompatible with the claim that they 
are.  
Relatedly, it should be kept in mind that under my approach 
the question whether a certain entity is Richard Burton and the 
question whether that same entity has the thisness of Richard 
Burton are one and the same. For the question whether a 
certain entity is Richard Burton is indeed the question whether 
that entity has the thisness of Richard Burton inasmuch as it 
is duly appreciated that for something to have a certain 
thisness simply is for something to be identical with a given 
thing – whether or not thus being is to be construed as a 
property in a substantive sense at all.  
 
That thisnesses need not be existing properties was also 
remarked by Adams:  
 
It may be controversial to speak of a ‘property’ of being 
identical with me. I want the word ‘property’ to carry as 
light a metaphysical load here as possible. (…) We could 
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probably conduct our investigation, in somewhat different 
terms, without referring to thisnesses as properties (…).55 
 
Part of my aim in this dissertation is that of both vindicating 
Adams’s purpose in formulating his contention about primitive 
thisness and providing a phrasing of that same investigation 
that does not refer to thisnesses as properties. However, Adams 
seems to think that a substantive notion of a qualitative 
property is still needed in order to make sense of the debate 
about metaphysical Haecceitism. I, by contrast, attempt to 
phrase the whole point in terms that are ‘nominalistic-friendly’ 
– as concerns, so to speak, both the qualitative and the non-
qualitative. 
I see no reason, indeed, why a nominalistic-friendly notion of a 
qualitative feature should not be assumed for the sake of the 
present debate. As a matter of fact, I already provided two in § 
1.5 above.  
More generally, a nominalist need not be someone who denies 
that things come with a qualitative profile. She just needs to 
account for things’ having a qualitative profile without 
appealing to the idea, which she rejects, that they do by having 
certain qualitative properties or by standing in certain 
qualitative relations. If she can do so, she can also accept, in 
principle, either of the following claims:  
 
1. there is at least one possible thing that has primitive 
thisness. Supposing this thing is a, this means that for 
	
55 Adams (1979): 7.  
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no qualitative way to be, for something to be a is for it to 
be that way;  
2. claim 1. is false: no possible thing has primitive thisness.  
 
As can be seen from what I said in § 2.1, the latter claim would 
entail that no case of haecceitistic difference can possibly arise 
– given the framework I am working with, it then counts as a 
form of anti-Haecceitism. The former claim, as will be clear in 
due course, contradicts a certain form of anti-Haecceitism and 
counts as a form of Haecceitism. Hence, both positions are in 
principle compatible with nominalism about properties and 
relations.  
  
An analogous remark should be made as concerns a 
metaphysically committing fact-talk being unneeded in stating 
the present issue. I will say more on this in Chapter 4 and in 
Chapter 6. However, it may already be appreciated that since 
claim 2. above rules it out that any case of haecceitistic 
difference can possibly arise, it also does justice to the rationale 
for anti-Haecceitism without prima facie committing to an 
ontology of facts at all.  
 
2.3. Haecceity and Thisness  
 
As I said, at least some forms of anti-Haecceitism – that is, 
those that get rid of every case of primitive identity concerning 
the Ks by respecting both identity-explanation and 
distributiveness – must commit one to the claim that no K has 
non-qualitative thisness. Forms of Haecceitism that oppose 
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such views will then endorse the claim that at least some K does 
have non-qualitative thisness. 
Now, although ‘thisness’ is a literal translation of the Latin 
‘haecceitas’ (a term that is commonly ascribed to John Duns 
Scotus), it is crucial that the two notions be kept duly 
distinguished.56  
As a matter of fact, it should go by itself, from what I said in the 
previous section, that an entity having non-qualitative thisness 
is not the same as that very same entity having a haecceitas so 
as Scotus (and others) have characterized the concept.57 For, 
as is well known, a Scotusian haecceitas must be a property in 
a robust sense. So much so, that in order to make full sense of 
a theory of individuation through haecceitates as per Scotus’s 
original suggestion, a form of extreme realism will have to be 
endorsed at least as concerns haecceitates themselves.58  
Still the point is worth focusing on in some detail, not only for 
historical reasons (the debate about Haecceitism does have its 
roots, after all, in the one concerning the notion notoriously 
ascribed to Scotus), but also for theoretical ones. The fact that 	
56 Some protest that the notion of a haecceitas, if not the term, is actually 
due to Boethius – not to Scotus. See, for instance, Plantinga (1976): 149; 
(1978). I will not get into such a philological issue here.  
57 I take both Alvin Plantinga and Gary S. Rosenkrantz to closely follow 
Scotus in their construal and use of the notion of a haecceity – at least in 
all the respects that are relevant for the present debate. More on this in due 
course.  
58 Consistently with this, Gary Rosenkrantz argued at length that we should 
accept a form of extreme realism about properties because such a view is 
entailed by the acceptance of haecceitates as literally existing entities that 
individuate their bearers, and haecceitates of this sort are required by the 
best theory of individuation for particulars one may provide. See 
Rosenkrantz (1993): x; 53-54; 88-89; 132; 138; 148-149.  For analyses of 
the problem of individuation so as it was construed and assessed by Scotus, 
see, among others, Park (1988); (1990); Bates (2010): 86-125; Cross (2014). 
Cf. also Noone (2003); King (2005).  
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many still tend to identify Haecceitism with a view that posits 
haecceitates, and are consequently led to reject it, broadly, by 
their commitment to Ockham’s razor, strikes me as a sign that 
a lot of theoretical work is needed in order to get clear on what 
Haecceitism authentically is up to – and, in particular, on why 
its main tenet is not the acceptance of haecceitates.59 Moreover, 
even if Adams’s notion of a thisness were to be understood as a 
genuine property, such a concept would still be crucially 
different from the one of a haecceitas originally endorsed by 
Scotus – and so would be the resulting two theories of 
individuation.60  
The difference is, in a nutshell, the following. The haecceitas, h, 
of an entity, a, is supposed to individuate a in the sense that if 
a has h as its haecceitas then a will depend for its identity on 
the identity of h.61 But it would be deeply misguided to think 
that the same holds for an entity and its thisness under my 
construal of the notion – which I take, in this respect, to mirror 
Adams’s.  
Adams explains the point in detail in the 1981 paper Actualism 
and Thisness, where he defends, together with his own concept 
of a thisness, what he calls ‘Serious Actualism’. Serious 	
59 Morganti (2013): Ch. 3 makes this point in the context of the debate about 
the identity and individuality of quantum entities – although he uses 
‘thisness’ as synonymous with ‘haecceitas’, while I take the former to convey 
the nominalistic friendly notion (roughly, the one that Morganti ascribes to 
William of Ockham, and that he himself accepts), and only the latter to stand 
for a literally existing property responsible for individuation. Roughly the 
same idea, as applied to the debate about Quidditism, is vindicated in Locke 
(2012).  
60 For a view that takes thisnesses to be literally existing properties and 
attempts to duly characterize the metaphysics of thisness instantiation, see 
Diekemper (2015).  
61 For the notion of identity-dependence, see Tahko and Lowe (2016): § 4.2. 
Cf. Correia (2005); (2008).  
		 93 
Actualism holds, among other things, that “all possibilities are 
purely qualitative except insofar as they involve individuals that 
actually exist”.62 Adams’s target was, in this context, the form 
of Actualism defended by Alvin Plantinga in the paper Actualism 
and Possible Worlds – in particular, the idea that “there are all 
the possibilities de re there could have been” because “while 
there are not all the individuals there could possibly have been, 
there are essences of all the individuals there could possibly 
have been”.63 The term ‘essences’ should be understood, here, 
as short for ‘individual essences’ – where an individual essence 
of a thing (say, of Richard Burton) is a property that is both 
“essential to him and essentially unique to him”, so that “there 
is no possible world in which there exists something distinct 
from him that has it”.64  
Every haecceity of something clearly is an individual essence in 
that sense. 65  And, if worries concerning the commitment 
conveyed by property-talk are set aside, every thisness of 
something is as well. This is the case both under Adams’s 
conception and my own.  
Yet both Adams and I reject the idea that thisnesses may be 
“non-qualitative entities (…) which could exist without the 
individuals whose thisnesses they are”.66 For if thisnesses are 
thus conceived, then “I depend on my thisness in a way that it 
does not depend on me; for certainly I could not have existed 
	
62 Adams (1981): 3.   
63 Ibid.  
64 Plantinga (1976): 149.  
65 However, for a defence of the idea that haecceities are not essential to 
their bearers, see Denby (2014).  
66 Adams (1981): 12.  
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without it” – that is, without being the very entity I am.67 But 
“to be the property of being identical with a particular individual 
is to stand, primitively, in a unique relation with that 
individual”.68 And “[t]he relation between an individual and its 
thisness is essential to both of them”.69  
Under this construal, I could not possibly have existed had my 
thisness not existed but, also, my thisnesses could not possibly 
have existed had I not existed, in turn. For, had I not existed, 
my thisness could not have stood in any relation with me. 
Hence, it could not have been my thisness. Hence, it could not 
have been simpliciter.  
 
(This is why Adams is led by his endorsement of Actualism to 
the claim that “there are not thisnesses of individuals that 
never actually exist – although of course there could have been 
other individuals than those that there are, and if they had 
existed they would have had thisnesses”.70 Such a truth is also 
taken to be a necessary one: “in no possible world would there 
be thisnesses of individuals that do not exist in that world”).71  
 
The point is that, under this perspective, a thisness is taken to 
have its existence parasitically on the thing it is the thisness 
of.72  
	
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.: 11.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.: 4-5.  
71 Ibid.: 5.  
72 Cf. ibid., 10: “God can create a woman of such and such a qualitative 
character. And when He has done so, she is an individual and has a 
thisness, which is the property of being her; and there may be non-
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Hence, under a traditional approach to individuation at least, 
it cannot be the case that every thing is individuated by virtue 
of having the thisness it has. For under such an approach, in 
order for, say, Richard Burton to be individuated by his 
thisness – in order for RB’s thisness to be an individuator of 
RB’s – it should be the case that RB depends for his identity on 
his own thisness. That is, it should be the case that which 
thisness in particular RB’s thisness is metaphysically 
determines which entity of his kind RB is. But this cannot be 
the case if identity-dependence (the relation that holds between 
a thing and its individuators) is supposed to be 
antisymmetrical, so that “no two distinct things can be each 
other’s individuators”. 73  And Adams is very explicit in 
emphasizing that there is no such asymmetry in the case of a 
thing and its thisness.  
As far as existential dependence is concerned at least, he has it 
that (e.g.) my thisness depends on me no less than I depend on 
it – for none of us could have existed without the other. If 
anything, one may argue that my thisness depends on me in 
ways I do not depend on it, for:  
 
a. as mentioned above, given a thing and its thisness, the 
existence of the latter is taken by Adams to be parasitic 
on the actual existence of the former; 
b. Adams mentions two ways in which a thisness – as a 
property – may be conceived of consistently with his view, 
	
qualitative possibilities regarding her. But that property and those 
possibilities are parasitic on her actual existence”. 
73 Lowe (2012): 215.  
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although he does not explicitly support any of them in 
particular. Under one of them, he says, “my thisness 
could be conceived as the ordered pair whose first 
member is the relation of identity and whose second 
member is me. In that case I would be a constituent of 
my thisness, rather than my thisness of me, and it would 
be particularly obvious that my thisness could not have 
existed if I had never existed”.74 But it may well also 
seem, I contend, that under this conception my thisness 
would depend on me for its identity – just as we usually 
take it that a set is individuated by its members, hence 
depending on them for its identity. (As I said earlier, 
existential dependence would still go both ways: my 
thisness could not have existed without me and vice 
versa);  
c. Adams says that under his view we do not “need a special 
constituent to make [individuals] identical with 
themselves or distinct from each other. Those can be seen 
as primitive relations of the individuals to themselves and 
to each other”.75 In the same context, he declares that 
“the individuals themselves provide the basis for non-
qualitative facts, by their identity and distinctness”.76 
Now, I have already stressed that the matters of identity 
that are at issue when Haecceitism is are not merely 
matters of identity with oneself and difference from 
anything else. However, such claims, together with the 
	
74 Adams (1981): 17.  
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid.: 13.  
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fact that Adams defines the main point about 
Haecceitism as the question whether “all possible worlds” 
are “constituted by purely qualitative facts” or “thisness 
hold[s] a place beside suchness as a fundamental feature 
of reality” suggest, I think, that he takes Haecceitism not 
to commit to thisnesses as existent entities at all, but 
only to certain claims concerning individuals and matters 
of identity concerning them.77  
 
That things are not individuated by their thisnesses by virtue of 
depending on them for their identity is then consistent with 
Adams’s view, and is certainly the case under my own.  
Thus, given my construal of the view, the Haecceitist about the 
Ks is not committed to positing thisnesses as existents by her 
theory of individuation for the Ks. For, as I have been arguing, 
such a theory does not hold that the Ks depend on their 
thisnesses for identity. Rather, her claim that at least some Ks 
have primitive thisness will amount to the idea that such Ks 
are not individuated by anything about their qualitative 
profiles. Yet this much was accepted already by Aristotle, who 
resorted to the matter composing an individual substance as a 
principle of individuation for it, and was never refuted by Duns 
Scotus, who posited haecceitates because he was discontent 
with Aristotle’s theory of individuation for reasons external to 
that tenet.78 
	
77 Adams (1979): 5.  
78 The main reference for this aspect of Aristotle's thought is Metaphysics, 
Z. For an excellent overview, see Loux (1991). For analyses of Scotus’s theory 
of individuation, see references in fn. 58 above.  
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The question whether a thing’s primitive thisness should be 
understood as a literally existing property nonetheless will be a 
further one. Such a question does not strictly need to be posed 
while framing the issue about Haecceitism in itself.79  
 
2.4. Two Degrees of Primitiveness  
 
So far, I have been characterizing the notion of some entities 
having their thisness primitively in a somewhat narrow sense – 
that is, with respect to their qualitative profiles.  
We may define the notion of a thing having primitive thisness 
in a stronger sense – in the sense, i.e., that nothing at all makes 
it be the very entity it is, in particular – in terms of properties 
as follows:  
 
a has strongly primitive thisness* =df it is not the case 
that for some F such that Ψ(F), for something to be 
identical to a is for it to have F (for Ψ a condition such that 
Ψ(F) just in case: (i.*) F is not the same property as being 
identical to a (under the relevant conditions for property 
sameness) (ii.*) there is no P such that for something to 
have F is for it to be identical to a and have P). 
	
79 Substantially the same point is made, I think, in Cross (2014), § 1: 
“According to Scotus, haecceities and essences are distinct real properties 
of substances. Scotus is not, in other words, a nominalist about these 
properties. But (…) it would be possible to hold that there is no purely 
qualitative or relational criterion for identity without holding that haecceities 
are metaphysical ingredients of things. It is possible to argue that any 
medieval opponents of haecceities (in Scotus's robust sense) in fact covertly 
accept this weaker form of haecceitism — and thus that at least part of the 
debate between Scotus and his later opponents has to do with the status of 
properties as such, rather than the question of individuation”. 
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The reason for imposing condition (i.*) is obvious enough.  
As for condition (ii.*), suppose one aims to say that Richard 
Burton has strongly primitive thisness. Suppose, further, that 
RB is essentially human. Then, absent condition (ii.*), the 
definition would not be adequate, because for something to be 
RB would be, indeed, for it to be RB and human. Adding 
condition (ii.*) allows one to avoid such a problem.  
Some may think that further conditions should be added. In 
particular, it might seem that the property of being RB if and 
only if human should also be ruled out in the definition above. 
However, I think that such a property is already ruled out by 
condition (ii.*). Here is an argument to that effect.  
Suppose some x has the property F defined as follows:  
(1.) lx (Gx « Hx)    
Suppose, further, that for x to be the thing it is (say, Richard 
Burton) is for it to have F. Suppose G is the property of being 
RB.  
Now, F may also be defined as follows: 
(2.) lx ((Gx Ù Hx) Ú (¬Gx Ù ¬Hx)) 
x can have F by satisfying either of the disjuncts in the matrix 
of (2.), or both. But it cannot satisfy both, on pain of 
contradiction. And it cannot satisfy the second disjunct, 
because we are under the assumption that x is RB – hence, that 
it has G. Hence, it must be the case that x has F by satisfying 
the first disjunct in the matrix of (2.). For x to have F is then for 
it to have the following property:  
(3.) lx (Gx Ù Hx) 
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Hence, if for something to be RB is for it to have F, then there 
is some P such that for something to have F is for it to be 
identical to RB and have P – that is, H. Even if built as a 
biconditional instead of as a conjunction, F does not fulfil 
condition (ii.*) above.  
I grant that there might be other seeming counterexamples. In 
each of such cases, it will have to be verified whether:  
a. On deeper examination, they turn out to be already 
excluded by my definition as the one above is;  
b. They seem to single out features that the definition 
should exclude, but that it really need not exclude, or:  
c. They do impose that further conditions be added my 
definition.  
 
As will be clear in due course, the notion of property sameness 
that I need to assume cannot count all properties that are 
necessarily coinstantiated as identical.  
Nor can it be the case that F and G count as the same property 
if and only if it is true that for something to be F is for it to be G. 
I need a more fine-grained criterion. More precisely, in all cases 
in which F and G count as the same property it is the case that 
for something to be F is for it to be G, but not vice versa.  
It is intended, by contrast, that two expressions that are 
logically equivalent must express the same property under my 
approach.80 Thus, some properties that as Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2006) remarks would trivialize PII, such as the following:  
	
80 As a consequence, whenever F and G are logically equivalent it is the case 
that for something to be F is for it to be G. While some might find this 
implausible, I am ready to bite the bullet.  
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(4.) lx (¬(x¹a Ù Fx) Ù ¬(x¹a Ù ¬Fx)) 
where F is, say, the property of being red, are excluded by my 
definition inasmuch as they count as identical to the property 
of being identical to a. Indeed, the expressions in (5.)-(8.) below 
are all equivalent to (4.):    
(5.) lx ((¬(x¹a) Ú ¬Fx) Ù (¬(x¹a) Ú Fx)) 
(6.) lx (¬(x¹a) Ú (¬Fx Ù Fx)) 
(7.) lx (¬(x¹a))  
(8.) lx (x=a).  
Hence, the property expressed by (4.) is excluded by condition 
(i.*).  
Another property that Rodriguez-Pereyra excludes is one that 
we can express as follows:  
(9.) lx ((x=a Ú Fx) Ù (x=a Ú ¬Fx)).  
This property is excluded by condition (i.*) inasmuch as it is 
equivalent to: 
(10.) lx (x=a)  
It is also excluded by condition (ii.*) inasmuch as it is equivalent 
to:  
(11.) lx ((x=a) Ù (Fx Ú ¬Fx)).81  
I should point out that the considerations in Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2006) are not formulated through lambda-abstractions and 
that they are more fine-grained than the ones I just presented. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra considers the properties that I have plugged 
in as conjuncts in the matrix of (4.) and argues that neither (nor 
any other property that is relevantly similar to them) can be 
	
81 See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006): 209-210.  
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allowed while formulating the weakest non-trivial version of PII. 
Ditto for the conjuncts in the matrix of (9.).  
But my present issue is different from Rodriguez-Pereyra’s – not 
all properties that would trivialize the Principle are mandatorily 
such that, if for something to be a is for it to have one of them, 
then a fails to have strongly primitive thisness.  
For instance, Rodriguez-Pereyra excludes as trivializing 
properties such as that of being a member of the singleton of a. 
However, if it were the case that a is the thing it is by virtue of 
being a member of such a singleton, I think that a would indeed 
fail to have strongly primitive thisness.  
The feeling of oddness that this might provoke is due, I think, 
to the fact that it is usually assumed that things are the other 
way around. It is commonly thought that {a} is the thing it is in 
virtue of being in a certain relation with a, and not vice versa. 
It is commonly thought that the identity of {a} depends on the 
identity of a, and not vice versa. If these claims were false, 
though, it might be the case that for something to be a is for it 
to be a member of {a} and that this being the case, a does not 
have strongly primitive thisness.  
Note that Rodriguez-Pereyra takes it to be the case that “a 
belongs to {a} in virtue of being a rather than being a in virtue 
of belonging to {a}”.82  
If he is right, then it cannot be that what prevents a from having 
strongly primitive thisness is it being the case that for 
something to be a is for it to belong to {a} – and one might claim 
	
82 Ibid.: 217.  
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that the property of belonging to {a} should be excluded by my 
definition as well.  
Yet he also takes the property of belonging to {a} to be the 
property of being identical to a and being such that {a} exists.83 
If so, then such a property is excluded by condition (ii.*) of my 
definition.  
 
Now, as in the case of primitive, non-qualitative thisness, I need 
a different definition in order for my framework to be 
nominalistic-friendly.  
Here is a proposal that employs, again, second-order non-
committal notions and the equivalence operator ‘@’ that 
expresses sameness between (non-objectual) ways for things to 
be.  (Here too – mutatis mutandis – ‘F @ G’ cannot simply be 
taken as synonymous with ‘For something to be F is for it to be 
G’. The underlying criterion for sameness of ways for something 
to be must be more fine-grained.) The notion of something’s 
having strongly primitive thisness can then be defined as 
follows:  
 
a has strongly primitive thisness =df it is not the case 
that $F such that Ψ(F) and for something to be identical to 
a is for it to be the case that Fx (for Ψ a condition such that 
Ψ(F) just in case: (i.) it is not the case that F @ is identical 
to a, and (ii.) it is not the case that $G such that F @ (G & 
is identical to a)).84  	
83 See ibid.: 217-218. This is also taken to explain why a belongs to {a} in 
virtue of being a and not vice versa. 
84 Cf. § 1.5 and § 2.1 above; Rayo and Yablo (2001).  
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Finally, a definition in terms of predicates – which would be 
subject to the same worry mentioned in § 2.1 – is the following:  
 
a has strongly primitive thisnesspred. =df it is not the case 
that for something to be identical to a is for it to satisfy ‘F’ 
(where (i.) ‘F’ is not synonymous with ‘is identical to a’, and 
(ii.) ‘F’ is not a conjunctive predicate of the form ‘G and H’, 
where ‘G’ is synonymous with ‘is identical to a’).  
 
Now, the form of Haecceitism I am presently considering – i.e., 
the thesis that at least some things have primitive, non-
qualitative thisness – is compatible with, but does not strictly 
speaking entail, the stronger claim that some entities have 
strongly primitive thisness. In particular, it seems that one may 
hold that some things have non-qualitative thisness while 
denying that those same entities have strongly primitive 
identity. For it may be that a certain thing is not individuated 
by anything about its qualitative profile but is nonetheless 
individuated by other, non-trivial, albeit non-qualitative, 
means.  
For instance, one may hold that for something to be Richard 
Burton is for it to be something that has married Liz Taylor 
twice. In that case, Richard Burton would not have strongly 
primitive thisness.  
 
Yet under this hypothesis, it might still be the case that Richard 
Burton has non-qualitative thisness. For the feature of having 
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married Liz Taylor twice counts as non-qualitative under any of 
the qualitative distinctions proposed in § 1.5.85  
By contrast, the claim that at least some things have strongly 
primitive thisness entails that some entities also have non-
qualitative thisness. In effect, any thing that has strongly 
primitive thisness is itself, a fortiori, one that has non-
qualitative thisness.  
Penelope Mackie made a different, yet closely related point 
while assessing, in her book How Things Might Have Been, 
Graeme Forbes’s views about modality and transworld identity. 
Forbes maintains, crucially, that cases of numerical identity 
and difference between individuals across possible worlds 
cannot be ‘bare’. That is to say, he holds that, whenever an 
individual a in a possible world w1 is, or fails to be, identical to 
an individual b in w2, where w1 is distinct from w2, a and b 
being transworld identical (or distinct) must be in some way 
supported by a further matter of fact.  
Now, I am being intentionally silent as to which connection in 
particular should be said to hold, in this perspective, between 
a case of transworld (non-)identity and the further fact of the 
matter in question. I take this question to be, at least to some 
extent, open. In Forbes’s own terminology, transworld identities 
and differences must always be ‘grounded’ in something else. 
By contrast, Mackie, though at times glossing Forbes’s tenet as 	
85 See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) for the notion of a “property of identity” (fn. 
5) and for the “intuition (…) that the predicate ‘thinks about a’ and ‘is one 
metre apart from a’ contain the [Basic Identity Predicate] ‘is identical to a’” 
(p. 212). See also p. 213: “Being a member of {a} seems to contain the 
property of being identical to a in the sense that it is a relational property 
whose relatum ({a}) is specified in terms that depend on the identity of a and 
so, in that sense, on the property of being identical to a”. Cf. Katz (1983).  
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the claim that “any transworld identity” must hold “in virtue of” 
“something (other than that identity)”, also calls this a 
“supervenience thesis” – and characterizes Forbes’s target (“the 
bare identities thesis”) as its negation.86 Now, the association 
may look unfortunate, since grounding is nowadays known, 
mainly, as the label for an intensely debated notion of priority 
and metaphysical explanation that, crucially, cannot be 
captured in terms of supervenience or in other, still merely 
modal ones.87 But I find the point unproblematic inasmuch as 
it is far from clear that Forbes meant to use such terms as 
‘ground’ and ‘in virtue of’ in the technical sense they have been 
ascribed in the current debate. Moreover, as will be clear is due 
course, his own solution in terms of individual essences makes 
for a precise, comprehensive treatment of his own concerns 
about transworld identity – in terms that are, to some extent, 
immune to metatheoretical worries concerning the meaning of 
ground-talk.  
Be that as it may, my main concern is not so much the details 
of Forbes’s view, here, as it is my own strategy in stating and 
defending a given form of metaphysical Haecceitism.  
I will then presently take Mackie’s own construal of Forbes’s 
theoretical framework as unproblematic, and just present the 
distinction she needs to make as phrased under that approach. 
The abovementioned bare identities thesis that Forbes targets, 
Mackie says, should be kept distinct from modal Haecceitism. 	
86  Mackie (2006): 42-43. The main reference for Forbes’s views in this 
concern is Forbes (1985). See also Forbes (1980); (1994); (1997).  
87 See, in particular, Fine (2001); (2012); Correia (2005): Ch.3; Schaffer 
(2009); Rosen (2010). For introductions, see Clark and Liggins (2012); 
Trogdon (2013); Bliss and Trogdon (2014). For an excellent anthology on the 
topic, see Correia and Schnieder (2012). 
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She characterizes the latter, in turn, as the negation of a further 
supervenience thesis – one to the effect that every numerical 
(non-)identity across possible worlds must supervene on some 
further fact of the matter that is purely qualitative.  
The two supervenience theses (and their respective negations) 
differ as concerns what is included in the supervenience basis 
a given transworld (non-)identity is supposed to supervene on 
(or may fail to). The “No Bare Identities” thesis that Forbes 
defends has it that “any transworld identity must supervene on 
facts other than that identity, although these facts may always 
include facts about the identities of other individuals”.88 But 
the supervenience thesis that modal Haecceitism denies is 
stronger: it holds that the supervenience basis for a given 
transworld identity “cannot ultimately appeal to identity facts 
about other individuals, but must ultimately appeal to 
qualitative differences”.89  
Mackie rightly remarks that Forbes is not committed to 
defending such a stronger thesis (as we shall see, he actually 
holds that the solution to the bare identities problem stands in 
ascribing to every individual an individual essence that is not 
purely qualitative, thereby grounding each fact of transworld 
identity or difference in further facts of transworld identity or 
difference). 90  The stronger, anti-haecceitist supervenience 
thesis, by contrast, entails Forbes’s No Bare Identities thesis: if 
every transworld (non-)identity must supervene on some 
further facts that are not themselves facts of (non-)identity, but 
	
88 Mackie (2006): 43; 44.  
89 Ibid.  
90 See ibid.: 43-44.   
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purely qualitative ones, then a fortiori, none of them can be bare 
in the sense of not supervening on anything else at all. 91 
Finally, modal Haecceitism – if construed as the denial of the 
stronger supervenience thesis just mentioned – is compatible 
with, but does not by itself entail, the bare identity thesis that 
Forbes rejects: if no transworld identity fails to supervene on 
something other than itself, though some of them do not 
supervene on anything that is purely qualitative, then both 
modal Haecceitism so construed and the No Bare Identities 
thesis hold.92  
In the light of Mackie’s analysis, Forbes’s No-Bare Identities 
thesis may be associated, mutatis mutandis, to the claim of 
someone who denies that any entity may have strongly 
primitive thisness. The idea is the following.  
Where the former position urges us to claim that every 
transworld identity must supervene on something other than 
itself, the latter has it that the thisness of every possible thing 
consists in something else.  
Something similar goes for modal anti-Haecceitism and the 
thesis that nothing has primitive, non-qualitative thisness. 
According to the former, every case of transworld identity must 
supervene not only on some other fact, but on some other fact 
that does not itself appeal to further transworld identities at all. 
Similarly, denying that anything may have non-qualitative 	
91 Ibid. 
92 Mackie takes (modal) Haecceitism, as per her construal, to be essentially 
the same doctrine that was characterized and thus called by Lewis, although 
the latter was not phrased in terms of transworld identities. See Lewis 
(1986): § 4.4; Mackie (2006): 42-43, fn. 37. Since I have perplexities about 
this point, I will separately treat Lewis’s anti-Haecceitism in the next 
chapter.  
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thisness is to hold that, given a possible thing, its being the very 
thing it is must consist in its fulfilling some further condition 
that does not involve the identity of the thing in question nor of 
any other.  
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Chapter 3 
Supervenience, Grounding, and Individuation 
 
As I anticipated, the theses of metaphysical Haecceitism and 
metaphysical anti-Haecceitism that are the topic of this 
dissertation are not to be identified with the two modal theses 
that bear the same labels. By the latter, and as has become 
quite standard in the literature, I mean those theses that David 
Lewis (1986) famously stated in terms of supervenience. After 
making this point, I will address the question whether the 
debate on metaphysical Haecceitism can also be stated in terms 
of supervenience and consider reasons for a negative answer (§ 
3.1). I will then present two alternative strategies to frame that 
debate. In § 3.2, I will focus on a proposal in this sense that 
was recently advanced by Shamik Dasgupta – one that is 
phrased in terms of a distinction between qualitative and non-
qualitative facts and of a relation of grounding allegedly 
holding, or failing to hold, thereof. Finally, I will set forth my 
own understanding of the debate in terms of qualitative 
individual essences (§ 3.3, § 3.3.1, and § 3.3.2).  
As will be clear shortly, an anti-Haecceitist in my sense is 
someone who excludes every case of primitive identity by 
respecting the two desiderata of identity-explanation and 
distributiveness, so that by the same token she excludes that 
any thing (of the category she takes as target at least) has 
primitive thisness. Not so in the case of anti-Haecceitism as is 
defined and defended by Dasgupta – a theory that attempts to 
exclude cases of primitive identity without respecting, at least, 
the second desideratum. Since this move is critical in 
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Dasgupta’s attempt to avoid the sort of difficulties I ascribe to 
anti-Haecceitism – and, in particular, a commitment to strong 
PII – it is crucial that I approach that attempt in order to set the 
stage for the case I will make against it later on.  
 
3.1. Metaphysical anti-Haecceitism: Still a Supervenience 
Thesis?  
 
In On the Plurality of Worlds, Lewis considered the somewhat 
multifarious definition of Haecceitism that had been advanced 
by David Kaplan (1975). He then singled out the following as 
what he took to be “the main doctrine” of Haecceitism – i.e., “the 
denial of a supervenience thesis”:  
 
All hands agree in distinguishing two ways that worlds – 
genuine or ersatz – might differ. (1) Worlds might differ in 
their qualitative character; or, for ersatz worlds, in the 
qualitative character they ascribe to the concrete world. 
(...) (2) Also, worlds might differ in what they represent de 
re concerning various individuals: this-worldly individuals 
at least, and also other-worldly individuals if such there 
be.  
(…) 
What is the connection between these two ways for worlds 
to differ? Does representation de re supervene on 
qualitative character? (…) Or are there sometimes 
differences in representation de re without benefit of any 
difference whatever in qualitative character? If two worlds 
differ in what they represent de re concerning some 
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individual, but do not differ qualitatively in any way, I shall 
call that a haecceitistic difference. Haecceitism, as I 
propose to use the word, is the doctrine that there are at 
least some cases of haecceitistic difference between 
worlds. Anti-haecceitism is the doctrine that there are 
none.93 
  
As has become quite standard in the literature,94 by ‘modal 
(anti-)Haecceitism’ I will refer to the doctrines thus defined by 
Lewis.95 
It is important to see that metaphysical Haecceitism and anti-
Haecceitism, as I suggest we use the terms, are not to be 
identified with such modal doctrines. My reasons for thus 
thinking will still draw on my claim that in order to properly 
define metaphysical Haecceitism one should start by looking at 
cases against it such as the ones I considered in Chapter 1.   
	
93 Lewis (1986): 221. A case of haecceitistic difference in Lewis’s sense that 
was intensely debated is in Chisholm (1967).   
94  As a matter of fact, many just drop the qualification, and label the 
Lewisian doctrines ‘Haecceitism’ and ‘anti-Haecceitism’, simpliciter. But that 
is because either they are not interested in the metaphysical versions of 
those doctrines, or because they use different terms for them, such as 
‘Individualism’ and ‘Qualitativism’. As will be clear shortly, these last terms 
have been used for views that significantly differ from ‘metaphysical 
Haecceitism’ and ‘metaphysical anti-Haecceitism’ as I conceive of them. 
Hence, the difference is not merely terminological here.  
95 The landmark characterization offered by Kaplan is, as a matter of fact, 
source of theoretically interesting questions on its own. My own take on it – 
one that I have no way to justify here – is that it not only mashes together 
parts of the metaphysical doctrine and parts of the modal one, but also 
classifies as ways to adhere to Haecceitism, which is in both versions a 
metaphysical claim, stances that properly pertain to semantics, and most 
notably some aspects of Saul Kripke’s attitude towards proper names in 
modal talk. See Kripke (1980); cf. Hughes (2004). For what is, to my 
knowledge and in my opinion, the deepest analysis of Kaplan’s claims in this 
context, see Salmon (1996). 
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To begin with, a haecceitistic difference in my sense – one of 
those cases of primitive identity that the metaphysical anti-
Haecceitist aims to exclude – may arise (if at all) even within a 
single world. The same cannot be true of a haecceitistic 
difference in Lewis’s sense, which is by definition a difference 
between worlds or between maximal possibilities more 
generally.96  
Note that were we not to define haecceitistic differences – in the 
sense that is relevant for metaphysical Haecceitism – as 
differences that can possibly arise (at least in principle) within 
a single world, then the metaphysical anti-Haecceitist would 
not be in a position as to rule out such differences inasmuch 
as they are intra-world ones.  
Yet both cases for anti-Haecceitism I considered in Chapter 1 
are supposed to exclude intra-world haecceitistic differences. 
Indeed:  
- I take it to be in the spirit of Dasgupta’s argumentation 
that differences such as the one involving Peter and Paul 
in his example must be excluded within any world whose 
physics respects NGT. Otherwise, the door would be open 
to differences that are, by Dasgupta’s own lights, 
danglers. For indeed, such intra-world differences would 
be undetectable by any of the measurement instruments 
that NGT can provide, and – still according to Dasgupta 
	
96 See Skow (2008, 2011) for the idea that Lewisian Haecceitism should not 
be defined in terms of differences between worlds, but in terms of differences 
between maximal possibilities. Cf. Cowling (2016) for the different ways to 
define the doctrine depending on one’s stance as to how the modal operators 
should be assessed. See ibid. for further references on modal Haecceitism.  
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– they would contribute nothing to our physical 
knowledge of what is going on in the world in question;97 
- Leibniz’s case rests on the idea that God’s will in creating 
the actual world respects PSR, and that if there were 
worlds that differ haecceitistically from the actual one 
that idea would turn out false. Yet intra-world 
haecceitistic differences are not acceptable by Leibniz’s 
lights either. Otherwise, his case for PII could not play 
the role he ascribed to it in view of a case against absolute 
space.98  
 
This worry may perhaps be escaped simply by adopting a notion 
of a haecceitistic difference that is broader than Lewis’s. For 
instance (as in my own construal of the notion) we may take it 
that haecceitistic differences are differences between situations 
and that, while some situations are possible worlds, some are 
proper parts of one instead.99   
However, there is a further worry that stands still even if such 
a strategy is adopted – it goes as follows.  
Even when the ‘difference-bearers’ at issue – so to speak – are 
possible worlds,100 my notion of a haecceitistic difference does 
not call into play the machinery of representation de re at all. 
Accordingly, two qualitatively indiscernible worlds some 
denizens of which are world-bound would differ 
haecceitistically in my sense – but not in Lewis’s, in case they 	
97 Cf. § 1.3 above.  
98 Cf. § 1.4 above.  
99 I owe this point to Fabrice Correia.  
100 This should all be read modulo Skow’s worries. However, I take it that 
none of what I am saying here does run into the difficulties that were raised 
by Skow.  
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are exactly alike not only qualitatively but also in what they 
represent de re.101 And indeed, I take a case like this to be one 
that Leibniz must exclude.102 For that would still be a case that 
faces God with two worlds among which She cannot choose 
without violating (so Leibniz has it) PSR.  
Once it is appreciated that the issue of metaphysical 
Haecceitism is significantly different from the one of modal 
Haecceitism, the question may be raised as to whether the 
former can still exhaustively be phrased in terms of 
supervenience.  
The point is important and, I argue, worth exploring. For, as 
they stand, the two arguments for anti-Haecceitism that I 
presented in the previous chapter do seem to point towards the 
need for a certain supervenience claim, or, at least, for what is 
commonly characterized in terms of supervenience – that is, a 
requirement of co-variation. It seems indeed that:  
-  At least prima facie, none of those danglers that 
Dasgupta takes ‘primitive individuals’ to be would seem 
to possibly threaten if every non-qualitative difference 
(i.e., every difference in the identity of the things involved 
in some situations) were accompanied by a qualitative 
one. For in that case, non-qualitative differences would 
not be empirically undetectable after all: each one of 
them could at least be detected indirectly, via detection 
of that qualitative difference by which it is accompanied. 
	
101 Cfr. Lewis (1986: 224): “For all I know, there are many indiscernible 
worlds (…). I see no theoretical benefits to be gained by supposing that there 
are or that there are not, so on this question I advise that we remain 
agnostic”.  
102 See § 1.4 above.  
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(Note that I am not ascribing to Dasgupta the somewhat 
odd claim that contemporary physics can detect every 
qualitative difference whatsoever. What I am presently 
speculating to be a potential outcome of Dasgupta’s 
argument may be duly modified, and still be stated in the 
lexicon of ‘no A-difference without B-difference’ – for 
instance, where ‘A’ would stand for ‘non-qualitative’ and 
‘B’ for ‘qualitative and detectable by post-Newtonian 
physics’).103  
A little more precisely, Dasgupta’s arguments point to the 
idea that no device that post-Newtonian physics can 
allow us to build could possibly detect mere non-
qualitative differences between the objects of our 
observations. But the mere non-qualitative differences in 
question are precisely non-qualitative differences that are 
not accompanied by qualitative ones!104 
Analogous considerations hold for the point that 
Dasgupta makes about redundancy. His case in this 
sense rests on the following contentions:  
 
“[I]t is a straightforward consequence of NGT that mere 
differences in individualistic facts at an initial time do not 
give rise to differences in the future evolution of inter-
particle distances or any other difference; in particular, 
they do [not] give rise to any difference in general facts. 
(…) My claim here is just that primitive individuals are 
	
103 Needless to say, Dasgupta’s argument would then sound much less 
interesting than it does. 
104 Cf. Dasgupta (2009): 40-43.  
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redundant in the sense (…) that mere differences in 
individualistic facts do not give rise to any other 
differences at later times”.105  
 
The supervenience claim I am speculating on – one to the 
effect that every non-qualitative difference must be 
accompanied by a qualitative one – would clearly seem to 
ban such a problem.  
- Something similar may be said, mutatis mutandis, about 
Leibniz’s point. If every non-qualitative difference 
between worlds were accompanied by a qualitative 
difference, then none of them would face God with a 
choice between indifferent options. For necessarily, when 
willing that a given world be made actual, She would be 
choosing a world that does qualitatively differ from every 
other. No two worlds, indeed, would anywhere differ in a 
merely non-qualitative fashion. In particular, no world 
would differ in a merely non-qualitative fashion from the 
actual world. And since it is mere non-qualitative 
differences between the actual world and some other that 
– so Leibniz has it – would force God to choose between 
indifferent options, it seems that Leibniz’s concern would 
indeed not arise if every non-qualitative difference 
between worlds were accompanied by a qualitative one.   
 
	
105 Ibid.: 41.  
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Now, I know of no conclusive reason to exclude the possibility 
that some supervenience claim that does justice to the issue of 
metaphysical Haecceitism may be found. 
However, diverse considerations may be taken as reason 
enough to look for an alternative characterization – one that in 
some sense goes beyond certain limits on what can be claimed 
in terms of supervenience. 
A first line of thought in this sense is the following. One might 
think that a claim of supervenience would still fail to do justice 
to the spirit of anti-Haecceitism 106  even though, strictly 
speaking, such a demand would indeed exclude both danglers 
in Dagupta’s sense and the threat to PSR that Leibniz 
describes. For – so the thought would go – it is in the spirit of 
anti-Haecceitism that some further feature, one that tracks 
priority, supports the supervenience relations in question. 
Thus, one may have it that the proper claim – on the side of the 
anti-Haecceitist – should at least be one of difference-making, 
with the result that every non-qualitative difference must be not 
only accompanied, but also produced, by a qualitative one.107  
And even more than that, one may argue, should be demanded 
– again, in the spirit of anti-Haecceitism. As in the phrasing of 
the issue that was first sketched by Adams, we may think that 
anti-Haecceitism should be properly thought to not only 
demand that all cases of primitive identity be ruled out, but 
that this be done within a theory that takes the qualitative to 
constitute the fundamental level of reality.108  	
106 Now the comparison with the modal doctrines has been taken care of, I 
will refer to metaphysical (anti-)Haecceitism by dropping the qualification.  
107 I owe the starting point for such a hypothesis to Ghislain Guigon.  
108 The reference in this sense is, once more, Adams (1979): 5.  
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I find it quite natural that this should be so in a theistic 
perspective such as Leibniz’s. For if some features of reality are 
singled out as the only ones that can properly be taken into 
consideration by God in the act of creating – if they are what 
God decides that be made the case when She chooses to 
actualize a given world – it would seem odd at best not to take 
those to be the fundamental features of reality.109 
As for Dasgupta’s framework, I suspect that things are less 
straightforward. Although he does take it to motivate the claim 
that reality is fundamentally qualitative, his argument against 
‘primitive individuals’ largely turns on considerations as to 
which features of reality post-Newtonian physics can detect. It 
can detect the qualitative ones, while it cannot detect (if 
Dasgupta is right) the merely non-qualitative ones.  
The question would arise, then, as to whether some features of 
reality’s being detectable by post-Newtonian physics should be 
taken as mark of their being fundamental. While Dasgupta has 
to take it that this is the case,110 I am happy to remain agnostic 
about such an issue.   	
109 Cf. Adams (1981), fn. 5: “Could God have created you without all the evils 
that preceded your coming to be? It might be suggested that He could have 
done so by simply deciding to create something having your thisness in a 
world without those evils. But I am claiming here that thisnesses of possible 
individuals are not available to God for that kind of decision. This thesis 
may be of some use for theodicy, but some theologians may be offended by 
the implication that God does not know as possible all the singular 
propositions that would actually be true if He created certain sorts of world 
(…). And we may speculate that Leibniz (i) believed that primitive thisnesses 
would depend on the actual existence of the thisses, (ii) saw that primitive 
thisnesses would therefore be a feature of the world that God could not have 
known as possible independently of which world He actualized, and (iii) 
regarded this consequence as theologically objectionable. I think this may 
have been one of Leibniz's motives for rejecting primitive thisnesses and 
affirming the necessity of the identity of indiscernibles”.  
110 Although it may sound like he thinks otherwise: at times, he seems to 
take it that all facts that are neither qualitative nor grounded in the 
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As a matter of fact, I have a different reason to think that the 
issue of Haecceitism would better not be stated in terms of 
supervenience. For as I will argue in the next chapter, there is 
no way to satisfy the anti-Haecceitist’s theoretical aim – that of 
excluding every case of primitive identity – without either (i.) 
banning, by the same token, any entity with primitive thisness 
(at least from one’s fundamental ontology), or (ii.) turning anti-
Haecceitism into something that it is not and, most 
importantly, that the arguments for it do not support. But to 
satisfy (i.) is to defend a form of anti-Haecceitism that gets rid 
of every case of primitive identity by respecting the two 
desiderata I have considered in § 2.1 – hence, by individuating 
every entity (or at least every fundamental one) by purely 
qualitative means. And I know of no way to do so via a claim of 
supervenience.  
To sum up: the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism is not to be 
identified with the one of modal Haecceitism, and there is 
reason to doubt that the former can still effectively be 
characterized in terms of supervenience.  
Aiming at a form of anti-Haecceitism that embeds the claim that 
reality is fundamentally qualitative, Dasgupta has set the 
debate in terms of grounding. Moving from different reasons to 
be dissatisfied with a phrasing in terms of supervenience, I 	
qualitative would be danglers in his sense. Cf. Dasgupta (2014), 6: “(…) I 
favor qualitativism. Very briefly, my reason is that if individualism were true 
then the individualistic facts of our world would lie beyond our epistemic 
ken. The idea is that our knowledge of the world is limited to knowledge of 
its qualitative nature and whatever is grounded in that qualitative nature”. 
But given the point I made above – i.e., since Dasgupta has not provided 
reasons to think that non-qualitative differences would be undetectable even 
if invariably accompanied by qualitative ones, I do not think that that is 
quite right.  
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characterize the issue in terms of qualitative individual 
essences. As will be clear shortly, anti-Haecceitism as I conceive 
of it is exactly the sort of view that Leibniz defended (at least 
under a certain interpretation of his thought). I will now turn to 
presenting Dasgupta’s proposal and my own.  
 
3.2. Grounding: Qualitativism  
 
Aiming to defend a form of anti-Haecceitism that not only 
excludes all cases of primitive identity but does so in such a 
way as to characterize reality as fundamentally qualitative, 
Dasgupta has set forth to phrase the present debate in terms 
of grounding.  
It is important that I focus on this approach for at least two 
reasons.  
On the one hand, Dasgupta’s strategy, if successful, provides a 
way to satisfy the anti-Haecceitistic rationale without 
committing to qualitative individual essences and PII. Hence, I 
will have to prove that strategy unsuccessful (or at least deeply 
problematic) in order for my main point against anti-
Haecceitism to go through.  
On the other, I have considered at several points, but never 
clearly characterized, the question whether the qualitative 
settles or metaphysically determines the non-qualitative. The 
notion of metaphysical determination and cognate ones are 
nowadays widely conceived in terms of grounding. Since 
Dasgupta defines the whole point about Haecceitism exactly in 
those terms, assessing such an attempt will pave the way to 
further considerations as to what it means to argue that the 
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qualitative metaphysically determines the non-qualitative, as 
anti-Haecceitism is sometimes taken to hold.  
As will be clear shortly, Dasgupta’s way to frame the issue – as 
opposed to Adams’s and my own – makes no appeal to the 
notion of thisness at all. Rather, as is quite standard in the 
literature on grounding, such a relation is taken to be one that 
may hold between facts, the term ‘fundamental’ is understood 
as tantamount to ‘ungrounded’, and the claim that a given fact 
grounds another would amount to the idea that the latter holds 
in virtue of the former – or, that the former’s obtaining makes 
it the case that the latter obtains.111 In line with this, Dasgupta 
takes the question whether all ungrounded facts are qualitative 
to exhaust the whole point about Adams’s question,112 and no 
inquiry as to how some entities are individuated is addressed – 
or so it prima facie looks. 
More precisely, Dasgupta singles out two mutually antagonistic 
families of answers to Adams’s question, as he conceives of it. 
One may be an Individualist, and claim that all fundamental 
facts are non-qualitative. Or, one may hold that every 
fundamental fact is qualitative instead – hence committing to 
Qualitativism. Unless either of such positions is combined with 
an eliminativist stance towards the non-fundamental facts, 
both will have to be further qualified. Still under Dasgupta’s 
definitions, the Individualist has it that the qualitative facts are 
	
111 See references in fn. 87 above.  
112 Note, however, that while Adams raised his inquiry as one that would 
concern all possible worlds, Dasgupta restricts his investigation to “material 
reality”. None of his claims as to whether reality is fundamentally qualitative 
is then supposed to apply to worlds where such things as numbers, ghosts 
and Cartesian egos exist. 
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grounded in the non-qualitative ones – vice versa for the 
Qualitativist.  
However, as will be clear in due course and as one may already 
foresee, Dasgupta’s case for Qualitativism is effective (if at all) 
against views that are significantly weaker than Individualism. 
One is simply the negation of Qualitativism: it has it that at 
least one fundamental fact is non-qualitative – call it Weak 
Individualism. A further one claims that at least one fact is 
neither qualitative nor grounded in qualitative ones – call it 
anti-Qualitativism.  
While Weak Individualism entails anti-Qualitativism (under the 
hypothesis that the fundamental facts are the ungrounded 
ones), the converse entailment may fail. For instance, suppose 
there is an infinite chain of non-qualitative facts F, F’, F’’, …, 
such that F is grounded in F’, F’ is grounded in F’’, and so on. 
If the sole grounds of F are members of that chain, then anti-
Qualitativism is true (F is neither qualitative nor grounded in 
qualitative facts). Yet Weak Individualism might still be false – 
for instance, if no fact whatsoever is ungrounded. (In that case, 
both Qualitativism and Individualism as defined by Dasgupta 
would of course be trivially true). 113   
 
Clearly, the above does not exhaust the aim of defining the 
positions in question: the distinction between qualitative and 
non-qualitative facts will first have to be duly characterized. 
 
	
113 Thanks to Fabrice Correia for pushing this point and related ones below.  
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(Note that Dasgupta labels the non-qualitative facts 
‘individualistic’. I take ‘non-qualitative fact’ and ‘individualistic 
fact’ as plainly synonymous and favour the former for reasons 
of overall terminological consistency. However, I will sometimes 
use the label ‘individualistic distinction’ for the distinction 
between qualitative and non-qualitative facts, lest the 
distinction is mistaken for the ones that apply to properties or 
to predicates).  
 
Dasgupta does not provide a thoroughly unambiguous 
definition of the individualistic distinction;114 however, he does 
advance several hints towards the notion he has in mind:  
 
On this view [i.e., Individualism] the most basic, 
irreducible facts about our world include facts about what 
individuals there are and how they are propertied and 
related to one another, such as 
 
a is F, b is G, a bears R to b 
 
where a and b are individuals, or "primitive individuals" as 
I will call them to underline their status on this view.115 
 
[R]oughly speaking a fact is individualistic iff whether it 
obtains depends on how things stand with a particular 
individual (or individuals) and qualitative otherwise.116  	
114 In one of his papers on the topic, he explicitly declares that he will not 
attempt to provide any such definition; cf. Dasgupta (2014): 5.  
115 Dasgupta (2009): 36.  
116 Dasgupta (2014): 5.  
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[A fact] F is individualistic iff there is an x (or there are 
some Xs) such that whether F obtains depends on how 
things stand with x (or with the Xs).117  
 
Very roughly, says Dagupta, we may think of qualitative facts 
as those facts that can be expressed in first order logic with 
identity but without constants; in order to express an 
individualistic fact, instead, we would need to refer to at least 
one individual in particular (not merely ‘to the thing that is so-
and-so, whichever it may be’) – hence resorting to individual 
constants.118 Intuitively, the fact that Richard Burton married 
four women would then count as individualistic, while the fact 
that someone married four women would count as qualitative.  
Dasgupta does not advance a clear-cut definition of what an 
individual is, in turn: he takes it to be enough for his aims that 
we think of individuals as “what in ordinary English we call 
‘things’ – apples, alligators, atoms, and so on”.119   
Now, as I said, Dasgupta’s case for Qualitativism focuses on 
what he calls ‘primitive individuals’, and on the contention that 
such things are danglers in the light of post-Newtonian physics. 
More precisely, Dasgupta has it that non-qualitative facts that 
are not grounded in qualitative ones should be excluded 
	
117 Dasgupta (2017): fn. 2.  
118 See Dagupta (2009): 40, (2014): 5-6, (2017): § 1.   
119 Dasgupta (2014): 5; (2017): § 1. See also Dasgupta (2009): 35. In this last 
paper, Dasgupta goes as far as to present his argument for Qualitativism as 
one that provides, also, a reason to infer that “fundamentally speaking at 
least, there are no such things as material individuals” (ibid.: 35). I do not 
think that such a conclusion follows – but I will take care of this point in 
due course (see Chapter 4). 
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because, if there were such facts, the individuals involved in 
them would qualify as ‘primitive individuals’.120  
In effect, even the weakest individualistic view I have considered 
above – the one I called anti-Qualitativism – is committed to 
there being non-qualitative facts that are not grounded in 
qualitative ones. Hence, such a view will posit at least some 
primitive individuals, in Dasgupta’s sense.  
For the defender of such a view will have it that, for at least an 
individual, say, a, there is a fact of the matter as to whether or 
not it – as opposed to every other – is involved in some given 
fact (that is to say, in any fact such that whether or not it 
obtains depends on how things stand with a itself), and such a 
fact of the matter cannot be said to rest on any collection of 
merely qualitative considerations.  
The way I understand the argument from danglers, and several 
other parts of Dasgupta’s dialectic, this is the idea behind the 
(at times confusing, I suggest) claim that there are (if 
Qualitativism is wrong) ‘primitive individuals’. For there does 
not seem to be much that characterizes something as a 
primitive individual, as opposed to an entity that is not, except 
for such a thing’s being involved in at least one non-qualitative 
fact that is not grounded in qualitative ones.  
There would then be two ways to characterize the notion of a 
primitive individuals:  
 
	
120  For Dasgupta’s point in this sense, and for the role it plays in his 
argument for Qualitativism, see Dasgupta (2009): 37-44. I will henceforth 
refer to that argument as ‘the argument from danglers’.  
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1. For any x, x is a primitive individual iffdf some non-
qualitative fact F (i.) is such that whether or not it obtains 
depends on how things stand with x, and (ii.) is not 
grounded in qualitative facts.  
 
2. For any x, x is a primitive individual iffdf some non-
qualitative fact F (i.) is such that whether or not it obtains 
depends on how things stand with x, and (ii.) is 
fundamental (that is, ungrounded).  
 
Weak Individualism would then be committed to there being 
primitive individuals under both definitions (of course things 
that satisfy 2. satisfy 1. as well). By contrast, anti-Qualitativism 
would embed primitive individuals only as defined in 1. 
Both definitions should likely include, also, a condition 
imposing that something can be a primitive individual only if it 
is an individual in the first place. As I mentioned, though, it is 
not clear what Dasgupta means by ‘individual’. While he 
presumably has it that at least universals cannot possibly be 
primitive individuals, I will cast doubt on such a conviction in 
due course.  
Dasgupta’s contention is one against primitive individuals even 
in the weaker sense of 1. above. For in effect, a world where all 
facts about material reality are non-qualitative while no fact is 
fundamental should count as a world including danglers if his 
contention is sound.  
 
Now, note that through his argument from danglers, Dasgupta 
aims to do more than just single out an epistemic vice intrinsic 
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to individualistic views. In effect, he takes that argument to 
support a particular form of Qualitativism that he calls 
‘Generalism’.    
Dasgupta has it that a generalist view – as opposed to some 
other forms of Qualitativism such as the bundle theory – does 
not even attempt to give a story about how individuals can be 
said to consist in other, purely qualitative, items. It just focuses 
on the facts that can be said to build up the fundamental level 
of reality – that is, given the qualitativist dictum, only qualitative 
ones – and on how they should be properly characterized.  
The view that Dasgupta labels ‘Quantifier Generalism’ provides 
a first suggestion in this sense: the idea is that the fundamental 
facts are all and only those facts that can be expressed in first-
order logic with identity but without constants.  
Consider again the case of a Black’s world.  
The bundle theorist is still committed to what may be seen, in 
Dasgupta’s spirit, as a sort of ‘original sin’: she aims to build 
up individuals out of qualities. Faced with Black’s world, she 
will have no choice but to recognize a sole individual that is 
built out of a certain collection of compresent qualities (for the 
same collection lies behind the ‘two’ spheres) – hence accepting 
a substantive version of PII.  
By contrast, the quantifier generalist can just embed the idea 
that there are two spheres in her own description of Black’s 
world – the latter will be something like: 
 
 (Q.G.) $x $y (x¹y Ù Fx Ù Fy Ù Hxy) 
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where ‘F’ conveys a complete qualitative description of each 
sphere, and ‘H’ expresses the relation of being at, say, nine 
metres from.121 And since the description mentions only what 
the quantifier generalist takes to be qualitative facts, she can 
claim that her account is indeed a qualitativist one. 
However, according to Dasgupta this suggestion does not go far 
enough in getting rid of primitive individuals. For not only do 
we naturally take quantified expressions to range over a domain 
of individuals – hence may doubt that a satisfying alternative 
understanding is available;122 it may also well be (and many do 
believe) that quantified facts are grounded in their instances. If 
this were the case, then any fact that can be expressed as “there 
is a sphere” would be grounded in the fact that a certain sphere 
in particular exists – hence, contra the quantifier generalist, no 
such fact would be fundamental.123  
Moreover, if the qualitative facts are to be understood in terms 
of a domain of individuals, or even worse if they are grounded 
in their instances – i.e., in facts concerning at least one given 
individual in particular – it is not so clear how (if at all) one can 
claim that such facts constitute the fundamental level of reality 
without committing to the idea that the world must be 
accounted for in terms of some primitive individuals after all.  
Nothing like this happens with Algebraic Generalism – i.e., with 
the form of Qualitativism that Dasgupta aims to defend. 
According to Algebraic Generalism, nothing exists at the 
fundamental level but a domain of n-adic properties; these are 
	
121 See Dasgupta (2009): 49-50; Dasgupta (2014); Dasgupta (2017): § 3.  
122 Cf. Dasgupta (2009): 50. 
123 See ibid.; Dasgupta (2017): § 3.  
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arranged in a certain structure that can be described via 
formulas of a particular language G that well suits the 
Generalist’s metaphysics. Dasgupta draws the relevant formal 
language from Quine’s Algebraic Logic and Predicate Functors. 
Very roughly, the peculiarity of language G can be summarized 
as follows: 
i. it can mimic first-order quantification in a way that 
does not seem – at least prima facie – to bring in 
problems concerning whether or not one is 
quantifying on a domain of individuals. Since there 
are no quantifiers, and the element of G that mimics 
them does not take any argument, there is no question 
as to ‘what ranges over what’, so to speak; 
ii. it does not treat properties as predicates but as terms 
– so there is no question as to whether predicates 
apply to individuals either;  
iii. all of its syntactic symbols apply to such terms for 
properties – so that, again, there seems to be no space 
for a mention of individuals in G’s formulas. 
 
Without getting into technical details, I will just show as an 
example a formula of G that the algebraic generalist may use to 
represent what is going on in Black’s world – by mentioning 
qualitative facts alone: 
 
(A.G.) cc (F1 Ù pF1 Ù ¬I2) obtains 
 
(where ‘F’ conveys a complete qualitative description of each 
sphere – for simplicity, I will assume that such a description 
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captures not only the intrinsic qualitative properties of each 
sphere, but also the relational ones). 
Very roughly, the formula may be understood as saying 
something like ‘the fact that it F-izes, and it F-izes, and it 
numerical-difference-izes obtains’. 124  The two ‘c’ at the 
beginning of the formula stand for as many applications of the 
‘cropping operator’: its role is to cancel an argument-place in a 
given property’s adicity. As a result, from an n-adic predicate 
that we would naturally think as applying to n individuals we 
can get to have a term that seems to stand by itself. This seems 
to confirm that we can describe Black’s world through G by 
assuming properties alone and without taking the two spheres 
to be one and the same. Intuitively, an application of the 
cropping operator in G is, by the same token, what mimics an 
existential quantification of first-order logic.125  
I said that, according to Algebraic Generalism, at the 
fundamental level properties are arranged in a structure that 
may be described through formulas of G. It may have sounded 
more natural to say that, through G, we can combine properties 
in order to construct more complex properties – and, via them, 
qualitative facts. However, I suggest that this would fail to 
effectively mirror the fundamental reality as conceived by 
Dasgupta’s metaphysics. In effect, according to Dasgupta, the 
best form of Qualitativism – Algebraic Generalism – naturally 	
124 It would feel much more natural to talk about the fact that there is F-
ness, and there is F-ness, and there is numerical difference, instead – but 
this would not fit Dasgupta’s aims because, under such a description, that 
fact would turn out to look like a quantificational one.  
125 Language G plays a crucial role in Dasgupta’s theory and I did not do 
justice to its subtleties at all. For details, see in particular Dasgupta (2009): 
“Appendix on language G”, and of course Quine (1976). 
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goes with both a structuralist and a radically holistic 
conception of reality. In a nutshell, if one aims to accept 
Algebraic Generalism without taking an eliminativist stance 
towards non-qualitative facts, one should accept (Dasgupta 
says):  
 
- Structuralism about individualistic facts. An account of 
one individualistic fact is by the same token an account 
of all of them.126 
- Radical Holism. The world is fundamentally a single 
whole. At rock bottom, the only fundamental fact is that 
a single complex state of affairs that characterizes the 
whole world obtains. Distinct atomic facts may still hold, 
but they are not fundamental; they obtain in virtue of 
that sole one fundamental fact.127  
 
I will not focus on the reasons why Generalism entails Radical 
Holism here.128  
As for Structuralism, the point should be connected to another 
crucial feature of Dasgupta’s metaphysics – in particular, to his 
conception of grounding for individualistic facts. According to 
Dasgupta, if Qualitativism is right then the individualistic facts 
are plurally and non-distributively grounded in the qualitative 
facts: the plurality of the individualistic facts that obtain is, 
collectively, grounded in the plurality of the qualitative facts 
	
126 See Dasgupta (2014): 10-11. 
127 See Dasgupta (2009): 55-56, 58. 
128 For Dasgupta’s very neat argument to this end, see Dasgupta (2009): 55-
56. 
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that obtain, though no individualistic fact, considered by itself, 
has a qualitative ground of its own.  
Of course, this turns into a modus ponens by Dasgupta’s lights, 
for the argument from danglers was supposed to show us that 
Qualitativism is right indeed. As a consequence, Dasgupta 
rejects Singularism about ground: according to his view, not 
only the grounds of a fact, but also what is grounded can be a 
plurality. 129  Roughly, his argument for this move is the 
following.  
Suppose Qualitativism is right. Consider then some non-
qualitative fact, say – in line with Dasgupta’s own suggestion – 
the fact that Obama exists; call it S. Given Qualitativism and 
the mainstream assumption that, although what grounds can 
be a plurality of facts, what is grounded is always one single 
fact – given, that is, Singularism about ground – we would 
expect there to be some collection of qualitative facts Q that 
collectively ground S. However, note that Dasgupta assumes 
the following constraints on grounding:  
 
a. Necessitation. “[T]he grounded is metaphysically 
necessitated by its grounds”.130 
b. Whole relevance. “[A]ll parts of an explanation must be 
explanatorily relevant: if the Xs ground the Ys and x is 
one of the Xs, then x is explanatorily relevant to the Ys in 
the sense that x plays at least some role in making it the 
case that the Ys obtain”.131 	
129 See Dasgupta (2014): 3-4; Dasgupta (2017): § 4.  
130 Dasgupta (2014): 4. For an opposite take on this, see Leuenberger (2014) 
and Skiles (2015). Cf. also Loss (2017).  
131 Dasgupta (2014): 4.  
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Now, according to Dasgupta, nothing short of the collection of 
all the qualitative facts obtaining at our world – if anything – 
will be enough to necessitate the fact that Obama exists.132 Yet 
even that collection (call it ‘Big Q’) will fail to ground S. For of 
course not every part of Big Q will be relevant to an explanation 
of S – there are of course qualitative facts about galaxies far, far 
away that would be irrelevant to an explanation of Obama’s 
existence, and yet such facts are, indeed, part of Big Q.  
More generally – so the thought goes – there is no way to save 
both Necessitation and Whole Relevance if we aim to argue that 
every non-qualitative fact is grounded, by itself, in some 
collection of qualitative facts.133 
However, there is an easy way out if we accept that grounding 
can be plural and non-distributive. Consider again Big Q. We 
said that Big Q fails to ground S because parts of the former are 
not relevant for an explanation of the latter. This seems to 
openly contradict the qualitativist credo: there are, one would 
say, individualistic facts that do not have a qualitative ground 
– S is one of them. Yet this is not the whole story. In effect, S is 	
132 Dasgupta’s point here is roughly the following. Suppose we start looking 
for qualitative grounds of the fact that Obama exists. We may start by 
considering the facts that such-and-such a man exists (say, one that is tall 
and smart and has a contagious smile), that he at some point in his life is a 
lawyer, that he at some later time becomes president of a huge federal 
republic, and so on. None of this seems sufficient to necessitate that Obama 
exists – unless, of course, a strong version of PII holds. Even considering all 
of the qualitative facts forming the story of our solar system would not seem 
to suffice: the world could have contained a solar system indiscernible from 
ours but numerically different from it, and a man indiscernible from Obama 
but numerically different from him. However, we are working under the 
hypothesis that Qualitativism is true, so the collection of all the qualitative 
facts obtaining at our world must suffice to necessitate that Obama exists. 
See ibid.: § 3.   
133 Cf. ibid.: 8-11.  
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a counterexample to Qualitativism only inasmuch as 
Qualitativism is held together with Singularism about ground – 
that is, only if one assumes that every individualistic fact must 
by itself be grounded in the qualitative.  
By contrast, if what is grounded – and not only what grounds – 
can be a plurality of facts, accepting that S by itself fails to be 
grounded in the qualitative may pose no deep problem to the 
qualitativist.  
Intuitively, what the qualitativist needs to exclude is that some 
aspects of reality are neither part of Big Q nor settled by it, so 
to speak. Now, consider a further collection of facts: the 
collection of all the individualistic facts that obtain – call it ‘Big 
S’. As opposed to what happened with S, it is easy to ascribe a 
qualitative ground to Big S without contravening either 
Necessitation or Whole Relevance: Big Q will be said to be such 
a ground. Every part of Big Q will of course be relevant for 
explaining some part of Big S. In effect, there is a sense in which 
the two collections may be taken to ‘describe’, as it were, exactly 
one and the same portion of reality: Big Q captures a complete 
qualitative description of our whole world, while Big S captures 
a complete individualistic one. 
Moreover, given Qualitativism and given that every qualitative 
feature of our world is part of Big Q, every part of reality that is 
not part of Big Q must be grounded in – hence, also necessitated 
by – it. (It may be relevant to recall that Dasgupta’s point here 
is a conditional one: “if the world is fundamentally qualitative, 
then the individualistic facts are plurally grounded in the 
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qualitative”.134 The reasons for accepting Qualitativism in the 
first place should be sought elsewhere – according to Dasgupta, 
in the argument from danglers).  
Consider now S again. By claiming that Big Q grounds Big S, 
the qualitativist does exclude that any part of reality can fail to 
be either part of Big Q or settled by it. For every part of reality 
that is not part of Big Q is part of a plurality that is grounded 
in Big Q – i.e., of Big S. Even S is part of Big S – hence, its not 
having a qualitative ground of its own need not pose a problem 
to the qualitativist credo. For by being part of a plurality that is 
grounded in Big Q, S itself is, so to say, indirectly settled by Big 
Q.135 
(We may also wish to say that if plural grounding is accepted, 
then the notion of ‘fundamental’ should be modified. Under 
Singularism, a fact counts as fundamental iff it is ungrounded. 
Under Pluralism, a fact counts as fundamental iff it is 
ungrounded and it is not part of a plurality of facts that is 
grounded).  
 
3.3. Individuation: Individual Essences   
 
For reasons that I will provide in the next chapter, I think that 
a proper framework of the present debate must appeal to the 
notion of primitive thisness. More precisely, it must 
characterize anti-Haecceitism about the Ks as a view that holds 
that every K must be qualitatively individuated, so that none of 	
134 Ibid.: 2-3. 
135 More precisely, Dasgupta talks of a sense in which Big Q would “account 
for” S, by grounding a plurality (the one I am labelling Big S) that has S as a 
logical consequence. See ibid.: 11.  
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them possibly has primitive thisness. This claim, in turn, 
commits one to the idea that every K has a qualitative individual 
essence. In what follows, I will characterize the latter idea by 
properly defining the notion of a qualitative individual essence 
that is relevant to the framework I defend (§ 3.3.1) and argue 
that in order to rule it out that any of the Ks may have primitive 
thisness one must indeed ascribe to each one of them an 
individual essence of that sort (§ 3.3.2).  
 
3.3.1. Purely Qualitative Minimal Individual Essences  
 
An individual essence of Richard Burton is (roughly) an 
essential feature of Richard Burton that is also an individuating 
feature of him. It is, in the spirit of Alvin Plantinga (in particular 
1974; 1976), a property of Richard Burton, or a collection 
thereof, that is both essential to him and essentially unique to 
him.136  
The debate about such properties in metaphysics was a 
significant one long before Plantinga’s systematic treatment, 
though: Aristotle famously addressed the question whether 
each individual substance has a non-trivial individual essence 
in this sense, and answered it in the negative.137 (The sense of 
‘trivial’ and of related notions that is relevant here will be clear 
in due course). By contrast, as I already mentioned, an 
influential interpretation of Leibniz’s modal metaphysics has it 
	
136 While the notion of a property being essentially unique to something may 
sound obscure, I am mentioning it here in view of how important the thought 
of Plantinga, who made use of it, was for this topic. Nothing of what follows 
will theoretically rest on the exact meaning of this particular phrase.  
137 See references in fn. 78 above.  
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that his doctrine of complete individual concepts amounts to 
the claim that each individual substance has an individual 
essence – and, as a matter of fact, a purely qualitative one.138  
Issues about individual essences are nowadays complicated by 
the fact that the problem of how to understand essentialist 
notions of any sort is itself an intensely debated one. In 
particular, the once-standard approach that analyses 
essentialist notions in terms of modal ones was shown to face 
what look like serious counterexamples by Dunn (1990) and 
most famously by Fine (1994). 
Plantinga himself did accept, in the works I am considering, 
that approach. He had it that the essential properties of a thing 
are those that the thing has necessarily – where to have a 
property necessarily, in turn, is to have it in every possible 
world in which one exists.  
(As has become customary, I will call the idea that the essential 
properties of a thing are those that the thing could not possibly 
exist without an endorsement of the ‘existential-modal’ account 
of essentialist notions).139  
Accordingly, Plantinga characterized the notion of an individual 
essence as follows:  
 
E is an individual essenceP =df “there is a world W in 
which there exists an object x that (1) has E essentially 
	
138 See references in fn. 49 above. Cf. also Mackie (2006): 22.  
139 Cf., among others Roca-Royes (2011); see also Robertson and Atkins 
(2018). Gorman (2005), Wildman (2013), Torza (2015) and others employ the 
label ‘modalism’ for any view that analyses essentialist notions in modal 
terms, but since the same had been used to name forms of primitivism about 
the meaning of modal operators, I find it desirable to adopt a different one.  
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and (2) is such that there is no world W* in which there 
exists an object distinct from x that has E”.140  
 
(Here and in what follows, and as has also become quite 
customary, I use the phrase ‘individual essence’ where 
Plantinga himself would speak simply of an ‘essence’ instead. 
This choice helps avoiding, I think, some serious confusions. 
For instance, many are willing to deliver claims that entail there 
to be something such as the essence of Richard Burton, or of 
Socrates – where ‘essence of a’ and ‘nature of a’ are commonly 
taken as synonymous – without thereby committing to the idea 
that either of RB and Socrates has an individual essence in the 
sense that is presently relevant, or at least a non-trivial one. 
The point will be further clarified in due course).141   
 
But we may as well assume an understanding that is neutral 
as to how modal notions are to be construed. A first 
approximation to the one I favour is the following:  a property E 
is taken to constitute an individual essence of an entity a if and 
only if having E (or: being E) is a condition that is necessarily 
both necessary and sufficient for being a. This understanding 
was employed by Penelope Mackie in her very neat treatment of 
	
140 Plantinga (1974): 72. For Plantinga’s views on individual essences, see 
also Plantinga (1979), which discusses Chisholm (1976)’s treatment of the 
notion.  
141 See also Adams (1981): fn. 1 for warning against a further potential 
confusion. An explicit endorsement of both the significance of the 
essentialist labels I have in mind – of phrases such as ‘the essence of a’ and 
‘the nature of a’ – and the idea that things have individual essences is 
defended in Lowe (2008).  
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the topic (and, in particular, of Forbes’s modal views).142 It is 
easy to see that, if necessity is understood as truth in every 
possible world, then this construal is equivalent to the one by 
Plantinga considered above.   
As I anticipated, though, it is clear that those who reject the 
modal-existential account of essentialist notions will also deny 
that this one in particular – the notion of an individual essence 
– may be exhaustively understood in those terms. For the 
arguments presented in Fine (1994), if sound, show that not 
every property that an entity could not exist without is essential 
to it. The converse, though, would still hold: every essential 
property of a thing would be one that the thing could not 
possibly exist without.  
As concerns the notion I am engaging with here, this would 
mean that conditions such as those invoked by Plantinga, 
Mackie, and others, since cashed out in existential-modal 
terms, are necessary, but not sufficient, for a property to qualify 
as an individual essence of a given thing.  
As a matter of fact, Fine’s important case concerning Socrates 
and his singleton may itself be rephrased in terms of individual 
essences. Fine’s point in this regard is, in a nutshell, the 
following. On the one hand, the recognition that the property of 
having Socrates as one’s sole member is one that singleton 
Socrates could not exist without seems to be legitimately 
accompanied by the intuition that such a property is also 
essential to that singleton. On the other, the property of being 
the sole member of singleton Socrates, despite being such that 	
142  See Mackie (2006): 19, ff. Cf. also Forbes (1985), (1994): fn. 23; 
Rosenkrantz (1993): 43-44; Mackie and Jago (2017).  
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Socrates could not exist while lacking it, does not seem to 
pertain to Socrates in as intimate a way.  In Fine’s own words:  
 
Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it 
has never been suggested that in order to understand the 
nature of a person one must know to which sets he 
belongs. There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I may 
put it this way, which demands that he belongs to this or 
that set or which even demands that there be any sets. (…) 
[C]an we not recognize a sense of nature, or of "what an 
object is", according to which it lies in the nature of the 
singleton to have Socrates as a member even though it 
does not lie in the nature of Socrates to belong to the 
singleton?143 
 
But I think that – if the point is accepted of course – something 
stronger may be claimed. The property of having Socrates as 
one’s sole member is necessarily both necessary and sufficient 
for being singleton Socrates, as being the sole member of 
singleton Socrates is for being Socrates. The former property 
may well be said to be an individual essence of the singleton in 
question. For having exactly certain things as members is 
widely taken to be – via the axiom of extensionality – all it takes 
in order for some set to be a given set in particular, as opposed 
to every other: having Socrates as one’s sole member is then an 
individuating property of singleton Socrates. And the same 
property is indeed – even for those who reject the modal-
	
143 Fine (1994): 5.  
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existential account – an essential one of the singleton. However, 
if Fine is right then being the sole member of singleton Socrates 
is not essential to Socrates, hence a fortiori not an individual 
essence of him, although it is necessarily both necessary and 
sufficient for something to possess that property in order for it 
to be Socrates. 
Given these worries, I will label the notion we may draw from 
glosses such as Plantinga’s and Mackie’s ‘minimal individual 
essence’. Similarly to what Mackie does, I will assume the 
following definition:  
 
F is a minimal individual essence of a =df. Necessarily, for 
any x, x has F if and only if x=a. 
 
The following definition, by contrast, appeals to an essentialist 
notion that is left unanalysed:  
 
F is an individual essence of a =df. F is a property of a, or 
a collection thereof, that (i.) is essential to a and (ii.) 
necessarily, for any x, if x has F then x=a.   
 
It may then be accepted, I suggest, by those who are led by 
Fine’s argument to endorse primitivism about essentialist 
notions.  
(I assume that the primitivists about essence would take it as 
unproblematic that (ii.) is cashed out in modal terms, as long 
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as (i.) guarantees that any property satisfying the definition is 
indeed essential to a in the sense they favour).144  
 
The claim that F is an individual essence of a will then just 
amount to the claim that F is a minimal individual essence of a 
in the mouth of someone who accepts the existential-modal 
account. By contrast, the primitivist will have it that if F is an 
individual essence of a, then F is a minimal individual essence 
of a – but she will deny that the converse is the case. 
As I said, forms of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks that respect 
the two desiderata of identity-explanation and distributiveness 
must rule it out that any one of the Ks may have primitive 
thisness. In order to do so, I said, such views must ascribe some 
qualitative individual essence to each one of the Ks.  
The latter claim may now properly be qualified: my point is that 
the views in question must ascribe to each one of the Ks some 
minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative. If the anti-
Haecceitist of the sort I have in mind is also a primitivist about 
essence and essentialist notions, she may or may not have 
reasons for claiming that each one of the Ks has a qualitative 
individual essence in the stronger sense that the notion conveys 
by her own lights. Whether and why she should do that is an 
issue that lies beyond my present aims. 
The notion of a thing’s having a qualitative individual essence 
may be immediately appreciated if the qualitative distinction is 
taken to be one that applies to properties – as it is under one of 
the strategies I have considered in § 1.5 above.  
	
144 Thanks to Fabrice Correia and Alex Skiles here.  
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Indeed, if the qualitative distinction is one that applies to 
properties, then to say that a has a qualitative individual 
essence is to say that there is some property or some collection 
of properties F such that (i.) F is an individual essence of a and 
(ii.) F (or: every property that is part of the collection F) is 
qualitative.145  Mutatis mutandis for the notion of a having a 
qualitative minimal individual essence.  
That is:  
 
a has a qualitative individual essence* =df For some 
qualitative property or collection of qualitative properties 
F, (i.) F is essential to a, and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, if x 
has F then x=a.  
 	
145  This, however, brings back to one of the problems that made me 
sympathize with the idea of avoiding a qualitative distinction that applies to 
properties in the first place. For given the picture I provided in the second 
chapter, a given thing, a, has primitive thisness iff there is no qualitative 
property P such that for something to be a is for it to have P. And I am about 
to argue that the claim that a fails to have primitive thisness entails that a 
has at least a minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative. As 
already mentioned, ascribing some qualitative individual essences to every 
individual substance was exactly Leibniz’s way to rule it out that individual 
substances may have primitive thisness – hence, also that they may give 
rise to cases of primitive identity. However, according to some, something 
stronger holds in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Not only would a’s qualitative 
individual essence convey conditions that are necessarily both necessary 
and sufficient for having a’s thisness (where a is an arbitrary individual 
substance): a’s qualitative individual essence would literally be the thisness 
of a. (Cf. Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics: 8). Yet as we saw, the 
qualitative distinction, if applied to properties, urges us to count every 
thisness as non-qualitative. How could then any thisness be identical to an 
individual essence that is qualitative instead? The fact that under this 
approach a’s qualitative individual essence may be a collection of qualitative 
properties, and still could not be identified with a’s thisness because of the 
way the qualitative distinction has been characterized would seem to 
frustrate Adams’s effort to allow for the claim he ascribes to Leibniz by 
accepting that thisnesses may be complex suchnesses. Cf. Adams (1979): 8-
9 and supra, § 1.5.  
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And:  
a has a qualitative minimal individual essence* =df For 
some qualitative property or collection of qualitative 
properties F, necessarily, for any x, x has F iff x=a. 
 
But alternatives that do not appeal to properties can also be 
provided.  
As above (§ 1.5, § 2.1, § 2.4), second-order non-objectual 
notions may again be employed.146 The result would be:  
 
a has a qualitative individual essence =df $F such that 
(i.) F is a qualitative way for something to be, (ii.) it is 
essential to a that Fa is the case, and (iii.) necessarily, for 
any x, if Fx then x=a.  
 
a has a qualitative minimal individual essence =df $F 
such that (i.)  F is a qualitative way for something to be, 
and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, Fx iff x=a. 
 
And, in terms of predicates: 
 
a has a qualitative individual essencepred. =df For some 
qualitative predicate ‘F’, (i.) satisfying ‘F’ is essential to a, 
and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, if x satisfies ‘F’ then x=a.  
 
	
146 The reference is, again, Rayo and Yablo (2001).  
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a has a qualitative minimal individual essencepred. =df 
For some qualitative predicate ‘F’, necessarily, for any x, 
Fx iff x=a. 
 
The idea is in any case intuitive enough: if not all, at least most 
things come with a qualitative profile of their own. Given an 
entity, a, if and only if there is some part of its qualitative profile 
– some ‘being so-and-so’ – such that being so-and-so is 
necessarily both necessary and sufficient in order to be a, a has 
a minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative: being 
so-and-so plays such a role. More generally, if and only if being 
so-and-so (again: to be read as a part of a’s qualitative profile) 
is essential to a and such that necessarily, anything that is so-
and-so is a, 147  being so-and-so is a qualitative individual 
essence of a.  
And as I argued in § 2.2, nominalists need not in general deny 
that things are qualitatively a certain way – say, that Richard 
Burton is tall and talented. Inasmuch as they have a way to 
embed the claim that RB is tall and talented, they can also 
claim that he is essentially so. By the same token, they can 
have it that being tall and talented is what individuates RB – 
which would at least entail that, necessarily, if something is tall 
and talented then it is RB. Hence, nominalists may embed the 
notion of a qualitative individual essence.  
 
 
	
147  See Roca-Royes (2011) for the notion of a sufficient-for-existence 
property and its role in characterizing an individual essence.  
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3.3.2. Non-Primitive Thisnesses Require Purely Qualitative 
Minimal Individual Essences 	
It is important to see why in order to exclude that a given thing 
has primitive thisness one must ascribe to it a minimal 
individual essence that is purely qualitative.  
A way to make this point draws on the notion of generalised 
identity, which I have employed in order to define primitive 
thisness. As I said, denying that a has primitive thisness is to 
argue that for something to be a is for it to be F, for some 
qualitative F. Now, a principle that is taken to govern claims of 
generalized identity is the following:  
 
If to be F is to be G, then necessarily, for any x, x is F if 
and only if x is G.  
 
It follows straightforwardly from that principle and from the 
claim that for something to be a is for it to be F that being F is a 
minimal individual essence of a as per my definition.148 
And there are alternatives, in case one is reluctant to make the 
point rest this heavily on the principles that govern generalised 
identity.  
One draws on the notion of a principle of individuation. I said 
that if for something to be a is for it to be F, then a’s being F is 
what individuates it, at least in the sense of making it be the 
very thing it is.  
	
148 The principle is explicitly accepted in Correia and Skiles (forthcoming)’s 
treatment of generalised identity; see ibid.: 5. See also Rayo (2013): 49, 66; 
Dorr (2016): 40. Cf. Linnebo (2014).  
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But then clearly being F must be a sufficient condition for being 
a: the idea that something may be F without being a contradicts 
the claim that being F is what makes a be the very thing it is 
(that is, a) in the first place.  
Under many conceptions of what a principle of individuation is, 
being F will then also be a necessary condition for being a: it 
will be excluded that a could possibly fail to have the feature 
(being F) that makes it be the thing it is.  
The definition of a minimal individual essence also requires that 
such two conditions themselves hold as a matter of necessity: 
it has to necessarily be the case that something is a if and only 
if it is F.  
To see that the last condition must indeed hold if being F is 
what makes something be a – and if the claim that that is the 
case is supposed to ensure anti-Haecceitism about a – we may 
consider the anti-Haecceitist’s rationale once again. The 
ultimate aim of my target here is still the one I have ascribed 
her in Chapter 1 above: i.e., it is the aim to exclude that the 
entities of a given class may give rise to cases of primitive 
identity and of haecceitistic difference.  
Let me focus for the moment only on cases of the latter sort. We 
have seen that differences of the relevant sort may arise 
(although they should not, says the anti-Haecceitist) also 
among things in different possible worlds – which is what is 
unacceptable by Leibniz’s own lights. The condition I am 
presently considering has exactly the result of excluding that 
cases of haecceitistic difference may arise that involve things in 
different possible worlds – or, if modality is not analysed in 
terms of possible worlds, in different maximal possibilities. For 
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if being F is necessarily a necessary and sufficient condition for 
identity with a, then no two things may differ trans-worldly 
merely as to their being identical or different from a: any two 
things that thus differ must also differ in their being F or failing 
to.  
The point leads to a further way to appreciate why an anti-
Haecceitist must commit to a’s having a qualitative minimal 
individual essence in order to exclude that a has primitive 
thisness.  
Given some arguments from Mackie (2006) that I have already 
touched upon, substantial or non-trivial individual essences 
must be ascribed to things lest cases of bare identity and 
difference across possible worlds involving such things are 
allowed. But if we focus on trans-world differences alone, the 
bare differences in question are in a way special cases of the 
sort of haecceitistic differences that we saw Leibniz argue 
against: they are cases in which the trans-world difference in 
the identity of some entities are not only unaccompanied by any 
qualitative difference, but also not accompanied by any further 
difference. If the foe of bare differences must ascribe to things 
non-trivial individual essences that may nonetheless be non-
qualitative, the anti-Haecceitist will then have to ascribe them 
a non-trivial individual essence that is also purely qualitative. I 
will get back to this point in § 5.1.1 and § 5.1.3 below.  
As concerns my point about individuation – that by holding that 
being F is what individuates a the anti-Haecceitist commits to 
the claim that being F is a minimal individual essence of a – a 
worry may be raised to the effect that weaker views about 
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individuation have been defended, and that such views would 
fail to support my point.  
In particular, under some theories of individuation what 
individuates a thing may fail to pertain to it necessarily. This 
would allow for it to be the case that being F is what makes 
something be a although being F is not necessary for something 
to be a. In that case, being F would individuate a without 
qualifying as a minimal individual essence of it.  
Something like this seems to be true in Aristotle’s metaphysics: 
having denied individual substances to have non-trivial 
individual essences, Aristotle committed to the idea that each 
individual substance is the one it is – as opposed to others that 
may share with it every qualitative essential feature – by virtue 
of being composed of that given chunk of matter that happens 
to compose it. However, under this view it is not necessary to 
being a given individual substance (say, to being Aristotle 
himself) that one is composed of a certain chunk of matter in 
particular – and this despite the fact that being thus composed 
is what individuates Aristotle, the individual substance in 
question! 
 
(The point is particularly interesting for the present debate. For, 
according to many interpreters, one of the reasons that led 
Scotus to resort to haecceitates was his discontentment with 
Aristotle’s theory of individuation for individual substances. In 
particular, Scotus would have found it unacceptable that an 
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individual substance be individuated by such an accident as 
being composed by a given chunk of matter).149 
 
In reply to this, one may call attention to the fact that most 
conceptions of individuation – at least among those that are 
commonly accepted nowadays – do require stronger conditions 
than the ones that Aristotle’s strategy is able to satisfy.  
For instance, it may be highlighted that identity criteria for 
entities of a given kind are customarily taken to provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for identity to hold between 
the referent(s) of two expressions that stand for entities of a 
certain kind.150  
And inasmuch as principles of individuation are taken to 
demand for something else than what identity criteria provide, 
they are in a sense taken to demand for more. Sometimes the 
quest for identity criteria is taken to be an epistemic one, while 
only the one for principles of identity is invested of metaphysical 
significance; principles of individuation are commonly taken to 
be such that they should hold trans-worldly, and not only about 
things of a certain kind within a given possible worlds, while 
the same is not required of identity criteria; sometimes it seems 
that principles of individuation are indeed taken to be after a 
question of what confers identity with a given thing in 
particular (what I would call ‘identity in the sense of thisness’), 
as opposed to identity criteria, which would regiment claims of 
identity or difference between items of a certain kind whichever 
	
149 See references in fn. 58 above.  
150 See, among many others, Davidson (1969); Williamson (1986); Lowe 
(1989); (1991); Noonan (2009); Fine (2016).  
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those items may be – or, to use a phrase whose legitimacy in 
the context was defended by Fine,  where such items are picked 
arbitrarily.151  
It then seems safe to assert that the anti-Haecceitist’s claim 
that being F is what individuates a, with the entailment that 
being F is a minimal individual essence of a, would fit these 
notions of what a principle of individuation is. The claim would 
be one of metaphysical force, stating conditions for identity with 
a certain entity in particular, a (i.e., for having a’s thisness) that 
are not only necessary and sufficient, but also necessarily so.  
Whether right or wrong, considerations such as these would 
hardly be exhaustive in making the point that an anti-
Haecceitist must commit to things’ having minimal individual 
essences in order to exclude that they have primitive thisness. 
For the issue is not so much what most philosophers take a 
principle of individuation to convey, either in the contemporary 
debate or in some other stage of philosophical investigation. 
The point is, rather, what a claim concerning the individuation 
of a certain thing is supposed to convey in the mouth of the 
anti-Haecceitist, given her own philosophical aims.  
As I said, the anti-Haecceitist is, in the present predicament, 
someone who denies entities of a certain sort to have primitive 
thisness in order to exclude that they may give rise to cases of 
primitive identity.  
Given this aim, the anti-Haecceitist is committed to the idea 
that each entity of the relevant sort is such that for something 
	
151 See Fine (2016). Cf. also Fine and Tennant (1983); Fine (1985).  
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to be identical to that thing is for it to be F – where being F is 
some qualitative way for something to be.  
But being identical to a given thing, a, just is to have a’s 
thisness. And having a’s thisness certainly is a minimal 
individual essence of a. For (trivially enough), it is necessary 
that being a be a necessary and sufficient condition for being a. 
Thus, in order to claim that for something to have a’s thisness 
is for it to be F, one must certainly commit to the idea that being 
F and being a have one and the same modal profile – hence, 
also to the idea that being F is, necessarily, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for being a.  
There are two ways to appreciate the point in even more detail, 
if so is needed.   
First, since the claim I have ascribed to the anti-Haecceitist is 
one of generalised identity, such a claim literally says that for 
something to be a and for it to be F are one and the same. Clearly 
though, if they are one and the same then they cannot differ in 
any way – not, in particular, in their modal profile. Second, a 
brief point I made in § 2.1 may be worth recalling here. Roughly, 
the idea was that each fact of the matter that may be described 
as ‘a is F’ may be made to rest on a further one to the effect that 
‘the thing that is G is F’, if it is the case that for something to 
be a is for it to be G. This is, in a nutshell, the reason why 
claiming that a does not have primitive thisness allows the anti-
Haecceitist to rule it out that a may give rise to cases of 
primitive identity. But whatever exactly is meant by the idea 
that each fact of the matter of the former sort ‘may be made to 
rest on’ one of the latter, for such a condition to hold it must at 
least be the case that each fact of the former sort is without fail 
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accompanied by one of the latter. Hence, being G must pertain 
to a just as intimately as being a does: it must be a feature such 
that necessarily, something is G if and only if it is a. That is, it 
must be a minimal individual essence of a.  
 
(One may argue that something stronger may actually be 
claimed: inasmuch as a difference is acknowledged between the 
two notions, the thisness of a thing, a, is arguably not only a 
minimal individual essence of a, but also an individual essence 
of a tout court. For it would go against the very spirit of 
essentialism to deny that, say, being Richard Burton is both 
essential to Richard Burton and such that, necessarily, if 
something ‘has it’ then it is RB.152 If so, there would be some 
pressure on the anti-Haecceitist about the Ks who rejects the 
existential-modal account of essence to accept that each one of 
the Ks has a qualitative individual essence proper – not only a 
minimal one. Still, that each of them has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence would follow from the latter claim – which is 
what I will need in order for my argument against anyone who 
denies that things may have primitive thisness to go through).  
 
In light of the above, I suggest that we conceive of anti-
Haecceitism (better, of forms of anti-Haecceitism that respect 
both identity-explanation and distributiveness) about the Ks as 
the claim that every K has a qualitative minimal individual 
essence. Being a Haecceitist about the Ks will then be to deny 
such a tenet – that is, to hold that at least some of the Ks fail 
	
152 Again, modulo Denby (2014)’s opinion.  
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to have a minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative. 
Some clarifications still need be made, but I will postpone them 
to Chapter 6, where I will characterize in detail my Haecceitistic 
position and defend it from some objections.  
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Chapter 4 
Desiderata for a Framework  
 
A doctrine that properly does justice to the case for anti-
Haecceitism I have spelled out in the first chapter does not boil 
down, I have argued, to modal anti-Haecceitism as defined by 
Lewis, nor, it seems, to other claims of supervenience. I have 
considered two ways to adequately characterize such a 
doctrine: Dasgupta’s one in terms of grounding and my own in 
terms of individual essences.  
This chapter is meant to give reasons to favour the latter. I will 
start by making a point I already touched upon – one to the 
effect that, against what most of the literature has so far 
assumed, anti-Haecceitism need not have a problem with 
individuals as opposed to entities of some other kind (§ 4.1). For 
reasons that are crucially related to that point, I will argue, 
Dasgupta’s account of the debate is significantly problematic as 
it stands (§ 4.2).  There is no way to fix its fallacies, I will 
contend, without either embedding in anti-Haecceitism the 
claim that no fundamental entity has primitive thisness or 
turning the view into a much more controversial one – one that 
the case for anti-Haecceitism itself does not support.  
Far from concerning Dasgupta’s view alone, such a morale is 
utterly general: any form of anti-Haecceitism properly 
conceived must indeed deliver a claim in terms of primitive 
thisness. More precisely, it must at least exclude there to be 
fundamental things with primitive thisness (§ 4.3).  
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4.1. Is the Appeal to Individuals Mandatory?  
 
On the background of what has been said so far, the present 
chapter is meant to settle the definitional aim of this 
dissertation.  
The upshot will be the following: in order to adequately fulfil the 
rationale behind anti-Haecceitism (see § 1.3, § 1.4), a doctrine 
must either deny there to be any fundamental entities or 
exclude that any of them has primitive thisness.  
However, the former option (what in recent literature is 
sometimes labelled ‘Ontological Nihilism’, or something close to 
it) is much stronger than anti-Haecceitism per se – what is 
worse, the case for anti-Haecceitism does not support it. Hence, 
a proper phrasing of the debate on Haecceitism must indeed 
appeal to the notion of primitive thisness.  
As concerns grounding, by contrast, things are less 
straightforward. Needless to say, an appeal to such a notion will 
be welcome by those who wish to characterize their anti-
Haecceitism as a claim about what is fundamental and to 
construe fundamentality in terms of ungroundedness. Yet we 
should be wary of what one can as a matter of fact gain from 
such an appeal – and aware of what one cannot gain. 
Crucially, as I will argue, talk of non-qualitative facts and of 
their being grounded in qualitative ones may accompany, but 
cannot substitute (as Dasgupta’s strategy presumes) talk of 
entities and of their thisnesses being non-primitive. Since the 
presumption that it can instead is critical for Dasgupta’s 
attempt to defend anti-Haecceitism without committing to PII, 
making this point will play a decisive role in my whole 
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argument. For my main charge against the anti-Haecceitist – to 
stress once more – is that, overtly or covertly, she does have to 
commit to such a controversial Principle.  
Yet Dasgupta’s view does look like an anti-Haecceitistic 
metaphysics that is not committed to PII. Hence, if I am right, 
something is wrong with it. While exposing what I think is 
wrong with it, I will now make a general point also – one that I 
have touched upon several times already.  
The point is very roughly the following: as opposed to what has 
been widely assumed in the debate, it is not the case that 
individuals can in principle offend against the anti-Haecceitist’s 
rationale while entities of some other category cannot. As will 
be clear shortly, the erroneous assumption that that is the case 
is pivotal to Dasgupta’s phrasing of the debate; indeed, it allows 
the Generalist to misrepresent her view as one that can exclude 
all cases of primitive identity without banning primitive 
thisnesses (hence without committing to PII).  
The following considerations should help get a clearer grasp on 
why this point is crucial for my case against Generalism.  
Consider the aim, on the part of the anti-Haecceitist, to rule it 
out that cases of haecceitistic difference involving some 
fundamental entities may arise.   
If the only ways to properly fulfil such an aim are the ones I 
mentioned above, that is:  
a. to hold that no fundamental entity has primitive 
thisness,  
or:  
b. to hold that there are no fundamental entities 
whatsoever,  
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this is very bad news for the anti-Haecceitism who is not willing 
to commit to PII. For, as I said:  
- the rationale for anti-Haecceitism does not support the 
latter option, and:  
- the former option entails that every fundamental entity 
has a qualitative minimal individual essence (cf. § 3.3.2 
above). And as I will argue in the next chapter (§ 5.1.1), 
the claim that every entity of a certain class has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence entails, in turn, 
that all such things respect strong PII.  
 
(Note that I am working under the hypothesis that the anti-
Haecceitist aims to rule it out that any fundamental entities 
may give rise to cases of haecceitistic difference, but the 
scenario is even more problematic for one who aims to exclude 
all cases of haecceitistic difference whatsoever. For at least 
prima facie, if I am right, then such an anti-Haecceitist would 
have to either hold that every single entity respects strong PII 
or deny that there are entities simpliciter!) 
 
Yet this is exactly the scenario we should expect.  
Or, rather, it is the one we should expect unless it is the case 
that the entities of certain sorts can in principle give rise to 
cases of haecceitistic differences while others cannot – quite 
independently from whether the latter have primitive thisness. 
For in that case, the anti-Haecceitist could hold together all of 
the following claims:  
- there are fundamental entities (hence, Ontological 
Nihilism is false);  
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- such entities need not have qualitative minimal 
individual essences, nor need they respect strong PII. 
They cannot possibly give rise to cases of haecceitistic 
difference for reasons quite independent from whether or 
not they have primitive thisness.  
I will argue that Dasgupta’s strategy rests on an assumption 
such as the one I just mentioned – i.e., the assumption that 
only the entities of a certain class (individuals) may in principle 
offend against the rationale for anti-Haecceitism. By proving 
that assumption wrong, I will make the case that his strategy 
does not allow the anti-Haecceitist to escape the scenario I 
depicted. Any view that satisfies the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism must ultimately commit to either a. or b. above.  
 
Let me now introduce in some more detail the assumption I will 
be arguing against – I shall call it “the Individuals Assumption”. 
The Individuals Assumption has it that when it comes to 
Haecceitism something theoretically significant hinges on those 
allegedly special entities that are taken to deserve the label of 
individuals, in at least the following two ways. 
 
i. Only (so-called) individuals are taken to be relevant as 
the scope of an (anti-)Haecceitist theory, so that either 
defending or rejecting Haecceitism is to take a stance 
as concerns whether the identity of such things (and 
only of them) is qualitatively determined or ‘explained’. 
 
Fine clearly seems to have this in mind when he claims that 
“metaphysical Anti-Haecceitism is a doctrine concerning the 
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identity of individuals. It states that the identity of individuals 
– or, at least, of certain individuals – is to be explained in terms 
of their purely qualitative features or in terms of their 
qualitative relations to other individuals”.153 
 
ii. Such things alone – individuals – may give rise (if 
anything at all may) to haecceitistic differences. 	
This latter idea in particular, I think, led some to infer that anti-
Haecceitism is incompatible with there being fundamental 
individuals, and naturally comes with a fundamental ontology 
of sole universals instead. 
Thus, Dasgupta himself first introduced his Qualitativism as 
the view that “[f]undamentally speaking, there are no such 
things as individuals”.154  The idea is less outlandish than one 
may think: more generally, we tend to assume that claiming 
that reality is fundamentally qualitative is to claim that 
qualities – however they are conceived of – are what 
fundamentally exists, while the existence of individuals is in 
some way derivative on theirs.  Accordingly, Fine (2005) has it 
that, at least “very roughly”, anti-Haecceitism “is a version of 
the bundle theory (‘there is nothing to a particular over and 
above its properties’) while metaphysical Haecceitism is a 
version of the doctrine of ‘basic particulars’”.155  And although 
he himself does not seem to take such associations very 
seriously, the hint seems to come from the intuition I am talking 
about: the intuition that if anti-Haecceitism is true then only 	
153 Fine (2005): 31. See also, among others, Ujvári (2013) and Russell (2017).  
154 Dasgupta (2009): 35.  
155 Fine (2005): 31. See also Armstrong (1989): 59.   
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(qualitative) properties are fundamental existents, while 
individuals (if such things there be) must in some sense be 
‘built’, so to speak, out of them.156 
As should by now be clear, though, haecceitistic differences are 
nothing but special cases of primitive identities. They are still 
cases of non-qualitative features of reality that fail to be settled 
by the qualitative. So the idea that only so-called individuals 
may (again, if anything may at all) give rise to cases of 
haecceitistic differences and of primitive identity more generally 
seems to follow trivially from a further aspect of the Individuals 
Assumption. 
The point is that, following Adams, we tend to define the 
qualitative distinction in terms that are not generally 
acceptable unless the Assumption is indeed right. As I said (§ 
1.5), a property counts as non-qualitative in Adams’s 
framework if and only if it consists in being in some way related 
to a certain individual in particular, and every property that is 
not non-qualitative in this sense is purely qualitative – a 
‘suchness’.  
Consistently with such a framework, I contend, we thus tend to 
define the qualitative distinction in terms that crucially depend 
on the notion of an individual – more in particular, in such a 
way as to make it so that only individuals may be involved in 
non-qualitative features of reality. Hence, a fortiori, it turns out 
that only individuals may be involved in those peculiar non-
qualitative features of reality that are not settled by the 
qualitative (if such features there be).  
	
156 Cf. Introduction and § 2.2 above.   
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Yet Adams’s choice in that sense was merely motivated by his 
own theoretical interests – i.e., by his being “concerned (…) 
principally with the question whether the identity and 
distinctness of individuals is purely qualitative or not”.157  He 
himself mentioned – and did not exclude – that there may be 
properties that are analogous to thisnesses, but such that each 
one of them consists in being identical with a certain entity in 
particular – where such an entity is not an individual. He 
considered, in particular, “the property of being identical with 
the quality red”.158 He kept silent, though, about whether also 
concerning such ‘quasi-thisnesses’, so to speak – properties of 
being identical with a given entity in particular, where such an 
entity is not an individual – the question whether they are 
qualitative or equivalent to qualitative properties may have 
some relevance. But unless our interests mirror Adams’s own 
ones, it is such a question that we should address, before 
defining the qualitative distinction in such terms as to directly 
imply that a non-qualitative feature of reality – hence, a fortiori, 
one that is not settled by the qualitative – must be such by 
virtue of involving a certain individual (not a certain entity, more 
generally intended) in particular. 
A number of historical reasons lie behind, I suggest, the 
widespread acceptance of the Individuals Assumption. By 
looking at them, I contend, it can be appreciated that once a 
series of contingent idiosyncrasies are removed – as they should 
be – there is good grounds to doubt that solid theoretical 
reasons do support the Assumption. 	
157 Adams (1979): 6; italics mine.  
158 Ibid.  
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First, although contemporary Haecceitism is not the claim that 
each individual has a haecceitas (see § 2.3 above), it does have 
one of its historical roots in such a view.159  But Duns Scotus 
meant haecceitates as a solution to the problem of 
individuation, which in his days was taken to have two aspects. 
A principle of individuation was then supposed to answer both 
the question of what makes something qualify as an individual 
(as an entity belonging to such a kind, in general) and that of 
what makes that same thing be a certain individual in 
particular, as opposed to every other.160  
The former question is not taken to be part of the problem of 
individuation as it is approached in the contemporary debate, 
though. Also, once duly generalized, the latter question – the 
question of what makes a thing of a certain kind be the very 
one it is, as opposed to every other – is one we often attempt to 
answer about entities that many would not label ‘individuals’, 
such as, for instance, tropes. So if the connection to Scotus’s 
haecceitas is one of the reasons why the issue about 
Haecceitism has been taken to bear some special tie to the 
notion of an individual (as I suggest it is), we would better take 
it to be a merely historical – and theoretically not relevant – 
reason for that.  
Second, many of those involved in the debate on Haecceitism 
have been taking Lewis's definition of the doctrine as landmark. 
As I said (§ 3.1), the Lewisian Haecceitist claims, and the 
Lewisian anti-Haecceitist denies, that worlds may differ “in 
what they represent de re concerning various individuals” 	
159 Cf. Carrara and Morato (2007).  
160 See again references in fn. 58 above.  
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without differing “in their qualitative character; or, for ersatz 
worlds, in the qualitative character they ascribe to the concrete 
world”. 161  But in providing such a definition Lewis was 
interested in representation de re so as it is treated in On the 
Plurality of Worlds – i.e., via counterparts. Under that approach, 
the only entities that are eligible for having something 
represented de re of them by having such-and-such 
counterparts are, indeed, individuals.162   
Yet again, this is specific to (a certain bit of) Lewis’s view. We 
may need to abandon the presupposition that the only way for 
worlds to differ in what they represent de re is for them to differ 
in what they represent de re of some individuals, in particular 
(and not of some entities in general) in order to discuss modal 
Haecceitism in other frameworks, and even more may we need 
to reach a related generality of scope in order to discuss 
metaphysical Haecceitism, which is what is at stake here. 
Third, we should consider Adams’s influence in this sense as 
well – about which enough has been said already.  
 
These and possibly further historical motivations, I suggest, lie 
behind the Individuals Assumption. By contrast, I contend, one 
may well doubt that solid theoretical reasons do support the 
Assumption.  
On the face of it, it seems that one may be a Haecceitist (or an 
anti-Haecceitist of course) about things that are not individuals. 
	
161 Lewis (1986): 221; the latter italics is mine.  
162 Contra Lewis (2009), Guigon (2016) argues that Lewis himself should 
have endorsed a counterpart theory for properties as well. For further 
stances on the debate about Quidditism, see Black (2000); Schaffer (2005); 
Locke (2011); Curtis (2016); Smith (2016).  
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Otherwise, no theory that accepts haecceities à la Scotus and 
uses them to construct a principle of individuation would be 
tenable. For in order to perform the metaphysical work they are 
supposed to instead of turning out to be redundant additions 
to one's ontology, such entities would better not be qualitatively 
individuated. As a matter of fact, they cannot be qualitatively 
individuated. For they themselves lack any intrinsic feature and 
whatever can be positively said about a haecceity in purely 
qualitative terms – that is, without mentioning which individual 
possesses it – is true as well about any haecceity whatsoever. 
But a haecceity cannot be individuated in terms of the 
individual it belongs to, either – otherwise, we would be running 
in a circle. Finally, haecceities cannot themselves be individuals 
- they are supposed to belong to some other category and to be 
such that the individuals depend on them for their identity.163 
More generally, some views about individuation have held that 
each individual is individuated in virtue of being related to a 
determinate entity that is not an individual, where the latter 
entity has strongly primitive thisness – i.e., its being the very 
thing it is is to be taken as a brute fact.164  
Haecceities are not the only instance: the matter that composes 
a given individual substance in Aristotle’s metaphysics is a 
further example. As anticipated, Aristotle had it that the matter 
composing a given substance is what differentiates that 	
163  Cf. Rosenkrantz (1993) for a contemporary defence of Scotusian 
haecceities that clearly takes haecceities to have primitive identity. See also 
Plantinga (1976) and the discussion in Adams (1981).  
164 I am presently using the term ‘individuation’ so as it is intended in the 
contemporary debate and as I have developed it in Ch. 1 and Ch. 2 – i.e., as 
I argued above, under a construal that embeds only part of the Medieval 
problem of individuation. 
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substance from every other belonging to the same genus. But 
this should not be read as the claim that each substance is 
different from every other by being composed of a chunk of 
matter that differ qualitatively from the one that composes any 
other. Otherwise, it would turn out that every substance must 
be qualitatively different from every other – an idea that 
Aristotle explicitly denied.165 
And the relevant examples are not confined to ancient and 
medieval philosophy or to theories of individuation for 
individual substances. As I said, several contemporary 
theorists of the notion take tropes to be primitively 
individuated.  And tropes, albeit particular, are commonly 
taken not to be individuals: individuals would be, in this 
perspective, either bundles of tropes or further entities by 
which tropes are instantiated.    
These are all examples of entities that are not individuals, and 
yet they are conceived as such that they would possibly give 
rise to cases of primitive identity. In order to make room for the 
tenability of at least one of such views, we should indeed admit, 
I argue, that the Individuals Assumption gets things wrong. 
That is to say, it is not the case that individuals should be 
thought to threaten the anti-Haecceitist’s dictum in ways that 
entities of other kinds cannot.  
And it would indeed be surprising to find out that all these 
views are untenable: we certainly would need some very robust 
theoretical reasons in order to think they are. Yet as a matter 
of fact, it is hard to see reasons for thus thinking that are 
	
165 For references, see fn. 78 above.  
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independent from the very assumption that only individuals are 
eligible for possibly having facts of the matter concerning their 
identity not settled by the qualitative. And we are yet to be 
shown that there is a reason to think that only they are indeed 
such.  
Nevertheless, persuaded by the Individuals Assumption some 
take anti-Haecceitism to be incompatible with there being 
fundamental individuals, and to naturally come with a 
fundamental ontology of sole universals instead. Dasgupta’s 
approach is no exception: he clearly states that “(t)he 
generalist's ontology consists of a domain of properties” and 
that “(l)ike the bundle theorist, our generalist thinks of these 
properties as universals rather than sets of individuals or 
tropes”.166  Moreover, as will be clear shortly, the genuinely 
metaphysical difference between the facts that the Quantifier 
Generalist and the facts that the Algebraic Generalist take as 
fundamental (respectively) is that the former, but not the latter, 
seem to entail the existence of some individuals.  
I think that this idea is mistaken. As a matter of fact, I shall 
argue that assuming a fundamental ontology of universals 
alone is both too strong and too weak a theoretical move if one’s 
aim is to exclude Haecceitism. In particular, it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient in order to exclude cases of primitive 
identity. As I will now set forth to argue, this causes trouble to 
the project of rephrasing the issue of Haecceitism in terms of 
grounding in the way – and with the motivations – that the 
Generalist set forth.  
	
166 Dasgupta (2009): 52.  
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4.2. Is the Appeal to Grounding Mandatory? 
 
As I said (§ 3.2), Dasgupta takes his own arguments against 
Haecceitism to entail that we should not take there to be 
fundamental individuals. However, I think that by looking 
closely at his own case for anti-Haecceitism one may most 
conveniently appreciate that such a stance is wrong: the issue 
of whether there are cases of primitive identity and that of 
whether there are fundamental individuals are distinct and 
orthogonal.  
Consider, in particular, Dasgupta’s case to the effect that 
‘primitive individuals’ are danglers. Mere differences in the 
identity of the individuals involved in a given observation are, 
Dasgupta says, empirically undetectable and explanatorily 
redundant according to any physical theory from NGT onward. 
Since a lot has already been said about Dasgupta’s case for the 
claim that such differences are explanatorily redundant (§ 1.3), 
I will now focus on the case for their being undetectable. Here 
is what Dasgupta says to that end:  
 
[I]magine a situation in which (…) a primitive individual is 
placed in front of you. Depending on what sorts of things 
primitive individuals are (or would be, if they were real!), 
this might be a situation in which you are in front of a 
chair, or an electron, or perhaps something else. To fix 
ideas, let us suppose without loss of generality that it is a 
chair. And now imagine a situation in which everything is 
exactly the same except that a different primitive 
individual is in front of you. Suppose this different 
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individual has exactly the same qualities as the actual 
chair in front of you: imagine it were colored the same, 
shaped the same, and so on. (…) [T]he situation would look 
and feel and smell exactly the same to you: we cannot tell 
the difference between situations that differ only in their 
individualistic facts.167 
 
On the face of it, what such considerations seem to target are 
not the entities of a given sort per se – either individuals or 
something else, but some sorts of differences: differences in the 
identity of the entities involved in some given situation that are 
not accompanied by any qualitative difference. That is, once 
again, the anti-Haecceitist’s concern arises from the possibility 
that there might be cases of what I called ‘haecceitistic 
differences’.  
If some entities should also be taken as problematic in the light 
of such considerations, they must presumably be those entities 
that may (at least in principle) give rise to such differences. But 
we are yet to be told why we should think that only entities of 
a certain sort in particular – individuals – are such that they 
may give rise to those (allegedly problematic) differences. Even 
less should we feel persuaded, I contend, that all entities of that 
given sort should be held not to be fundamental existents. 
 
My point may perhaps be made, from a slightly different 
perspective, as follows. Let us still concede, for the sake of 
discussion, that such arguments as Dasgupta’s, if sound, do 
	
167 Ibid.: 42.  
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give us reason to exclude a certain category of entities (or ban 
them from the fundamental ontology at least). If so, the category 
at issue should at most be taken to be, I contend, that of 
primitive individuals in Dasgupta’s sense – i.e., those entities 
that may be characterized as follows: 
 
For any x, x is a primitive individual iffdf. some non-
qualitative fact F (i.) is such that whether or not it obtains 
depends on how things stand with x, and (ii.) is not 
grounded in qualitative facts.168  
 
And, it should be kept in mind, what has been singled out as 
unacceptable about such things is that they may give rise to 
haecceitistic differences. 
Why should we think that such entities are also the entities 
that belong to a certain category – that of individuals, though? 
A pretty obvious answer may be given insofar as Dasgupta’s 
own perspective is concerned: somewhat in line with the 
qualitative distinction that was provided by Adams as applied 
to properties, Dasgupta defines the qualitative distinction, as 
applied to facts, in terms that crucially depend on the notion of 
an individual. More precisely, he tells us that a fact is non-
qualitative if and only if it is such that whether or not it obtains 
depends on how things stand with a given individual.  
Yet this may well be to put the cart before the horse. For as I 
remarked earlier, the choice was motivated, in the former case, 
by Adams’s own theoretical interests. Yet it is not clear how to 
	
168 Cf. § 3.2 above.  
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justify the definitional choice in the latter case, if not by 
declaring, there too, that one’s interests are confined to facts of 
the matter concerning the identity of some special entities – 
individuals – alone.  
But then it would be really hard to see how one can legitimately 
move from an argument against haecceitistic differences such 
as Dasgupta’s to his alleged conclusion that there are no 
fundamental individuals. The proper outcome of the argument 
from danglers (if sound) would merely be that haecceitistic 
differences involving individuals are danglers – where the only 
special thing about individuals would be that they were chosen 
as scope of the argument from the start.  
By contrast, if whether or not individuals fundamentally exist 
is supposed to be what one may conclude by examining 
arguments such as Dasgupta’s and related ones, then the 
qualitative distinction should be defined in terms that are 
neutral with respect to the Individuals Assumption. (More 
precisely, in drawing the distinction one should not make 
assumptions as to which sorts of entities are allowed to be 
involved in non-qualitative features of reality). One would then 
have to define the notion of a haecceitistic difference on that 
basis, and only afterwards inquire as to whether there being 
fundamental individuals results in there being some such 
differences.  
  
For the question whether a given entity may give rise to cases 
of haecceitistic differences, and of primitive identity more 
generally, is orthogonal to the question whether that very entity 
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belongs to the category of individuals.169 This is true, I contend, 
even under the assumption that the entity in question is taken 
to be a fundamental one.  
Hence, all four combinations are possible – in particular, there 
may be metaphysics that embed fundamental individuals while 
having it that reality is fundamentally qualitative and hence 
excluding any case of primitive identity, and others that exclude 
fundamental individuals, yet such that entities that are not 
individuals do give rise to cases of primitive identity. Thus, 
excluding fundamental individuals not only is not necessary in 
order to make sure that the fundamental level of reality is 
indeed a purely qualitative one, as Boris Kment (2012) has 
rightly remarked.170 It is also, I contend, not sufficient for that 
aim. Yet given a framework such as Dasgupta’s, the claim that 
the fundamental is purely qualitative is critical in order for one 	
169 Andrew Bacon recently got to an akin conclusion: “Those who reject 
individualistic theories because they posit invisible differences should take 
caution: removing individuals from your theories doesn’t always remove the 
invisible differences (…) nor does having individuals automatically generate 
invisible differences”; see Bacon (2019): 260. The relevant ‘invisible 
differences’ would roughly be, in the context of his investigation, 
haecceitistic differences à la Lewis. However, Bacon still takes it that holding 
reality to be fundamentally qualitative is to hold that “reality is [not] 
determined (…) by the pattern of properties and relations that holds between 
individuals” (ibid.: 259). I am arguing that this is just part of the story, and 
that talk of thisness, as opposed to talk of individuals, is what really matters 
when it comes to the present debate. Moreover, I engage with the issue of 
haecceitistic differences in a broader sense than Bacon’s.  
170 Kment made the point that those who think that reality is fundamentally 
qualitative “are free to accept that individuals exist. They may even include 
individuals in their fundamental ontology (…). The view could perhaps be 
stated by saying that even fundamentally speaking, there are indeed 
individuals, but there are no fundamental facts about which individual any 
one of them is”; cf. Kment (2012): 579. To see that Kment’s point was not 
duly appreciated, consider that Turner (2017) openly opposes to Dasgupta’s 
arguments for Generalism the idea that we cannot, after all, “do without 
fundamental individuals”. Part of what I am trying to argue is that the 
primitive individuals that are Dasgupta’s target not only are not fundamental 
individuals: they may even fail to be individuals in the first place.   
		 175 
to safely claim that, if everything else is grounded thereof, then 
reality embeds no primitive individuals, and indeed it cannot 
possibly face us with haecceitistic differences. 
Individuals may well exist, I contend – even at the fundamental 
level!, in a metaphysics that does not accept ‘primitive 
individuals’ in the sense that should be relevant for Dasgupta’s 
considerations above (i.e., in the sense of entities that may give 
rise to haecceitistic differences).  
I think that Leibniz’s metaphysics – or one in the vicinity – may 
well be seen as a view of this sort. On the one hand, the entities 
that Leibniz calls ‘individual substances’ arguably are 
individuals under any understanding of the term that has been 
considered to this day. At least under a certain interpretation, 
such entities are indeed part of the fundamental ontology in 
Leibniz’s system.171 On the other hand, it seems that something 
like Dasgupta’s argument from danglers would be harmless 
against Leibnizian fundamental individuals. For any fact of the 
matter as concerns their identity is completely settled by the 
qualitative – via complete individual concepts that are purely 
qualitative; each one of them corresponds to exactly one 
individual substance and, so to speak, fixes its identity by 
completely characterizing its nature. 
To put it in different and perhaps less controversial terms, 
Leibniz’s individual substances satisfy a strong version of PII – 
one that has it that no numerically distinct such things 
perfectly resemble one another. Hence, they certainly cannot 
give rise to cases of haecceitistic difference. For every difference 	
171 See, among others, Mates (1986), O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (1999), 
Di Bella (2005), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2014). 
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with respect to which one of them is involved in given situations 
is necessarily accompanied by a difference as concerns how the 
individuals involved in those situations qualitatively are, 
because, necessarily, every individual is qualitatively different 
from every other.172 
 
(Note that while by Leibniz’s lights any two individual 
substances must be such that God can discern between them, 
it might be that two or more such things are empirically 
indiscernible to us as humans. Hence, it might be – for all I 
have said so far – that some situations that differ as to which 
individual substance they involve, respectively, are empirically 
indiscernible to us. Still, I contend, this would not, by itself, 
make Leibnizian individual substances unacceptable in view of 
Dasgupta’s argument from danglers. For the differences that 
argument qualify as unacceptable must also be explanatorily 
redundant. And what the argument points out as a mark of 
redundancy, about haecceitistic differences, is that they do not 
result in any qualitative difference. But as I said, any two 
situations that differ as to which Leibnizian individual 
substance is involved in them must indeed differ qualitatively 
themselves).    
 
Things are slightly complicated here by the fact that, in 
Dasgupta’s dialectic and quite commonly in the current debate, 
	
172 For a somewhat similar contemporary view of individuals – one that 
ascribes to each one of them a purely qualitative individual essence – see 
Ujvári (2013). Ujvári (2017) contends that things may have a qualitative 
individual essence without respecting strong PII. The next chapter will cast 
doubt on such a tenet.  
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‘fundamental’ is understood as ‘ungrounded’ and facts (not 
such entities as individuals, universals or the likes) are taken 
to be eligible for being – or failing to be – grounded. No such 
understanding is literally ascribable to Leibniz, though. Indeed, 
it seems that Leibniz never clearly distinguished between 
causation and something like grounding or metaphysical 
explanation.173 It is nevertheless clear that by Leibniz’s own 
lights an individual substance is a fundamental, ‘ultimate’ 
entity in the sense of being something whose existence is 
independent from that of anything else but God.174 
If a notion of ‘fundamental entity’ and of cognate ones in terms 
of grounding is nonetheless desired, here are two suggestions. 
First, as was mentioned by Kment, one may be taken to accept 
some entities as fundamental in case she holds that while 
stating the fundamental facts we need to quantify over those 
entities, where the fundamental facts are construed as the 
ungrounded ones.175 
A further suggestion is the following.  
 
x fundamentally exists (or, which is the same, x is a 
fundamental entity) =df there is no y such that y is 
numerically different from x and the fact that x exists is 
partially grounded in the fact that y is F, for some F.176 
 
Although such a notion in itself cannot literally be ascribed to 
Leibniz for the reason mentioned above (i.e., because he failed 	
173 See Frankel (1986). I am grateful for this point to Ghislain Guigon.  
174 See references in fn. 171 above.  
175 Cf. Kment (2012): 579.  
176 I owe this suggestion to Fabrice Correia.  
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to distinguish between grounding and causation), the resulting 
view would still be one that can accept Leibnizian individual 
substances as fundamental entities without allowing any 
haecceitistic difference to arise. 
Hence, assuming a fundamental ontology that embeds no 
individuals is not necessary in order to exclude haecceitistic 
differences. 
But such a move is not sufficient for that aim either.   
Consider, in effect, a metaphysics that includes no 
fundamental individuals – in particular, one that, like 
Dasgupta’s, accepts only universals as fundamental entities. 
Such commitments are, by themselves, insufficient as a means 
to rule out haecceitistic differences. For the anti-Haecceitist will 
still have to assume something like PII about the entities she 
takes as fundamental – because she needs to exclude that some 
of them may be qualitatively indiscernible though numerically 
different. Otherwise, some fact concerning their identity would 
fail to be fixed by the qualitative, hence giving rise to primitive 
identities.  
To make the point vivid, consider the two systems that 
Dasgupta depicts in order to support his claim that primitive 
individuals are explanatorily redundant – the one where Peter 
is propelled up in the air by a slingshot, and the one where Paul 
is thus flung (cf. § 1.3 above). However Dasgupta may wish to 
define the qualitative distinction, it seems clear that there being 
two such systems would lead to a case of haecceitistic 
difference even if Peter and Paul happened to be two 
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indiscernible universals, as opposed to two indiscernible 
individuals.177  
The same point may even more directly be made, mutatis 
mutandis, about Dasgupta’s case for the idea that differences 
between primitive individuals are undetectable – where we are 
asked to compare the observation of a chair with that of a 
second one, indiscernible from the first.   
And although the idea that something like PII is almost trivially 
verified by such entities as universals has been more or less 
taken for granted in the general debate, it has recently been 
challenged, with quite convincing reasons, by Rodriguez-
Pereyra.178 I will get back to this point in the next section, where 
I will argue that any form of anti-Haecceitism must rule it out 
that there may be fundamental things with primitive thisness. 
As will be clear in due course, that will conclude my case for 
the claim that an appeal to grounding cannot by itself spare the 
anti-Haecceitism from committing to PII.  
Before that, a last remark on grounding and its role in the anti-
Haecceitist’s project is in order.  
Recall the recipe that Dasgupta offers to the anti-Haecceitist in 
order to make sure that no haecceitistic difference may arise, 
though not committing to PII. The idea was to bypass 
individuals, focus on the qualitative facts alone, and claim that 
such facts are sufficient to in some way ground the non-
qualitative ones. Given this project, the way the distinction 
between qualitative and non-qualitative facts is drawn is 	
177 For a different point to the effect that things that are not individuals (in 
particular, relations) may turn out to be danglers in Dasgupta’s Generalism, 
see Turner (2017). 
178 See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2017a). See also MacBride (2005): 609, fn. 41.  
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crucial: for the recipe to succeed, it must be the case that if 
those facts that are singled out as qualitative ground all the 
other facts, then reality is fundamentally qualitative also in the 
sense that no haecceitistic difference can possibly arise.  
However, if my case against the Individuals Assumption goes 
through, then the distinction between facts that Dasgupta has 
set forth is deeply problematic as it stands.  
First, note that Dasgupta does not provide us with a properly 
clear-cut distinction between the two alleged categories of facts 
– although, as should by now be clear, the very notion of a 
primitive individual crucially depends upon it.179 At most, we 
are given an extensional criterion: all those facts that may be 
expressed in first order logic with identity but without 
constants are qualitative, while any other fact is non-
qualitative.180  
Yet importantly – as I said (§ 3.2) – this cannot be the end of the 
story by the Generalist’s own lights: for, given a widely accepted 
principle, existentially quantified facts are grounded in their 
instances and cannot, therefore, be fundamental. Hence 
Dasgupta’s resorting to the algebraic language G. But this move 
would better be more than just a formal artifice: after all, every 
sentence of first-order logic without constants but with identity 
has a translation in G and vice versa. Some independent 
theoretical reason should be given to think that the right 
description of the qualitative is provided by G and not by first 
order logic.  	
179 See the definition of a primitive individual I have set forth in § 3.2.   
180 Note that one may already be quite dissatisfied with this criterion: for 
indeed, any fact can be expressed in first order logic without constants by 
using the sentential letter ‘p’. I owe this point to Fabrice Correia.  
		 181 
To put it differently: we were told that the facts that can be 
expressed in a certain language may be taken to coincide with 
the qualitative facts, but also that they cannot be the qualitative 
facts, because they are not good candidates for being 
fundamental. Then we were given a translation for all the 
sentences that express those facts, and we were told that in 
such new clothes those facts can be said to be fundamental 
instead. But what makes them qualify as qualitative in the first 
place is still unclear. 
On the face of it, it looks like the main theoretical hallmark of G 
concerns the ontological commitment it seems to bring forth: 
as opposed to their counterparts of first order logic, the 
sentences of G are thought to mention only qualities, and they 
do not seem to demand for a domain of individuals at all. 
 
(Note that strictly speaking, the semantics of first-order logic 
does not in general demand for a domain of individuals either: 
a model for first order logic is given by a domain of objects and 
an interpretation function. Those who hold there to be 
universals will then admit that there are models whose domains 
are exclusively constituted by such entities. So perhaps 
Dasgupta’s point in this regard should be, rather, that first 
order logic is compatible with semantics that take domains of 
individuals while G is not).181   
 
Now, given this picture, perhaps the facts that we were brought 
to identify as qualitative – the facts that can be expressed in G 
	
181 Thanks to Fabrice Correia for pushing this point.  
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– are eligible to be fundamental indeed. And yet, I argue, it is 
far from clear that by claiming that they are the only 
fundamental facts one does get rid of haecceitistic differences. 
For at its core, the idea that if all and only the facts that entail 
the existence of universals alone are fundamental then no 
haecceitistic difference can arise depends on the conjecture 
that haecceitistic differences cannot possibly arise in a 
metaphysics that excludes fundamental individuals. Yet as I 
have tried to show, such a conjecture is wrong-headed (more 
on this in the next section).  
Once it is appreciated that the conjecture – along with other 
aspects of the Individuals Assumption – is wrong, the problem 
arises as to how the anti-Haecceitist can rephrase the 
distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative facts in 
order to still apply Dasgupta’s recipe. I have no answer in this 
concern. One may perhaps follow the same strategy I adopted 
in the first chapter while setting forth my take on the qualitative 
distinction, and just substitute ‘entity’ for ‘individual’ in all the 
relevant definitions.  
Given one of Dasgupta’s glosses, we would then have to classify 
as non-qualitative any fact such that “whether it obtains 
depends on how things stand with” one or more entities in 
particular.182 Under this hypothesis, I personally would find it 
hard to see how a fact may fail to be non-qualitative.183 But 	
182 See Dasgupta (2014): 5.  
183 Generalised identities, if conceived as having a ‘factual counterpart’, may 
provide a counterexample to my present point. For instance, suppose that 
there is a fact that to be a vixen is to be a female fox, and that such a fact is 
not the same as the fact that necessarily, for any x, x is a vixen iff x is a 
female fox. One may then say that the former fact is not such that whether 
it obtains depends on how things stand with some given entities in 
particular. However, a Qualitativist who wished to identify the qualitative 
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then again, this is likely to simply amount to my being a 
Haecceitist!184 
What is worth noting here is that even if my points against 
Dasgupta’s project go through, the anti-Haecceitist is not left 
without a way to phrase her position in terms of fundamentality 
as ungroundedness. She can perfectly well do so by claiming 
that none of her fundamental entities has primitive thisness 
(what she has to do anyway, as I am about to argue) and then 
characterize the notion of a fundamental entity in terms of 
grounding – possibly, in one of the two ways I have suggested 
above.  
This would guarantee that no fundamental entity can give rise 
to haecceitistic differences. If the anti-Haecceitist aims at a 
metaphysic where no things whatsoever can give rise to such 
differences, she will have to integrate in her view some further 
claims to this effect.  
 
 
 	
facts with facts of generalised identity would then be committed to the idea 
that such facts are sufficient to ground all other facts about reality. This 
would seem like an uphill bottle. Thanks to Fabrice Correia for the 
counterexample.   
184 Still, I think what has been said should urge the Generalist to provide 
what Dasgupta has refrained from providing so far – that is, a clear 
metaphysics of facts that may fit in her proposal; cf. Dasgupta (2014): 4. For 
she will have to exclude that, as a piece of reality (so to speak), existentially 
quantificational facts simply are their instances; see Correia (2016), where 
facts, “understood as worldly items”, are labelled ‘situations’ – ibid.: 103. 
For in that case, arguably any such fact would turn out to be non-qualitative 
in light of the gloss I just considered; the sentence that describes one such 
fact in first order logic without constants would merely ‘hide’ that whether 
or not the fact obtains does depend on how things stand with some given 
entities. The appeal to language G would then look less and less helpful in 
this context!  
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4.3. Is the Appeal to Primitive Thisness Mandatory? 
 
I said that the question of Haecceitism and the question 
whether there are fundamental individuals are distinct and 
orthogonal – hence, that all four combinations are possible. And 
I presented Leibniz’s view (or something in the vicinity) as an 
example of an anti-Haecceitistic metaphysics that embeds 
fundamental individuals. Dasgupta’s Algebraic Generalism is a 
metaphysics that excludes both fundamental individuals and 
Haecceitism. A view that takes tropes to be the only 
fundamental entities, and accepts that there be indiscernible 
tropes, would be one that accepts Haecceitism while excluding 
fundamental individuals. Analogously, mutatis mutandis, a 
view that assumes a fundamental ontology of sole universals 
and allows for some of them being indiscernible. If I read him 
correctly, Adams’s view is one that accepts both Haecceitism 
and fundamental individuals – and so is my own, although it is 
no part of my aim here to defend the latter tenet.  
Now, as I said, the Generalist has to exclude indiscernible 
universals in order to make sure that her metaphysics is indeed 
one where no haecceitistic differences that involve fundamental 
entities (‘fundamental haecceitistic differences’, for short) can 
possibly arise. No matter how seriously one is to take the 
possibility of indiscernible universals, I contend that this 
motivates a serious reassessment of the Generalist’s project.  
Recall that the major reason Dasgupta gave us for taking the 
Generalist’s strategy – for bypassing individuals, building anti-
Haecceitism as a claim about the status of non-qualitative 
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facts, and so on – was the alleged desirability of excluding 
haecceitistic differences without committing to PII.  
Yet Generalism – even in its Algebraic variant – is not, strictly 
speaking, a view that does not commit one to PII. At most, it is 
a view that (at least inasmuch as it really does justice to the 
case for anti-Haecceitism) commits one to PII only as concerns 
entities that are usually taken to respect the Principle anyway. 
Compare it, for instance, with the sort of Leibnizian view I have 
considered above. The two square equally well in getting rid of 
fundamental haecceitistic differences.  
 
(As a matter of fact, one may even doubt that the former view 
will square as well as the latter in this respect at the end of the 
day. For as I said, if the Individuals Assumption fails, the 
Generalist owes us a new story as to how the distinction 
between qualitative and non-qualitative facts is to be 
characterized. And her whole recipe does rest on that 
distinction). 
 
Both views are committed to PII as concerns the entities that 
are taken as fundamental.  
It seems to me that the main edge of Generalism over the 
Leibnizian view should at this point be recognized to be 
vanishingly small. True, assuming that universals respect PII 
may sound less controversial than assuming that individuals 
do. Yet if Rodriguez-Pereyra is right, this may turn out to be 
merely an advantage in intuitiveness.  
Such an advantage does not come for free: it comes at the cost 
of ruling out any way towards some form of nominalism about 
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universals. Yet as should by now be clear, getting rid of 
fundamental haecceitistic differences does not mandatorily 
come at such a cost. Moreover – assuming that anti-
Haecceitism is what one wants – some features of Algebraic 
Generalism such as Pluralism about ground, Structuralism 
and Radical Holism are hardly less controversial that the idea 
that individuals fulfil PII!  
But I would like to draw a more general conclusion here – one 
of meta-theoretical significance. The Generalist’s recipe 
promised the anti-Haecceitist a way to exclude haecceitistic 
differences without respecting the desiderata of either 
distributiveness or identity-explanation (see § 2.1 above) – that 
is, without having to also rule it out that some things might 
have primitive thisness. And yet, I contend, that was just part 
of the story.  
True, an anti-Haecceitist may bypass individuals, focus on 
grounding non-qualitative facts and so on and so forth. But as 
long as she does take there to be entities of some kind or 
another at the fundamental level, it looks like she will still have 
to rule it out that any of those entities have primitive thisness, 
just as the Algebraic Generalist overtly or covertly does by 
excluding the possibility that there may be indiscernible 
universals.  
The claim that fundamentally, there are no entities whatsoever 
is sometimes labelled Ontological Nihilism.185 I take this to be 
too strong a stance to take if one’s aim is merely to exclude 
every case of haecceitistic difference – either fundamental ones 	
185  See O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens (1995); Turner (2011); Diehl 
(forthcoming).  
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or all of them altogether.  More importantly, such cases for anti-
Haecceitism as Leibniz’s and Dasgupta’s do not support it.  
As a consequence, at least until a proposal comes along that 
does provide a conclusive way to exclude cases of primitive 
identity without also banning things with primitive thisness (at 
least from the fundamental ontology), I argue that any form of 
anti-Haecceitism – hence, every account of the debate about it 
– will have to appeal to the issue of primitive thisness. 
 
To conclude this part – and to reinforce the points I made – I 
will now approach the question of how the notion of an 
individual should be characterized.  
The reader may have been surprised – even puzzled – by seeing 
that I have not addressed the issue so far. Note that given my 
stance, I am not strictly speaking required to provide an answer 
to such a question. Rather, my target, i.e., those who accept the 
Individuals Assumption and draw consequences from its 
dictum, should provide a clear understanding of what such 
special entities – individuals – are. For presumably, it is in such 
an understanding that one could find – if at all! – reasons for 
accepting the Individuals Assumption in the first place. Yet no 
clear-cut notion of what an individual is supposed to be is 
widely agreed upon in the debate about Haecceitism.  
 
(This is, incidentally, what drove me to doubt that the notion 
need in general be appealed to while defining Haecceitism after 
all).  
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Thus Adams (1979) and Dasgupta (2009) provide somewhat 
elusive, and presumably not equivalent, characterizations of 
what they respectively mean by the term.186 By contrast, there 
are approaches that take seriously the aim of defining 
individuality and fulfil the task in such terms as to qualify 
individuals as entities that cannot possibly give rise to cases of 
primitive identity at all. The view defended by Márta Ujvári, who 
ascribes to each individual a purely qualitative individual 
essence, is an instance (mutatis mutandis, what I said about 
the broadly Leibnizian metaphysics above applies to this view 
as well).  
The most systematic attempt towards defining individuality in 
the contemporary literature is arguably due to Jorge Gracia 
(1988). 187  According to such an account, noninstantiability 
constitutes a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for 
individuality – more precisely, anything is an individual if and 
only if it is a noninstantiable instance of some universal. The 
notion of noninstantiability, in turn, is taken as primitive, for 
“any definition or analysis of it would, in order to be complete, 
have to make reference to instantiation, instance and/or 
	
186 More on this in due course.   
187 It is worth mentioning Goodman (1956)’s claim that (roughly) anything 
may count as an individual (hence be acceptable under a certain strain of 
nominalism) as long as it is treated as an individual in a system – that is, 
taken as a possible value “of the variables of lowest type in the system” 
(Goodman 1956: 17). The only things that would not be treatable as 
individuals would then be ‘classes’ – roughly, things that may mutually 
differ albeit having the same members. This treatment of individuality could 
hardly justify one’s acceptance of the Individuals Assumption. Note also that 
the considerations in Strawson (1959), which are concerned with our 
language and conceptual schemes more than with reality itself, are not ones 
that the defender of the Assumption should appeal to either.  
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instantiables, that is, to the relation between the universal and 
the individual, to the individual, and/or to the universal”.188 
To my knowledge, no one has embedded such a conception into 
one’s stance on Haecceitism. I myself cannot assume it without 
betraying the spirit of my proposal – since much of my effort 
here consists in vindicating an account of the debate that is 
compatible with even the strongest strand of nominalism about 
universals.189  
More generally, I think that Gracia’s account of individuality 
could not easily fit with the way the notion is commonly 
approached when it comes to Haecceitism. 
For instance, one of the few hints Dasgupta gives as to what 
individuals are supposed to be is that that they must be 
things.190 By contrast, both something like individual things 
and their properties are taken by Gracia to satisfy his definition 
of ‘individual’. 
A proposal that was advanced in Dorato and Morganti (2013) is 
also worth mentioning here. As a contribution to the debate on 
the identity and individuality of quantum particles, Dorato and 
Morganti set forth a pluralistic approach towards the notion of 
individuality. Roughly, this proposal allows that the entities 
that are, respectively, studied by different scientific theories 
satisfy different and mutually irreducible notions of 
individuality – where all such notions would be equally 
	
188 Gracia (1988): 51.  
189 Note, however, that Gracia himself does not literally hold that universals 
exist: he has it that universals “are neutral with respect to existence; 
existence is a category that does not apply to them” (ibid.: 235).  
190 Cf. Dasgupta (2009): 35.  
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respectable. Individuality would then come in grades of diverse 
strength.  
It is particularly interesting, I think, that such a suggestion 
came from an area – the metaphysics of physics – where 
something like the Individuals Assumption I have argued 
against is particularly influential when it comes to the issue of 
haecceitistic differences and related ones. In particular, many 
take the fact that (roughly) quantum statistics cannot tell apart 
hypothetical cases of haecceitistic difference involving 
indiscernible particles as tantamount to such particles ‘not 
being individuals’, in some allegedly relevant sense.191  
 
Now, to sum up, several conceptions of the notion of an 
individual are available. What is important for my aims here is 
that such conceptions do not support, by themselves, the 
Individuals Assumption and its alleged consequences unless by 
confirming my present point – i.e., that what the anti-
Haecceitist should properly exclude from the fundamental 
ontology are those entities that may have primitive thisness.  
On the one hand, there is a family of very strict, substantial 
conceptions: something is an individual in this sense if and only 
if it is an individual substance – where the notion is construed 
more or less in line with the Arisotelian tradition. Adams seems 
to take a stance of roughly this sort: 
 
By ‘individual’ here I mean particulars such as persons, 
physical objects, and events. It is assumed that numbers 	
191 See French (2015) and references therein; cf. in particular French and 
Krause (2006).  
		 191 
and universals are not individuals in this sense, and that 
particular places and times are individuals if they have an 
absolute being and identity independent of their relation 
to particular physical objects and events.192 
 
But there are views that accept fundamental individuals even 
in this strong sense, and still hold that reality is fundamentally 
qualitative – at least in the sense that haecceitistic differences 
cannot possibly arise. As I argued, the broadly Leibnizian 
metaphysics considered above is an instance.  
On the other hand, the notion of an individual may be given a 
very loose characterization – so as to make it coincide with that 
of a countable thing. Yet the anti-Haecceitist would better not 
exclude individuals in this sense from the fundamental level, 
lest she is ready to buy into Ontological Nihilism, or at least 
into some form of Stuff Ontology.193  
 
(Dasgupta seems to get close to this option when he tells us 
that individuals “are things, such as my laptop and the 
particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied 
and related in various ways when we describe the material 
world around us”. 194  However, he also is implicitly taking 
particularity to be a necessary condition for individuality, so 
that he can still, consistently with his claim that fundamentally 
there are no individuals, take there to be fundamental entities 
of some sort – i.e., universals. Yet again, as I have argued, if 	
192 Adams (1979): 6.  
193 For Ontological Nihilism, see fn. 185 above. For Stuff Ontologies, see 
Steen (2016) and references therein; a recent defence is in Markosian (2015).  
194 Dasgupta (2009): 36.  
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one’s aim is that of ruling out fundamental haecceitistic 
differences, then the assumption that universals are the sole 
fundamental entities is by itself both dispensable and 
inconclusive).  
 
As I already pointed out, though, the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism does not by itself support either of such moves. At 
most, it does so if accompanied by the idea that taking the 
fundamental entities to respect PII is an unaffordable price. But 
I still doubt that a fundamental ontology of things that respect 
PII is more expensive than one completely devoid of things 
simpliciter.  
Finally, if being a particular is taken to be a necessary condition 
for being an individual, and if particulars are conceived of as 
those things that do not mandatorily respect PII, then it is true 
that excluding them from the fundamental ontology may play a 
relevant role in building up a metaphysics that excludes 
fundamental cases of primitive identity.195 Yet if this is what 
the claim that there are no fundamental individuals boils down 
to, I take it to confirm my point. The anti-Haecceitist has to rule 
it out that there be (fundamentally at least) things with 
primitive thisness. The Generalist’s appeal to grounding has 
not so far provided her with a way to sidestep such a 
requirement on her view. 
 
 
 	
195 I am grateful for this point to Fraser MacBride. See MacBride (2005): 609, 
fn. 41 and references therein.  
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Chapter 5 
Against Anti-Haecceitism 
 
At least under the best understanding of the issue so far 
achieved, I have contended, the anti-Haecceitist has no 
adequate way to rule it out that entities of a given kind (the Ks) 
may give rise to cases of primitive identity without respecting 
the desiderata of identity-explanation and distributiveness. 
Hence, she has to do so by denying that any of the Ks may have 
primitive thisness. I have also argued that in order to rule it out 
that any of the Ks may have primitive thisness one must ascribe 
to each one of them a minimal individual essence that is purely 
qualitative.  
After recapitulating such results (§ 5.1), I will argue that, if each 
one of the Ks has a qualitative minimal individual essence then 
such things respect a strong version of PII (§ 5.1.1). Though I 
do not have any new argument against the form of PII at issue, 
I will be content with proving the truth of such a Principle to be 
an actual commitment of anti-Haecceitism properly conceived. 
I will also present some reasons to think that such a 
commitment is a cost – not a virtue – of anti-Haecceitism (§ 
5.1.2).  
The rest of the chapter will be devoted to casting doubts on 
some strategies that the anti-Haecceitist may try to employ in 
order to avoid the commitment to PII.  
Still in the area of individual essences, I will draw on a case by 
Penelope Mackie concerning Graeme Forbes’s metaphysics of 
modality in order to argue that the option of ascribing non-
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trivial, yet non-qualitative minimal individual essences to 
entities is ultimately ineffective (§ 5.1.3).  
My argument for the idea that a proper form of anti-Haecceitism 
cannot legitimately sidestep the desiderata of identity-
explanation and distributiveness largely rested on my 
contention against Dasgupta’s Generalism. One may protest 
that there might be other ways to build a form of anti-
Haecceitism that does not respect those desiderata – ways that 
do not fall prey to the same difficulties that Generalism faces. 
After contending that my points against Dasgupta’s strategy are 
likely to generalize (§ 5.2), I will argue against two further 
foreseeable options: those that appeal, respectively, to non-
distributive individuation (§ 5.2.1) and to some form of 
eliminativism (§ 5.2.2).  
 
5.1. Against Anti-Haecceitism with Individual Essences  
 
In Chapter 2 (§ 2.1), I have defined the two desiderata of 
identity-explanation and distributiveness as follows.  
 
Distributiveness. There are no cases of primitive identity 
involving some Ks because each and every ‘which is 
which’-issue concerning a K is settled by the qualitative 
reality. Hence, not only all cases of primitive identity are 
excluded: they are excluded one by one – i.e., each one of 
them is.    
 
Identity-explanation. There are no cases of primitive 
identity involving some Ks because the Ks are individuated 
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by the way they are, qualitatively. As a result, a situation’s 
involving some Ks in particular is always a matter of how 
the Ks involved in that situation qualitatively are. That is 
why ‘which is which’-issues concerning the Ks are always 
settled by the qualitative reality.   
 
I have then pointed out that a form of anti-Haecceitism that 
excludes that entities of a given kind (the Ks) may give rise to 
cases of primitive identity by respecting both desiderata is also 
one that denies that any of the Ks has primitive thisness. I have 
also argued, in Chapter 3 (§ 3.3.2), that in order to exclude the 
possibility that any of the Ks may have primitive thisness one 
must ascribe to each one of them a minimal individual essence 
– let me leave to one side for a moment the idea that such an 
essence should be purely qualitative. Finally, I have contended 
in Chapter 4 that, at least under the best understanding of the 
present debate so far achieved, a form of anti-Haecceitism 
about the Ks must indeed respect both of the desiderata I 
defined.  
A view that does so by ascribing to each one of the Ks a minimal 
individual essence that is purely qualitative is a form of anti-
Haecceitism of exactly the sort that Haecceitism about the Ks, 
as I conceive of it, denies. As anticipated (§ 1.4), where the Ks 
are taken to be the individual substances, this is the sort of 
view that I take Leibniz to have defended. Just as Leibniz’s 
metaphysics, any such view (as I will point out shortly) is 
committed to the claim that the Ks respect a strong version of 
PII – i.e., that no two Ks may perfectly resemble one another.  
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Are there ways to rule it out that the Ks may give rise to cases 
of primitive identity by respecting the two desiderata albeit not 
committing to such a strong form of the Principle? Ascribing to 
each one of the Ks a minimal individual essence that is non-
trivial – roughly: one that is eligible for non-trivially 
individuating the K at issue – and yet is not purely qualitative 
may look like a worthwhile option.   
I will now consider these two strategies and argue that both 
must rely on strong PII in order to satisfy the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism.  
 
5.1.1. Qualitative Individual Essences and PII 
 
The idea that each one of the Ks has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence provides with a very neat way to fulfil the 
rationale for anti-Haecceitism about the Ks.  
As opposed to Algebraic Generalism, which rests on Pluralism 
about grounding, Structuralism, and Radical Holism, the 
resulting view does not force on us any quite as unexpected 
stance concerning the structure of reality.  
By making a claim concerning the Ks themselves, the view does 
not face the problem of having to come up with an adequate 
‘individualistic distinction’ such as the one that the Generalist 
has to provide at the level of facts.  
Relatedly, it does not by itself force on us an ontology of facts 
at all, nor a metaphysics that is incompatible with nominalism. 
Thus, supposing she has independent reasons to accept the Ks 
in her ontology and, further, reasons to hold that such things 
should not give rise to cases of primitive identity, the anti-
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Haecceitist of this fashion can simply ascribe to each one of 
them a minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative. 
For she does not need to count on some disputable principle 
such as I argued the Individuals Assumption to be.  
She can for instance have it that the entities she takes as 
fundamental are the ones that should not be allowed to possibly 
give rise to cases of primitive identity. For, as opposed to some 
variations on Generalism I considered in Chapter 4, her view 
need not turn into some fundamentally things-less 
metaphysics at all.  
The elegance of views of this sort surely comes at a price. For 
those who defend them are committed to the claim that each 
one of the Ks respects a strong version of PII. According to such 
a form of PII (‘strong PII’, henceforth) no two Ks are qualitatively 
just alike – no two of them perfectly resemble one another.  
There can be little doubt that if each one of the Ks has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence then each one of them 
respects strong PII.  
For I defined the notion of a thing’s having a qualitative minimal 
individual essence in Chapter 3 (§ 3.3.1) as follows:  
 
a has a qualitative minimal individual essence =df. $F 
such that (i.)  F is a qualitative way for something to be, 
and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, Fx iff x=a. 
(Where ‘F’s is a non-committal second-order predicate and 
the second-order existential quantifier is to be read as non-
objectual).196 	
196 For the sake of simplicity, I recall only one of the formulations provided 
in § 3.3.1 here. See § 3.3.1 and Appendix for alternative formulations.  
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But if something, a, is qualitatively indiscernible from a 
different thing, b, then a and b have the same qualitative profile. 
Still via second-order non-objectual quantification, this can be 
expressed as follows:  
 
(i.) For all F, if F is qualitative, then Fa iff Fb.  
 
Suppose this is the case and suppose for reductio that ‘G’ 
expresses a qualitative minimal individual essence of a. That is:  
 
(ii.) G is qualitative and necessarily, for any x, Gx iff 
x=a.   
 
Given (i.) and the first conjunct of (ii.), it follows that:  
 
(iii.) Gb 
 
Given (iii.) and the second conjunct of (ii.), it follows that:  
 
(iv.) b=a 
 
Being under the hypotheses that b is numerically different from 
a and that (i.) holds, we are then forced to reject (ii.).  
Hence, nothing can have a qualitative minimal individual 
essence and perfectly resemble something else. In other words, 
things with a qualitative minimal individual essence must 
respect strong PII.  
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5.1.2. The Commitment to PII  
 
How much of a cost does the acceptance of strong PII bring 
forth? This is a complicated question – one that can hardly 
receive, I suggest, a univocal answer. Indeed, the stance one 
should take in this concern will largely depend on (1.) what one 
has to gain by accepting strong PII, and (2.) which further costs 
one may avoid by doing so – still in view of such a gain.  
The answer is likely to also depend, at least in part, on 
considerations as to what sort of entities one is targeting – that 
is: to what the Ks at issue are, and to whether they can 
reasonably be taken to satisfy strong PII. For instance, as I said, 
while aiming to exclude cases of primitive identity, Dasgupta 
still refrains from accepting that individual objects such as 
spheres respect strong PII.197 By contrast, he takes the claim 
that universals do as unproblematic. Yet the latter claim gives 
him a way to effectively exclude primitive identities (if at all) 
only when accompanied by further ones that are themselves 
contentious. There is actually no evidence that those are less 
contentious, I have suggested, than the claim that individuals 
such as spheres respect PII itself. 
 
Having to claim that individual objects respect PII may look like 
no cost whatsoever to some broadly Leibnizian philosophers – 
and perhaps to those who have not read Black (1952) and 
Adams (1979).  
	
197 As I said, Dasgupta claims that Generalism can embed the possibility of 
a ‘Black’s world’, thus having an important edge on other forms of 
Qualitativism.   
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(As Rodriguez-Pereyra (2017b) remarks, the ‘argument from 
almost indiscernibles’ in the latter paper is supposed to enforce 
the outcome of the former.198 While Black merely contends that 
a world with indiscernible individual objects is possible, Adams 
supports such a contention by arguing that a world with almost 
indiscernible individual objects is possible and that, if so, then 
a world with perfectly indiscernible individual objects is as 
well.199 Rodriguez-Pereyra then goes on to argue that Adams’s 
argument is either ineffective or unnecessary. For, inasmuch 
as one can infer that there can be indiscernibles from the 
possibility of almost indiscernibles indeed, the hypothesis of 
almost indiscernibles turns out to be dispensable in view of a 
case against strong PII).200  
 
Some might even protest that a view’s commitment to strong PII 
should be seen as a virtue of the view in question – not, as I 
have been suggesting, as a cost of it.  
To make the point vivid, consider Leibniz’s philosophy again. 
Together with the Principle of Contradiction, Leibniz’s 
containment theory of truth entails his doctrine of complete 
individual concepts. The latter entails, in turn, that no two 
possible individual substances can perfectly resemble one 
another – hence, that any two such things must respect strong 	
198  Although Black’s dialogue is the locus classicus, a further 
counterexample to PII that also relies on the possibility of perfect symmetry 
is due to Ayer (1953): Chapter 2.  
199  For a slightly different reconstruction of the argument, see Forrest 
(2016), where it is labelled ‘continuity argument’. Cf. also Della Rocca 
(2005): 483. For a thorough discussion of counterexamples to PII and their 
faults and merits, see Hawley (2009).  
200 For a different discussion of Adams’s argument, see Baber (1992).  
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PII.201 This commitment is desirable by Leibniz’s own lights 
since in the framework of his metaphysics it entails that:  
i. no merely possible individual substance perfectly 
resembles any actual individual substance;  
ii. no merely possible world perfectly resembles the 
actual world.  
And if i. and ii. were false – so Leibniz had it – God’s will would 
have violated PSR and the Principle of the Best when She 
created the actual world. For in doing so, She would have 
chosen between indifferent options.   
However, in the case just considered a reason for seeing the 
commitment to strong PII as a virtue is provided that is 
independent from the claims that bring forth that commitment 
themselves. Even ruling out certain possibilities (i.e., any 
maximal possibilities that are qualitatively indiscernible from 
the one that God has chosen to actualize at least) is justified in 
view of the claims about God’s will that such a move helps one 
safeguard.  
It is far from clear that every anti-Haecceitistic view can also 
provide independent reasons for seeing the commitment to 
strong PII as palatable – especially in view of the seeming 
possibilities that such a Principle demands one to rule out.     
As a matter of fact, that many see strong PII – at least as applied 
to individual objects, and perhaps to individual entities of any 
sort202 – not as a virtue but as a cost is apparent if we consider:  
	
201 Cf. Look (2017).  
202 See Diekemper (2009) for the claim that individual events at least should 
be taken to violate strong PII. Cf. Ayer (1953): 32-33.  
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1. the efforts that have been devoted to show that 
metaphysics of individual objects seemingly committed to 
strong PII, such as the bundle theory of universals, can 
allow for the possibility of a ‘Black’s world’ after all;203  
2. how eager anti-Haecceitist metaphysicians of diverse 
fashions typically are to prove that their views do not 
entail strong PII for individual objects. Dasgupta is not 
the only case: among the modal anti-Haecceitists, Lewis 
is also an example.204  
 
The situation is interestingly different among philosophers of 
physics. Quite notoriously, identical quantum particles are 
widely taken to violate PII in any of its non-trivial readings.205 
And, as a matter of fact, several philosophers of physics take 
this as yet another reason to think that quantum particles are 
not individuals, in some allegedly significant sense of the term 
– or even for their not being objects.206  
At least since Saunders (2003; 2006a), the contention that 
quantum particles can still be regarded as individuals or “bona 	
203  See in particular Hacking (1975); O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995) and 
Zimmerman (1997). See Calosi and Varzi (2016) for arguments to the effect 
that none of the strategies proposed in said articles does allow one to defend 
strong PII and embed the possibility of a Black’s world. For a different 
discussion of Black’s dialogue, cf. Cross (1995). See also Rodriguez-Pereyra 
(2004), where it is argued that the bundle theory is compatible with the 
falsity of PII.  
204 See Lewis (1986): 224-225, where Lewis declares that his modal anti-
Haecceitism “does not imply any doctrine of identity of indiscernibles” and 
is indeed compatible with there being qualitatively indiscernible worlds. Cf. 
also ibid.: 157, where he explicitly allows for the possibility of there being 
“many indiscernible individuals”, as there would be in a world of two-way 
eternal recurrence – for the latter notion, see ibid.: 63.  
205 See in particular French and Redhead (1988); French (1989).  
206 See French and Krause (2006); French (2015), and literature therein. Cf. 
Quine (1976b).  
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fide objects”207 as long as any two of them are at least weakly 
discernible is among the most intensely discussed in this 
concern.208 Things are weakly discernible in the relevant sense 
if they stand in a relation that is symmetric and irreflexive.209 
Saunders (2006a) first argued that this is the case for 
maximally entangled fermions and the result was then 
extended to bosons (Muller and Seevinck, 2009). Some do take 
it that such results vindicate the truth of PII for the quantum 
realm (Muller, 2015). However, whether such a stance is 
justified rests on several issues. Some obviously have to do with 
the details of the relevant physical theory and need not concern 
us here. Some have to do with which version of PII one is 
attempting to vindicate. In this regard, I would just like to point 
out that, as far as the strong version of PII I have been 
considering is concerned, the option of weak discernibility had 
already been mentioned by Black:  
 
A. (…) Let me try to make my point without using names. 
Each of the spheres will surely differ from the other in 
being at some distance from that other one, but at no 
distance from itself – that is to say, it will bear at least one 
relation to itself – being at no distance from, or being in the 	
207 Saunders (2006a): 52.  
208 See, among many others, Saunders (2006b); Hawley (2006); Saunders 
and Muller (2008); Dieks and Versteegh (2008); for an overview, see Bigaj 
(2015a; 2015b).  
209  One might remark that numerical distinctness is a symmetric and 
irreflexive relation itself. However, advocates of weak discernibility implicitly 
appeal to the fact that certain quantum particles stand in some symmetric 
and irreflexive relation other than numerical distinctness. Indeed, Saunders 
(2003)’s starting point is exactly an inquiry as to how identity should be 
analysed in terms of other properties and relations when interpreting a 
physical theory.  
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same place as – that it does not bear to the other. And this 
will serve to distinguish it from the other. 
B. Not at all. Each will have the relational characteristic 
being at a distance of two miles, say, from the centre of a 
sphere one mile in diameter, etc. And each will have the 
relational characteristic (if you want to call it that) of being 
in the same place as itself. The two are alike in this respect 
as in all others.210 
 
Just like B in Black’s dialogue, I think that the two spheres in 
the example are qualitatively indiscernible and violate strong 
PII notwithstanding their being in the symmetric and irreflexive 
relation of being at two miles from. Hence, while it may be that 
quantum particles hold to one another symmetric and 
irreflexive relations that do make up for a qualitative difference 
between them, it is yet to be shown, I think, that weak 
discernibility can provide a vindication of strong PII as applied 
to individual objects in general.  
 
As anticipated, I have no new argument to propose against 
strong PII. As a matter of fact, I could not possibly have one at 
this stage, since, as I said, the proper stance to take towards 
strong PII will depend at least in part on which sort of entities 
one is supposing to respect said Principle. I am content with 
proving that the truth of strong PII is indeed a commitment of 
any form of anti-Haecceitism properly understood. Given a form 
of anti-Haecceitism that takes every K to have a qualitative 
	
210 Black (1952): 157.  
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minimal individual essence, hence to respect strong PII, 
Haecceitism about the Ks will then be a natural choice for those 
who maintain that at least some Ks should be taken to violate 
the Principle.  
Note, however, that the case of quantum particles points to an 
important observation. The contention that a commitment to 
strong PII might be desirable after all can simply be dismissed 
in case the things that a theory must take to respect the 
Principle actually turn out to violate it. In other words, no 
matter how desirable strong PII might theoretically be, a theory 
that must embed it is certainly to be rejected if PII is false.  
Note, finally, that quantum particles are exactly those things 
that are most widely taken to support a reasonably 
uncontroversial case against haecceitistic differences from 
contemporary physics. Hence, inasmuch as one is moved to the 
idea that anti-Haecceitism must be true by considerations 
about contemporary physics, it seems that one must certainly 
be an anti-Haecceitist about quantum particles. Yet if anti-
Haecceitism about quantum particles entails the truth of strong 
PII about such things, those who think that anti-Haecceitism is 
to be defended in the light of contemporary physics are in a 
quandary. They must either give up on such a contention or 
defend a claim that is widely taken to be false – i.e., the claim 
that quantum particles respect strong PII.  
I take this to further establish the importance of the point I am 
arguing for – i.e., that anti-Haecceitism about the Ks is 
committed to strong PII about the Ks.  
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5.1.3. Non-Qualitative Individual Essences and PII 
 
The anti-Haecceitist about the Ks who aims to respect the 
desiderata of identity-explanation and distributiveness, and yet 
is unwilling to rule it out that two or more Ks can perfectly 
resemble one another, may attempt to ascribe to every K a 
minimal individual essence that is not purely qualitative.  
If the resulting view is to satisfy the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism, the minimal individual essences in question will 
have to be non-trivial. This would mean, at least, that if every 
K has a minimal individual essence of this sort, then the Ks 
respect a version of PII that is, again, non-trivial, albeit not as 
strong as to exclude that any two Ks perfectly resemble one 
another.211  
For a further way to get at least a rough understanding of the 
relevant ‘non-triviality condition’, we may recall the notion of 
something’s having strongly primitive thisness that I 
introduced in § 2.4, that is:  
 
a has strongly primitive thisness =df it is not the case 
that $F such that Ψ(F) and for something to be identical to 
a is for it to be the case that Fx (for Ψ a condition such that 
Ψ(F) just in case: (i.) it is not the case that F @ is identical 
to a, and (ii.) it is not the case that $G such that F @ (G & 
is identical to a)).212  	
211 See again Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) for an important insight into which 
properties one should not quantify on when stating the weakest non-trivial 
version PII.  
212 For the sake of simplicity, I recall only one of the formulations provided 
in § 2.4 here. See § 2.4 and Appendix for alternative formulations. 
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Suppose that for something to be a is for it to be F. It follows 
that being F is a minimal individual essence of a – i.e., that 
being F is a condition that is necessarily both necessary and 
sufficient for being a. 213 (Recall the principle I mentioned in § 
3.3.2: if to be F is to be G, then necessarily, for any x, x is F if 
and only if x is G).  
Suppose, moreover, that since for something to be a is for it to 
be F, a does not have strongly primitive thisness. It follows from 
the latter claim that being F is a non-trivial minimal individual 
essence of a – although not mandatorily a qualitative one.  
Thus, if being Richard Burton is the only minimal individual 
essence of the Welsh actor, then Richard Burton does have 
strongly primitive thisness. For even supposing that not only 
being Richard Burton is a minimal individual essence of Richard 
Burton, but that for something to be Richard Burton is for it to 
be Richard Burton – which seems to be blatantly true – such a 
claim cannot make for a non-trivial principle of individuation 
for Richard Burton. Ditto for the feature of being Richard Burton 
and famous.214  
By contrast, as I said (§ 2.4), if for something to be Richard 
Burton is for it to have married Liz Taylor twice (which would 
entail that having married Liz Taylor twice is a minimal 
individual essence of the actor), having married Liz Taylor twice 
	
213 I am presently ignoring issues related to property-talk as opposed to a 
nominalistic-friendly formulation such as the one I favour. The point can 
easily be made in terms of either.  
214 However, the claim that for something to be Richard Burton is for it to be 
Richard Burton and famous, if true, would not be trivially so. Cf. Correia and 
Skiles (forthcoming).  
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could well serve as a non-trivial individuating feature of Richard 
Burton – but not as a qualitative one.215 
Consider now the claim that each one of the Ks has a minimal 
individual essence that is non-trivial, albeit not purely 
qualitative. The claim does not, by itself, result in excluding all 
cases of primitive identity and of haecceitistic difference 
involving the Ks. For instance, even supposing that having 
married Liz Taylor twice is a minimal individual essence of 
Richard Burton, two otherwise indiscernible situations may 
still differ haecceitistically in that one involves Richard Burton 
and Liz Taylor, while the other involves an indiscernible 
doppelganger of the actor and one of his twice former wife.  
A form of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks that ascribes to each 
one of the Ks a non-trivial, non-qualitative minimal individual 
essence would also strictly speaking fail to respect the 
desideratum of identity-explanation so as I stated it – that is, 
as requiring that each one of the Ks is qualitatively 
individuated.  
However, we may play along, and perhaps decide to loosen that 
definition, if, taking the claim that every K has a non-qualitative 
minimal individual essence that is non-trivial as a start, one 
could build on it a metaphysics that ultimately fulfils the anti-
Haecceitist’s rationale.  
 
(The new desideratum would in that case look roughly as 
follows:  
 	
215  See Mackie (2006): § 2.2 for more on how to define non-trivial (or 
‘substantial’) minimal individual essences.  
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Identity-explanation*. There are no cases of primitive 
identity involving some Ks because the Ks are non-trivially 
individuated. As a result, a situation’s involving some Ks 
in particular is always a matter of how the Ks involved in 
that situation are. That is why ‘which is which’-issues 
concerning the Ks are always settled by some further 
feature of reality).   
 
What I aim to argue here is that inasmuch as a project such as 
this succeeds, it will end up committing to the same strong 
version of PII I considered in the last section. 
In order to make this point, I will draw on Mackie (2006)’s case 
against Forbes’s metaphysics of modality. According to the 
latter view, many individuals – i.e., all biological organisms at 
least – have non-trivial minimal individual essences that are 
non-qualitative.216 
Now, as anticipated (§ 2.4), Forbes’s reason for holding that this 
is the case is significantly different from the anti-Haecceitist’s 
general aim. First, while the cases of primitive identity and of 
haecceitistic difference that the anti-Haecceitist rejects may be 
intra-world, Forbes is concerned with transworld identities and 
differences alone. Second, Forbes has it that any transworld 
identity or difference must somehow consist in something else 
– i.e., to recall his own terminology, no such identity or 
difference can be ‘bare’. He allows, though, that transworld 
identities and differences can consist in something else that is 
	
216 See ibid.: 54 for the idea that Forbes should consistently with his own 
arguments extend such a claim to artefacts as well. Cf. Forbes (2002) and 
Mackie (2002).    
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not purely qualitative. (For instance, when two worlds differ in 
the identity of some biological organism they contain, such a 
difference must be produced by, or at the very least supervene 
on, some further difference. Yet the latter may be a difference 
in the identity of some further biological organisms as well).  
Hence, as I said, every bare identity in Forbes’s sense is a case 
of primitive identity in my sense (ditto for bare differences and 
haecceitistic differences), but not vice versa.  
Like Saul Kripke, Forbes defends a thesis of the essentiality of 
origin for biological organisms, which he formulates as follows:  
 
“☐("x) ☐("y) ☐(Prop (x, y) ® ☐(Exists(y) ® (Prop (x, y)))”.217 
 
‘Prop (x, y)’ in the formula above is short for ‘x is a propagule of 
y’, where “x is a propagule of y iff x is one of the entities which 
grew or developed into y”.218 For instance, for any human being 
h, h’s sole propagule is, in Forbes’s theory, the zygote that h 
developed from. A zygote z’s sole propagules are, in turn, the 
sperm and egg from which union z sprang.219  
Furthermore, Forbes has it that if the X-s are all the propagules 
of y, then having the X-s as one’s sole propagules is not only an 
essential feature, but also a minimal individual essence, of y.220 
That is to say, y could not have existed and failed to originate 
	
217 Forbes (1980): 353.  
218 Ibid. In biology, a propagule is the part of an organism that can be 
propagated or act as an agent of reproduction.  
219 Cf. ibid.: 353-354. See also Forbes (1985): Ch. 6.  
220 Capital signs stand for plural terms here, as usual in plural logic. For an 
introduction, see Oliver and Smiley (2016).  
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from any of the X-s, and nothing other than y could have 
possibly originated from the X-s.221 
Consider a given zygote zm – the one zygote, let us suppose, that 
developed into me. According to Forbes, having zm as one’s sole 
propagule is a minimal individual essence of me. If so, then I 
cannot possibly give rise to cases of bare transworld identity or 
difference. In effect – to focus for the moment on bare 
transworld differences alone – every transworld difference 
involving me will be accompanied by a difference with respect 
to having zm as one’s sole propagule.  
In slightly different terms, no two worlds will differ merely in 
that I exist in one and not in the other. More generally, no two 
worlds will differ merely in what they represent de re of me.  
For no two possible individuals will differ solely in that one is 
me and the other is not. Any two possible individuals that thus 
differ will also differ in that one does, and the other does not, 
have zm as their sole propagule.  
Note that, at this stage, Forbes’s solution still allows for worlds 
that differ, solely, as regards some identities – mine, so to 
speak, plus some others. For instance, two worlds can still 
differ merely in that both zm and I exist in the one but not in the 
other. 
 
(Compare with the case I made above: under the hypothesis 
that having married Liz Taylor twice is a minimal individual 
essence of Richard Burton, two situations may still differ solely 
	
221 The notion of an individual essence (with no further qualification) that is 
used by both Forbes and Mackie is not different from the one I called 
‘minimal individual essence’. See Mackie (2006): 18-19 and § 2.3.1 above.  
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inasmuch as one involves Richard Burton and Liz Taylor, while 
the other involves two individuals that are numerically different 
yet indiscernible from them, respectively).  
 
This should come as no surprise in the light of (1.) the difference 
between Forbes’s No Bare Identities thesis and the anti-
Haecceitist’s rationale (supposing for the moment that the latter 
too is restricted to transworld cases), and (2.) the ways I 
characterized the non-qualitative distinction. I will recall those 
characterizations here for the sake of convenience:  
 
P is a non-qualitative property =df  For some things b1, 
b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary relation R, the property 
lx Px is identical to the property lx R(x, b1, …, bn).  
Every property that is not non-qualitative is qualitative.  
 
P is a non-qualitative way for something to be (or, 
formally: FP, where F is an operator that takes a 
predicate to form a sentence) =df  For some things b1, b2, 
…, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary R, P @ is R-related to b1, 
b2, …, bn (in this order).  
Every way for something to be that is not non-qualitative 
is qualitative.  
 
P is a non-qualitative predicate =df For some 
designators b1, b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary 
predicate R, the predicate P and the predicate R_, b1, …, 
bn are synonymous.  
Every predicate that is not non-qualitative is qualitative.  
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However, note that, if this were the end of the story by Forbes’s 
own lights, then nothing would prevent zm from possibly giving 
rise to cases of bare transworld identity and difference. Well 
aware of this, Forbes ascribes a minimal individual essence not 
only to each biological organism, but also to every propagule of 
one. This is done, again, by appealing to the identities of such 
a thing’s propagules.222  Thus, he takes having xm and ym as 
one’s sole propagules, where xm and ym are the egg and sperm 
from which union zm sprang, to be zm’s minimal individual 
essence.  
More generally, in order to avoid cases of bare transworld 
identity involving biological entities, Forbes ascribes to such 
things minimal individual essences that consist in having 
certain things as one’s sole propagules. In order to avoid cases 
of bare transworld identity involving such propagules, he then 
ascribes to each one of them a minimal individual essence of 
having certain things as one’s sole propagules, in turn.223 Each 
propagule of some biological entity's propagule has a minimal 
individual essence of the same type, and so on.  
Each one of these ascriptions is made in order to exclude cases 
of bare transworld identity and difference involving individuals 
of a certain kind. But if all minimal individual essences thereby 
ascribed are non-qualitative – if one does not at some point 
ascribe a qualitative minimal individual essence to some entity, 
one will just keep on accounting for some entity’s identity in 
terms of some other entities’ identity.  
	
222 See Mackie (2006): § 3.2. 
223 For the problem that Forbes’s view would face in the case of propagules 
that are generated by cell division, see ibid.: 53. Cf. Forbes (1997); (2002).  
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And, what is worse for my anti-Haecceitist, cases of 
haecceitistic differences will get no less possible than they were 
at the first step. Recall again the two situations I pictured – 
where one involves Richard Burton and Liz Taylor, while the 
other involves two indiscernibles of them. Situations that differ 
merely in the identity of n things of the same sort are 
unacceptable by the anti-Haecceitist’s light, no matter what 
number n stands for.  
 
But let me get back to Forbes’s view in order to conclude my 
present point. Given his tenets I introduced above, the risk of a 
potential infinite regress easily comes to mind.224  
Now, one may wish to concede225 that the concept of a regress 
is not highly problematic in itself. If it is not, Forbes can 
perhaps help himself to a view according to which every 
biological entity has a minimal individual essence that consists 
in having some given things as one’s sole propagules, and the 
series by which every individual’s identity thus rests on some 
fact of the matter concerning the identity of its propagules has 
no end.  
However, Forbes’ aim is to exclude every case of bare transworld 
identity involving any biological entity – either actual or 
possible. Hence, for his proposal to go through, the assumption 
that reality is regressive in the way just said must be true of 
every possible world that contains biological entities – and, if 
Mackie (2006) is right, of every possible world that contains 
	
224 Cf. Mackie (2006): 43.  
225 And some have argued: see, among others, Bliss (2013); (2014); Tahko 
(2014); and Morganti (2015).  
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artefacts as well. The claim that reality is regressive in every 
such world would then be a consequence of Forbes’ view (under 
this construal). And this may seem to be too high a price to pay 
– arguably, even to those who sympathize with the idea that 
reality is possibly regressive. 
As a more worrisome difficulty, note that said view would also 
entail that:  
(1.) there are infinitely many material entities in every 
possible world that contains biological entities;  
(2.) there are infinitely many propagules in every possible 
world that contains biological entities.  
It is not clear, though, that a philosophical argument should be 
allowed to decide whether (1.) and (2.) are the case. (2.), in 
particular, (i.) is likely to be contradicted by biological 
knowledge about the actual world, and (ii.) is incompatible with 
the possibility of there being a beginning of time – granted that 
the time interval between two contiguous propagules in a series 
cannot be arbitrarily small.226  
 
Or perhaps the series ends up forming a circle instead of an 
infinite regress. However, I do not see how this could have any 
plausibility within Forbes’s view. For, as I said, Forbes ascribes 
to each biological entity a minimal individual essence of having 
some given things as one’s sole propagules. Hence, for a circle 
to arise in the resulting series it should be the case that some 
propagules have a minimal individual essence of having 
developed into a given biological entity in particular – or: of 
	
226 Thanks to Claudio Calosi and Fabrice Correia here.  
		 216	
having developed into a biological entity that developed into 
another that developed into another… that developed into a 
given biological entity in particular.227  
But this would seem wrong. Even if zm actually developed into 
me, it could certainly have failed to do so because of some 
accidents occurred in the process of my generation; ditto for xm 
and ym, which union could have failed to generate zm, and so on 
and so forth.  
By contrast, if reality is neither regressive nor circular, the 
series that Forbes led us to consider has an end. If this is the 
case, there must be a last entity, e, to which Forbes would 
ascribe a minimal individual essence. For only if such an entity 
e has a minimal individual essence, e cannot possibly give rise 
to cases of bare transworld (non-)identity. And if Forbes’ 
solution is effective, the series can end only when there is no 
further entity f such that, unless f has an individual essence, f 
can itself give rise to cases of bare transworld (non-)identity.  
Now, e’s minimal individual essence must be either qualitative 
or non-qualitative.  
If it is non-qualitative, then it will still consist in being in a given 
relation with a further entity f. And if this is the end of the series 
indeed, no further story as to what supports cases of transworld 
identity and non-identity involving f will be provided. Yet this 
would mean that f can possibly give rise to cases of bare identity 
and difference.  
	
227 As remarked by Mackie (2006): 52, Forbes has it that the relation of 
generating, which holds between a propagule and the biological entity that 
sprang from it, is intransitive. Cf. Forbes (1985): 133.  
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If e has a minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative, 
instead, then obviously e is a thing that respects strong PII.  
If so, however, it is not clear how to escape the consequence 
that the other entities in the series do so as well. For the version 
of PII at issue is not one that excludes that things may be 
qualitative duplicates – i.e., have one and the same intrinsic 
qualitative character. Rather, it rules it out that things may be 
qualitative indiscernible – that is, have one and the same 
qualitative character simpliciter. 228  A thing’s qualitative 
character in this sense includes its extrinsic qualitative 
features.  
Thus, if e has a minimal individual essence that is purely 
qualitative (say: being so-and-so), and if some entity d has the 
minimal individual essence of having e as one’s sole propagule, 
it seems hard to deny that d has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence as well – that of having a thing that is so-and-
so as one’s sole propagule. Analogously, mutatis mutandis, for 
the entity c that was ascribed the minimal individual essence 
of having d as one’s sole propagule. And so on. (As seen above, 
the propagules of a thing can be a plurality. However, I am here 
considering examples of things that have only one propagule 
for the sake of simplicity).   
Now, being concerned only with cases of transworld identity 
and difference, Forbes has a way to avoid such a predicament. 
In effect, he resorts to a branching conception of possible 
worlds, where branching worlds are taken to literally share a 
common initial segment. He takes it that cases of identity and 
	
228 Cf. Lewis (1986): 63-64.  
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difference within the common segment may be taken as 
unproblematic – even if not supported by further facts of the 
matter.229  
However (and whatever the merits of such a proposal), I am not 
interested here in evaluating Forbes’s view, but in what we can 
learn about anti-Haecceitism by looking at it.  
In particular, we can now approach a question I have 
anticipated above, that is: can one take the claim that every K 
has a non-qualitative minimal individual essence as a start, 
and build a metaphysics that ultimately satisfies the anti-
Haecceitist’s rationale out of it? 
Not, I argue, unless one is willing to eventually accept that the 
Ks respect strong PII after all. For:   
 
1. in the series considered above, the claim that the last 
entity one is to consider, e, has a non-qualitative minimal 
individual essence results in allowing for the possibility 
of cases of bare identity and difference (which are also 
cases of primitive identity and of haecceitistic difference 
in my sense);  
2. while the option of accepting an infinite regress could, at 
least in principle, satisfy Forbes’s aims, it cannot satisfy 
the anti-Haecceitist’s. Indeed, at no step of the series 
described above the possibility of a haecceitistic 
difference is excluded – although at every step the 
possibility of bare differences involving a given entity is. 
For as I said, situations that differ in the identity of n 
	
229 See Forbes (1985): Chapter 6, § 6.  
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things they involve do differ haecceitistically in the way 
the anti-Haecceitist finds unacceptable – whatever 
number n may stand for.230 Analogous considerations 
would apply to the option of accepting that the series 
ends up forming a circle.  
 
If the anti-Haecceitist is unhappy with the idea that the Ks she 
has taken as a target satisfy strong PII – if she wants to hold 
that numerically distinct Ks can perfectly resemble one another 
– she may ascribe to each one of them a non-qualitative 
minimal individual essence that consists in being in some way 
related to a certain thing in particular that is not a K but, say, 
an L. The Ls, she may contend, have minimal individual 
essences that are purely qualitative; hence, they do respect 
strong PII, whereas the Ks do not. (We are here to suppose that 
the anti-Haecceitist has reasons to hold that taking the Ls to 
respect strong PII is less problematic than taking the Ks to do 
so).  
The problem is that the resulting view would not be a form of 
anti-Haecceitism about the Ks. It would be a form of anti-
Haecceitism about the Ls.  
I conclude that the anti-Haecceitist about the Ks must ascribe 
to each one of them a minimal individual essence that is not 
only non-trivial, but also purely qualitative. Hence, she has to 
commit to the idea that every K respects strong PII.  
 
	
230 See Mackie (2006): 43-44 for an analogous consideration, to the effect 
that the sort of regress considered above is compatible with modal 
Haecceitism.  
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5.2. Against Anti-Haecceitism without Individual 
Essences 
 
Some may protest that I was too quick in drawing the 
conclusion above. True, a form of anti-Haecceitism about the 
Ks that respects the desiderata of identity-explanation and 
distributiveness must hold that every K respects strong PII. 
However – so the thought would go – there may be ways to fulfil 
the anti-Haecceitist’s rationale without satisfying those 
desiderata; ways, in particular, that are immune to my 
objections against Algebraic Generalism.  
Now, of course I have no way to exclude that some such strategy 
might be developed.  
However, I argue that my points against Algebraic Generalism 
– and in particular my meta-theoretical points against 
Dasgupta’s approach to the present debate – are likely to 
generalize.  
For Dasgupta’s view is but one application of a general recipe – 
one that proved, I think, ineffective. To stress once more, the 
anti-Haecceitist about the Ks has a problem with the idea that 
situations may differ merely with respect to which Ks are 
involved in them. Focusing on the Ks themselves, and trying to 
deliver the claim that they cannot possibly be such as to give 
rise to such differences, traditionally led anti-Haecceitists to 
hold that every K is qualitatively individuated. Such a stance 
brought them to accept that every K has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence – hence, that such things fulfil strong PII.  
As we saw, however, even many anti-Haecceitists find the 
commitment to strong PII disturbing (at least when it comes to 
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individuals). As a solution, Dasgupta explored a strategy that 
sidesteps the entities at issue altogether and makes a claim 
about some propositional-like entities231 instead – in the case 
of his view, about facts.   
However, no matter which propositional-like entities one takes 
as one’s target, I think that the problem will still arise of 
defining a suitable qualitative distinction that applies to them.  
We saw that – faced with such a problem – the Generalist has 
three options.  
First, she may rely on something like the Individuals 
Assumption, as Dasgupta himself does. Yet I proved this option 
to be deeply problematic.  
Second, she may try and duly generalize the qualitative 
distinction as one that is not partial to individuals (or to any 
class of entities) anymore. Yet in the case of Generalism, this 
strategy led one to gain too much by turning anti-Haecceitism 
into something dangerously close to ontological nihilism. 
Finally, she may use a distinction that is partial to entities of a 
given sort – that is, to those entities that fail to have qualitative 
minimal individual essences. Yet avoiding such a theoretical 
move is among the benefits that Dasgupta’s recipe had 
promised to provide.232  
I see no reason to expect that by framing the debate at the level 
of some propositional-like entities other than facts one would 
avoid such difficulties. Indeed, by doing so one would even lose 
the chance to phrase the issue in terms of grounding, hence 
	
231 I came to appreciate this notion thanks to – and I borrow this label from 
– Alex Skiles.   
232 Cf. Chapter 4 above.  
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clearly accounting for the connection between anti-Haecceitism 
and fundamentality as ungroundedness. For the relata of 
grounding relations are usually taken to be facts.  
And while facts, as relata of grounding relations, are construed 
by some as obtaining states of affairs and by others as true 
propositions, I think that the points I made apply to them under 
either construal.233 
More generally, the anti-Haecceitist who phrases the debate in 
terms of propositional-like entities other than facts will also 
need to appeal to some suitable relation holding between the 
qualitative and the non-qualitative among them, and it is 
unclear which one would fit.  
(Given what I just said, such a relation cannot be grounding; 
as I argued in § 3.1, there is reason to doubt it can be 
supervenience either).  
 
As things stand, we have reason to doubt that one can 
effectively exclude cases of primitive identity while sidestepping 
the entities that are eligible for giving rise to such cases.  
In what follows, I will consider two further strategies that one 
may attempt to pursue in order to fulfil the anti-Haecceitist’s 
rationale while not committing to strong PII. Since I know of no 
actual attempt to pursue either of them, I will focus on pointing 
out the theoretical problems that such hypothetical attempts 
are likely to face.  
 	
233 Audi (2012) is an instance of the former approach. Rosen (2010) is an 
instance of the latter. Fine (2001) and Correia (2010) mention the viability 
of denying that true grounding statements ascribe a relation, and thus that 
there are items related by a grounding relation in the first place.  
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5.2.1. Non-Distributive Individuation  
 
Giving up on the idea of sidestepping the non-propositional 
entities that she fears may give rise to cases of primitive identity 
– say, the Ks, the anti-Haecceitist may attempt to set forth a 
view that respects the desideratum of identity-explanation 
without respecting that of distributiveness.234  
The idea would presumably be, roughly, the following. The Ks 
cannot possibly give rise to cases of primitive identity because 
they are qualitatively individuated. However, there is no 
entailment to the idea that every K is qualitatively individuated 
on its own, hence none to the claim that each one of them 
respects strong PII. They are qualitatively individuated – in 
some plural and non-distributive way.  
It is not easy to see what this could mean, exactly. However, we 
can try and think of it by analogy with the way Dasgupta asked 
us to think of grounding for non-qualitative facts.  
The anti-Haecceitist who respects both desiderata has it that 
to be a (where a is an arbitrary K) is to be F, for some qualitative 
F.  
By contrast, the anti-Haecceitist who respects identity-
explanation alone would perhaps claim that for some things X 
to be a and b and c… and n (where a and b and c… and n are a 
plurality of Ks) is for them to be F. ‘X’ would be a plural variable, 
and ‘F’ a qualitative predicate that applies to plural variables.  
She would then insist that even when a claim like the one just 
mentioned is true, it is not the case that for something to be a 	
234 For the problems that an anti-Haecceitist would face if she were to 
respect the latter but not the former instead, see Dasgupta (2014): § 3.  
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(or b, or c,… or n) as opposed to any other member of the 
plurality is for it to be G, for some qualitative G.  
 
Even supposing that all of the Ks are qualitatively individuated 
via plural, non-distributive claims of this sort, it is hard to see 
how this would guarantee that the Ks cannot possibly give rise 
to cases of primitive identity.  
Compare again with a form of anti-Haecceitism that respects 
both desiderata – and let me focus on cases of haecceitistic 
difference for the sake of simplicity. If every one of the Ks has a 
minimal individual essence that is purely qualitative, then any 
two situations that differ as to which Ks are involved in them 
will also differ in how the Ks involved in them are, qualitatively. 
Hence, any two such situations will differ qualitatively 
themselves. This is what guarantees that under such a view the 
Ks cannot possibly give rise to haecceitistic differences.  
However, the ‘every-talk’ is abandoned altogether in the 
hypothesis of a plural, non-distributive theory of individuation 
for the Ks. It is not strictly speaking the case that every one of 
the Ks is qualitatively different from any other. If so, however, 
it is not clear that every two situations that differ with respect 
to which Ks are involved in them must also differ qualitatively 
in some way.   
As an example, consider two Ks – a and b. Suppose neither of 
them can be qualitatively individuated on its own, and yet they 
can be qualitatively individuated together. In particular, 
suppose that for some things X to be a and b is for them to be 
F, but there is no qualitative G such that for something to be a 
is for it to be G. Mutatis mutandis for b.  
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I see no reason to exclude that some situations may involve 
either of a and b and nothing else. Consider then now two 
situations: S, which involves a alone, and S*, which involves b 
alone instead. How to make sure that any two situations that 
thus differ will also differ qualitatively in some way?  
As far as I can see, there is no way to do so without imposing 
that a and b must somehow differ qualitatively from one 
another. But since we made no hypothesis about a and b 
whatsoever, except for taking that they are qualitatively 
individuated together while none of them is qualitatively 
individuated on its own, this means that the same will hold of 
any two Ks: no two of them can perfectly resemble. Which 
means that the Ks must fulfil strong PII after all.  
Perhaps the anti-Haecceitist can still escape such a 
predicament by claiming that no situation can be such as to 
involve one single K; Ks enter in situations only as pluralities. 
Absent an independent justification for such a claim, the form 
of anti-Haecceitism I have been considering would seem highly 
unpalatable. For such a view would come at the cost of a quite 
unorthodox theory of individuation for the Ks – where by paying 
such a cost one would not even succeed in allowing that the Ks 
may violate strong PII.   
 
5.2.2. Eliminativism?  
 
One might suggest that the anti-Haecceitist who seeks to avoid 
the commitment to strong PII still has the option of taking an 
eliminativist stance.  
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But I argue that this is not a viable option given the way I have 
framed the debate.  
Eliminativism would perhaps be a viable option if the present 
debate were phrased in terms of thisnesses as literally existent 
properties. The anti-Haecceitist could then attempt to claim 
that she does not need to provide conditions that are 
necessarily necessary and sufficient for something to have a 
given thisness. For – so the thought goes – she could contend 
that there are no thisnesses to begin with. 
Or, if she follows Dasgupta in framing the issue in terms of 
qualitative and non-qualitative facts, she could attempt to 
claim that there are no facts of the latter sort whatsoever.  
However, my characterization of the debate does not appeal to 
either literally existent thisnesses or facts. As a matter of fact, 
it is not phrased in terms of entities of any sort other than those 
that lack qualitative minimal individual essence themselves. 
Clearly, being an eliminativist about those would not spare the 
anti-Haecceitist a commitment to strong PII. Indeed, such a 
move would entail that every single existent respects the 
Principle – for absolutely everything would have a minimal 
individual essence that is purely qualitative.  
I conclude that, given the way I have phrased the present 
debate, there is no meaningful eliminativist stance that the 
anti-Haecceitist can take in order to avoid the price of strong 
PII.  
 
Perhaps the anti-Haecceitist may still try to adopt a form of 
error theory, by saying that it is never the case that a given 
thing in particular is involved in a given situation. It is not the 
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case that Richard Burton married the same woman twice, 
although it is the case that a so-and-so actor married the same 
woman twice. Because the latter is true, we can move around 
successfully in the world with the belief that Richard Burton 
married the same woman twice – what is strictly speaking false.  
 
(Note however that, absent the tenet that being a so-and-so 
actor is a minimal individual essence of Richard Burton, there 
is no guarantee that the description ‘a so-and-so actor’ singles 
out one entity alone. And that is of course a tenet that the anti-
Haecceitist who rejects strong PII will refuse to uphold).  
 
Such an approach would presumably have interesting – and 
some may well say problematic – consequences for certain 
issues about personal identity.  
For instance, consider a suitable enrichment of John Perry 
(1979)’s case – one where Perry at some point gets to know 
everything there is to be known about the qualitative profile of 
the messy shopper he is chasing around the supermarket, and 
still does not realize that he himself is the messy shopper. It 
seems that, according to the sort of error theory I am 
considering, we should think that at that point Perry has 
nothing else to find out about the shopper. Or, at least, nothing 
true to find out: for the content of the belief he gets to entertain 
when he finally thinks ‘I am the messy shopper’ would strictly 
speaking be false. 
Still, the faults and virtues of such a view would have to be 
assessed once its details are duly spelled out. What is at best 
hard to see, in particular, is whether this stance could indeed 
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allow the anti-Haecceitist to exclude all cases of primitive 
identity without accepting strong PII.  
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Chapter 6 
Austere Haecceitism  
 
I have argued that a form of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks 
must include the claim that every K has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence. In this chapter, I will state Haecceitism 
about the Ks as the denial of such a claim (§ 6.1).  
As should by now be clear, being a Haecceitist about something 
does not commit one to ascribing to that thing some sort of 
haecceity, a property it depends upon for its identity. The claim 
that something has strongly primitive thisness, in particular, is 
at odds with the idea that such a thing depends on something 
else for its identity – hence, that it has a haecceity in the 
relevant sense. One may even say that the former stance plainly 
contradicts the latter.  
(As I already said, Haecceitism does not entail that there are 
things with strongly primitive thisness. However, as I will 
suggest, such a claim would contribute to building a 
particularly elegant Haecceitistic metaphysics; § 6.2).  
Any view that holds that (i.) some of the Ks have primitive 
thisness and (ii.) none of the Ks has a haecceity, I will call 
‘Austere Haecceitism’ about the Ks.  
Haecceitism as I myself defend it as true about at least some 
Ks is indeed a form of Austere Haecceitism in this sense. 
Moreover, it is also ‘austere’ in a further sense since it is not 
committed to properties of any sort whatsoever, nor to an 
ontology of facts. (Strictly speaking, this is true of any 
Haecceitistic claim that is stated in the terms I have been 
proposing).  
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I will conclude by addressing some potential objections to 
Austere Haecceitism (§ 6.3). I will contend, in particular, that 
such a view is neither ontologically (§ 6.3.1) nor metaphysically 
(§ 6.3.2) redundant, that it does not openly contradict any 
unquestionable interpretation of contemporary physics (§ 6.3.3) 
and that it does not amount to a metaphysics that excludes 
individuality (§ 6.3.4).  
 
6.1. Entities without Qualitative Individual Essences  
 
Haecceitism about the Ks, as I propose to conceive of it, is the 
denial of the thesis, which anti-Haecceitism about the Ks must 
accept, that every K has a qualitative minimal individual 
essence. 
This may seem too weak. Unless ‘K’ singles out some 
gerrymandered class of things – one may protest – either every 
K has a qualitative minimal individual essence, or none of them 
does. Hence, so the thought goes, Haecceitism about the Ks 
should be taken to hold that none of the Ks has a qualitative 
minimal individual essence, instead.  
Roughly, the idea would be that the members of classes that 
are not gerrymandered – the members of classes that are 
singled out by some proper sortal predicate – should be taken 
to be alike in their essential behaviour in some relevant 
sense.235   
However, I would rather stick to my weaker characterization for 
two reasons.  	
235 For the idea that a sortal conveys the essential profile of the things it 
applies to, see Grandy (2016) and references therein.  
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First, there may well be some class of things that is neither 
gerrymandered in a way that makes it irrelevant for the present 
debate nor such that all of its members should be assumed to 
be alike in their essential behaviour.  
Suppose, for instance, that the Ks are the actual entities and 
recall the general rationale for anti-Haecceitism – i.e., the 
suspicion against cases of primitive identity, and of 
haecceitistic difference in particular. One may have reasons to 
think that the actual entities, and only them, should be allowed 
to possibly give rise to such cases.236 If so, then one may wish 
to deny that anti-Haecceitism about the actual entities is 
generally speaking true. And still, the idea that all of the actual 
entities should either have or lack a qualitative minimal 
individual essence – that it cannot be the case that some have 
and some lack one – seems dubious.  
Second, it may be that no K has a minimal individual essence 
that is purely qualitative, and still not all Ks are alike in their 
essential behaviour in that some have a minimal individual 
essence that is non-trivial, albeit non-qualitative, and some do 
not.  
For instance, suppose that the Ks are the material objects, 
whether atomic or mereologically complex – assuming, of 
course, that there are both atomic and mereologically complex 
objects indeed. A mereological essentialist may consistently 
hold that all atomic objects have strongly primitive thisness – 
hence, that none of them has any non-trivial minimal individual 
	
236 Skyrms (1980) defends modal Haecceitism for actual entities and modal 
anti-Haecceitism for merely possible ones. A similar position is endorsed in 
Adams (1981).  
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essence, while every composite object has a non-trivial, non-
qualitative minimal individual essence that consists in having 
some things in particular as one’s proper parts. (The resulting 
view would of course entail mereological extensionality). This 
seems to undermine the intuition that Haecceitism about the 
Ks must claim that none of the Ks has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence because the members of any non-
gerrymandered class must all be alike in their essential 
behaviour.  
 
Haecceitism about the Ks is not, strictly speaking, the claim 
that there are cases of haecceitistic difference involving some 
Ks – although it does entail that such cases at least possibly 
arise.  
Haecceitism about the Ks has it, rather, that the only 
conclusive means to exclude any such case as either actual or 
possible – i.e., the tenet that every K has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence, hence that every such thing respects strong 
PII – is wrong. Or, at the very least, the Haecceitist thinks that 
such a stance is a very expensive one, and that the gain sought 
for by the anti-Haecceitist is not worth it.  
One may have diverse reasons for being a Haecceitist about the 
Ks.  
To start, the Ks might be things that appear to actually violate 
strong PII – as is most commonly taken to be the case for 
quantum particles.237  
	
237  More precisely, identical quantum particles are taken to violate all 
interesting versions of the Principle – and strong PII among them. Cf. § 5.1.2 
above.  
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Even when this is not the case, the Haecceitist may be 
convinced that cases where indiscernible yet numerically 
distinct Ks would exist are at least possible, and that no 
attempt to deny that they are is successful. Several such cases 
have been proposed in the literature.238 As I said, many anti-
Haecceitists are not at ease with the idea of excluding, in 
particular, the possibility of a Black’s world. A further 
interesting example that is far less often considered is that of a 
world of two-way eternal recurrence as depicted in Lewis 
(1986). A world of this sort would be one in which time is linear 
and an infinity of qualitatively indiscernible, yet numerically 
different epochs recur one after another – with no first and no 
last such epoch.239  
A Haecceitist may also take a related, but slightly weaker 
stance. Without positively claiming some such cases to be 
possible, she may nonetheless contend that deeming them all 
impossible is a serious cost – that one should not be willing to 
pay that much for the sole aim of excluding cases of primitive 
identity.  
 
(To use a nice label, one may say that bearing that cost is to fall 
prey to a questionable form of ‘modal blindness’.240 Note that, 
faced with cases such as the ones mentioned above, deeming 
them altogether impossible is not the only form of modal 
blindness that the anti-Haecceitist may adopt in order to 
	
238  Cf. in particular Adams (1979): 13-17. For a general assessment of 
arguments for modal Haecceitism that draw on thought experiments and 
conceivability claims, see Cowling (2017).   
239 See Lewis (1986): 63. Cf. ibid.: 157; 227-228.  
240 Thanks to Thomas Sattig, whom I owe the phrase.  
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safeguard her tenet. Consider for instance Lewis’s world of two-
way eternal recurrence. The anti-Haecceitist might say that in 
any world significantly similar to that, one and the same epoch 
would recur over and over again – and that time would, against 
what we have been assuming, be circular).241  
 
As a matter of fact, the Haecceitist refuses to concede that a 
view that excludes cases of primitive identity is generally 
speaking more palatable than one that allows for them.  
This is not to say that the Haecceitist would dismiss any 
argument to the effect that, for instance, haecceitistic 
differences involving entities of some sorts in particular are 
undesirable – or even that they should be banished altogether. 
 A Haecceitist who accepts immanent universals, for example, 
may be persuaded by Lewis (1999)’s and Ehring (2011)’s point 
against indiscernible universals and hold that there are no 
such things – hence, that universals cannot possibly give rise 
to haecceitistic differences.242  
Note that this would not prevent her from allowing that some 
possible worlds exhibit two-way eternal recurrence in the sense 
depicted above. A world like that could still be possible, and 
while universals would recur, numerically identical, in every 
epoch, a thing that is not a universal could in principle still be 	
241 An interesting parallel may be drawn between this latter theoretical move 
and the arguments in Hacking (1975). Hacking warns us that putative 
spatiotemporal counterexamples to PII are inconclusive inasmuch as the 
cases they advance can with equal legitimacy be described as either violating 
or respecting PII. By contrast, the anti-Haecceitist’s stance I just considered 
has it that there is only one right way to describe such cases – i.e., the one 
that leaves PII unharmed.  
242  Cf. also Lewis (1986): 84. See Rodriguez-Pereyra (2017a): § 4 for 
discussion.  
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allowed to exist in exactly one epoch, though having an 
indiscernible doppelganger in every other.  
Or, consider identical quantum particles again. As is well 
known, quantum statistics does not take into account 
haecceitistic differences involving identical quantum particles 
in a system. To oversimplify things, consider a system involving 
two identical quantum particles and two possible states, both 
of which are in principle equally accessible to either particle; 
suppose one is making an observation on such a system. Two 
possible outcomes of such an observation that differ merely as 
to which particle is in which state – i.e., two possible outcomes 
of the observation that differ haecceitistically – count as only 
one possible outcome under quantum statistics. Now, some see 
this as the basis of powerful arguments for the need to 
somehow rule it out that quantum particles are things that may 
give rise to haecceitistic differences in the first place – in the 
actual world and in worlds that are just like it physics-wise at 
least.  
Again, I do not mean to suggest that the Haecceitist must be 
deaf to such arguments.  
However, absent an independent argument to the effect that 
some things in particular should not be allowed to give rise to 
haecceitistic differences (in some well-defined circumstances 
such as observational systems as the one sketched above or in 
general), the Haecceitist does not see such differences as 
problematic in themselves. For it is in the spirit of Haecceitism 
to think that when (if at all) two situations differ merely with 
respect to the identity of some of the things they involve or to 
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‘which is which’ in them, respectively, this is (or would be) a 
respectable difference on its own.  
Haecceitism rejects the idea that any such actual, possible, or 
even merely hypothetical predicament would face us with what 
is sometimes labelled ‘a distinction without a difference’. Two 
epochs in a world of two-way eternal recurrence do differ not 
only numerically, but also in the identity of at least some of the 
things that exist in them, respectively, while not differing 
qualitatively in any way. And two states of a two-particles 
system that differ merely in that this particle is so while that 
particle is thus in the one, vice versa in the other, do differ in 
exactly this way.  
By the Haecceitist’s lights, these are genuine differences – while 
there may be reasons to exclude them, no such reason can 
merely consist in the conviction that they are not.   
 
6.2. Entities with Strongly Primitive Thisness   
 
I am a Haecceitist about concrete particulars: I hold that at 
least one of them fails to have a minimal individual essence that 
is purely qualitative.  
As a matter of fact, my own take on such things is stronger than 
Haecceitism itself: I hold that no concrete particular has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence.243  	
243 I decided not to argue for this point mainly for two reasons. First, much 
of my effort here has been devoted to reaching a clear-cut understanding of 
Haecceitism. And as I said, I do think that the claim that no K has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence is stronger than Haecceitism about 
the Ks proper. Second, as interesting as particular essentialist claims are, 
when arguing for or against them we often end up affirming or denying those 
claims on the sole basis of our intuitions. Thus, Aristotelians would say that 
Myrrha and Gregor Samsa are essentially human, while Ovid and Franz 
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For reasons that lie beyond the scope of the present inquiry, I 
also hold that every existent, either actual or possible, is a 
concrete particular. Hence, if I am right then no entity 
whatsoever has a qualitative minimal individual essence.  
Note that even this form of Haecceitism across-the-board does 
not commit me to holding that some things have strongly 
primitive thisness. Consistently with the tenets I just 
mentioned, I could still hold that every thing is non-trivially, 
albeit non-qualitatively, individuated.  
	
Kafka apparently saw no conclusive reason for thus thinking. Nor does the 
defender of extreme modal Haecceitism as defined by Lewis, who thinks that 
I could have been a poached egg – see Lewis (1986): 239-248; the view is 
defended in Mackie (2006). Kripke has it that Queen Elizabeth II could not 
have been born from different parents than her actual ones – which under 
his approach amounts to her essentially having been born from those two 
people; see, in particular, Kripke (1980): 110-113. But it would be hard to 
be convinced by Kripke’s claims in this concern unless one already agrees 
with them. And as strange as it may sound, I heard excellent philosophers 
protesting to Fine (1994) that Socrates certainly belongs to his singleton 
essentially.  
In a nutshell, it seems to me that arguments for or against particular 
essentialist claims either are indirect or tend to rely too heavily on one’s 
intuitions.  
At least some of Forbes’s arguments for the essentiality of origin are, I think, 
of the former sort. Having argued that we need individual essences in order 
to get rid of bare identities and having singled out a thing’s origin as the 
most likely candidate for being a thing’s non-trivial individual essence, he 
set forth such a case (among others) for the essentiality of origin.  
My main point against forms of anti-Haecceitism is also of the former sort. 
It relies on the thought that (1.) anti-Haecceitism about the Ks is committed 
to the idea that the Ks fulfil strong PII; (2.) unless the Ks are universals, the 
claim that they fulfil strong PII is very controversial; (3.) at least the 
fundamental things should respect strong PII if the anti-Haecceitist is to 
satisfy the general rationale for her own view; (4.) the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism does not strictly speaking support the claim that all 
fundamental things are universals.  
Unfortunately, my point for the idea that no concrete particular has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence is of the latter sort instead. Hence 
my reluctance to argue the point.  
Moreover, at least when it comes to persisting objects, I do not have much 
to add to Mackie (2006)’s case for the idea that such things should not even 
be taken to have non-trivial individual essences. See Mackie (2006): 55-64.   
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In the resulting view, every thing would have primitive, non-
qualitative thisness, although none would have strongly 
primitive thisness. As a consequence, every thing would have 
at least one non-trivial, non-qualitative minimal individual 
essence. And still nothing would have a qualitative minimal 
individual essence.  
I already considered a view of this sort while assessing Forbes’s 
theory of individual essences (§ 5.1.3). Mutatis mutandis, some 
considerations I made in that concern will apply to the view I 
am presently considering as well.  
In particular, unless one allows that there be at least some 
things with strongly primitive identity, the view will have to be 
one that postulates either an infinite regress or some circularity 
in the individuation of things.  
For, as should be clear from what I said in that occasion, to 
hold that something, a, is not qualitatively individuated and 
still fails to have strongly primitive identity is to commit to a 
buck-passing claim about the individuation of a – one that 
accounts for a’s thisness in terms of the thisness of some other 
things.  
More precisely, suppose that a does not have any qualitative 
minimal individual essence, and that yet it fails to have strongly 
primitive thisness. This entails that for something to be a is for 
it to have F, for some F such that (i.) F is not the same property 
as being identical to a, (ii.) there is no P such that for something 
to have F is for it to be identical to a and have P, and (iii.) F is 
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not a qualitative property.244  Hence, having F is a minimal 
individual essence of a.  
Since F is non-qualitative, for a to have it will be for it to be in 
some relation to a given thing, b. Furthermore, it will have to 
be the case that a and b are not one and the same thing.  
 
(This is not to say that a’s minimal essence of being in some 
relation to b need be a trivial one in case b is identical to a. If R 
is not the identity relation, and if being in relation R with a is 
indeed a minimal individual essence of a, it might well be a non-
trivial one. For instance, if loving Richard Burton were a minimal 
individual essence of Richard Burton then it certainly would be 
a non-trivial one, too.  
However, consider the claim that for something to be a is for it 
to be in relation R with a. Suppose, further, that being in 
relation R with a is all it takes to make something be a. Again, 
it would be understood that R cannot be the identity relation – 
otherwise, a would have strongly primitive identity after all. 
While the resulting view would strictly speaking be consistent, 
it would hardly be one that provides an informative principle of 
individuation for a. Indeed, a defence of this view would sound 
particularly odd if coming from someone who aims to exclude 
that things may have strongly primitive thisness.  
Moreover, suppose the claim is to be generalised to all the 
things that belong to the same kind as a, so that being in 
relation R with b is what makes something be b, being in relation 
R with c is what makes something be c, and so on. Unless R is 	
244 While my official approach is nominalistic-friendly, I use property-talk 
here for the sake of simplicity.  
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identity after all, it would be quite hard to single out a relation 
that would meet the requirements for playing its role.  
Compare:  
1. under Forbes’s view, if a is a biological organism, then 
having all of a’s propagules as one’s sole propagules does 
count as a minimal individual essence of a. However, 
what prevents a from giving rise to bare identities is its 
being related to some entities other than itself – i.e., its 
propagules;  
2. under a form of mereological essentialism that accepts 
mereological extensionality, if a is mereologically complex 
then having all of a’s proper parts as one’s sole proper 
parts does count as a minimal individual essence of a. 
However, the claim that for something to be a is for it to 
have all of a’s proper parts as one’s sole proper parts does 
not make for an informative principle of individuation for 
a. The claim that for something to be a is for it to have b, 
c, …, n as one’s sole proper parts, where b, c, …, n are all 
of a’s proper parts, does).  
 
What has been said about a must be true, mutatis mutandis, of 
b as well. That is, for something to be b is for it to have G, for 
some G such that (i.) G is not the same property as being 
identical to b, (ii.) there is no P such that for something to have 
G is for it to be identical to b and have P, and (iii.) G is not a 
qualitative property. Hence, having G is a minimal individual 
essence of b.  
Since G is non-qualitative, for b to have it will be for it to be in 
some relation to a further thing, c. And so on and so forth.  
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The predicament is very similar to the one I described with 
regard to Forbes’s view.  
However, in that case I assumed that the option of allowing for 
things with strongly primitive thisness was a non-starter. For a 
thing that has strongly primitive thisness is one that may give 
rise to cases of bare transworld identity, and Forbes cannot 
admit those.  
In this case, by contrast, I am assuming that allowing for things 
with qualitative minimal individual essences is a non-starter (I 
will say more on this shortly).  
In both cases, by ascribing non-qualitative minimal individual 
essences to a number of entities one accepts a series of buck-
passing accounts for the thisness of those things.   
In the case at hand, I argue that unless one allows for some 
things with strongly primitive thisness, one has to postulate 
that the series ends up forming either an infinite regress or a 
circle.  
Importantly, the idea that nothing whatsoever has a qualitative 
minimal individual essence is not required in order for the 
predicament to arise within a form of Haecceitism.  
To see the point, consider a form of Haecceitism about the Ks 
which accepts that some other things – the Ls – have qualitative 
minimal individual essences. Suppose the Ks are the things in 
the series considered above: a, which has the minimal 
individual essence of being in relation R with b; b, which has 
the minimal individual essence of being in relation R with c, and 
so on.  
The Haecceitist cannot hold that at some point in the series we 
have a K, say, d, which has the minimal individual essence of 
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being in relation R with one of the Ls – say, e. For, while this 
would prevent the series from forming an infinite regress or a 
circle, it would contradict the claim that d fails to have a 
qualitative minimal individual essence.  
 
(To recall a point I made in § 5.1.3, if being so-and-so is a 
qualitative minimal individual essence of e, and if d has the 
minimal individual essence of being in relation R with e, it seems 
that d will have a qualitative minimal individual essence as well 
– that of being in relation R with a thing that is so-and-so).  
 
Thus, the Haecceitist about the Ks who holds that none of the 
Ks has strongly primitive thisness has three options. She may:  
 
1. hold that the series at issue ends up forming an infinite 
regress;  
2. hold that the series at issue ends up forming a circle;  
3. hold that at some point in the series at issue there is a 
thing, say, f, that has the minimal individual essence of 
being is some relation to a further thing, g – where g has 
strongly primitive thisness.  
 
As I said in § 5.1.3, holding that the Ks give rise to a series such 
as the one described above and that such a series is regressive 
or circular would be of no use for the anti-Haecceitist about the 
Ks. By contrast, either of 1. and 2. can consistently be endorsed 
by a Haecceitist about the Ks who holds that no K has strongly 
primitive thisness.  
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Endorsing 1. is to commit to the claim that reality is regressive 
in every world that contains some Ks (note, moreover, that every 
such world would contain an infinity of things). Endorsing 2. is 
to commit to the claim that reality is circular in every world that 
contains some Ks. Endorsing 3. is to commit to the claim that, 
in every world that contains some Ks, at least one thing has 
strongly primitive thisness.  
Again, there may be good reasons to think that reality is 
possibly regressive or circular. However, absent an argument to 
the effect that the Ks, in particular, are individuated through a 
regressive or a circular series, I would rather endorse 3. and 
allow for things with strongly primitive thisness.  
 
6.3. Objections and Replies  
 
6.3.1. Haecceitism Is Not Ontologically Redundant  
 
Some think that Haecceitism is ontologically redundant – that 
it commits one to the idea that things have haecceities, i.e., 
literally existing properties that contribute nothing at all to 
their qualitative profiles and that are responsible for their 
individuation.  
Now, it is true that accepting haecceities is generally speaking 
an option for the Haecceitist. For instance, one may endorse all 
of the following claims:  
 
- none of the Ks has a qualitative minimal individual 
essence;  
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- every K has a non-trivial, non-qualitative minimal 
individual essence of having a given haecceity (e.g., a has 
b as its haecceity, c has d as its haecceity, and so on);  
- every haecceity of a K has strongly primitive thisness.  
 
The resulting view would count as a form of Haecceitism both 
about the Ks and about their haecceities.  
However, the Haecceitist is in no way committed to positing 
haecceities. The Haecceitist about the Ks is indeed committed 
to the claim that at least some Ks fail to have qualitative 
minimal individual essence. This entails, in turn, that those 
very things – call them the K*s – have primitive, non-qualitative 
thisness. Yet a K* might still well:   
 
1. have only one non-trivial minimal individual essence – 
one that does not consist in its having a given haecceity 
(but, say, in having some given things as one’s sole 
propagules, like a biological organism in Forbes’s theory), 
or:  
2. have strongly primitive thisness.  
 
Neither option is compatible with the idea that the K* in 
question has a haecceity.  
Concerning 1., the point is that if a K*, say, a, has a haecceity, 
say, b, then having b as one’s haecceity is a non-trivial minimal 
individual essence of a. This contradicts the claim that the only 
non-trivial minimal individual essence of a does not consist in 
its having a given haecceity.  
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Concerning 2., the point is the following. As I said, the haecceity 
of a thing is supposed to be responsible for the individuation of 
that thing. More precisely, the haecceity-defender holds that if 
a has b as its haecceity, then having b as one’s haecceity is 
what makes something be identical to a. This contradicts the 
claim that a has strongly primitive thisness – i.e., that nothing 
at all makes something be identical to a.  
More precisely, a has strongly primitive thisness if and only if 
there is no F such that for something to be a is for it to have F, 
where (i.) F is not the same property as being identical to a, and 
(ii.) there is no P such that for something to have F is for it to 
be identical to a and have P. But if a has b as its haecceity, then 
there is indeed an F that fulfils both (i.) and (ii.) – i.e., having b 
as one’s haecceity.  
 
Consider now a view that holds together the following two 
claims:  
- at least some of the Ks fail to have a qualitative minimal 
individual essence;  
- none of the Ks has a haecceity.  
 
I call a view such as this a form of Austere Haecceitism about 
the Ks.245 It should by now be clear that there is absolutely no 
reason to think that such a view is generally speaking less 
	
245 Locke (2012) calls Austere Quidditism a form of Quidditism that denies 
that properties have quiddities. My theory is different, though. For 
Quidditism is not a form of metaphysical Haecceitism: it is, rather, a theory 
that holds about properties what modal Haecceitism holds about 
individuals.   
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ontologically parsimonious than any form of Anti-Haecceitism 
about the Ks.  
As a matter of fact, Austere Haecceitism is more ontologically 
parsimonious than at least some forms of anti-Haecceitism. 
Consider:  
 
- a view that sees individuals as bundles of universals and 
holds that every individual has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence. As opposed to such a form of anti-
Haecceitism, Austere Haecceitism about individuals is 
not committed to there being universals;  
- Dasgupta’s Generalism. As opposed to any such view, 
Austere Haecceitism, so as I characterized it, is not 
committed to an ontology of facts at all.  
 
6.3.2. Haecceitism Is Not Metaphysically Redundant  
 
One might contend that even if Austere Haecceitism is not 
ontologically redundant, it still is metaphysically redundant. I 
see four potential rationales behind this contention. I will list 
them along with my replies here below.  
 
1. By denying that the Ks respect PII, Haecceitism excludes 
our best chance towards analysing claims of numerical 
identity and difference concerning the Ks. Hence, it is 
committed to an ideological primitive more than any form 
of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks – that is, to identity.  
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I do not have a conclusive argument against this point. 
However, I argue that the four following considerations do 
seriously undermine it.  
First, as I said in § 1.2, neither the identity relation in itself nor 
the question whether such a relation is ideologically primitive 
are among the topics of the present debate. Haecceitism is a 
claim concerning identity in the sense of thisness. It argues that 
at least some facts of identity in this sense are metaphysically 
primitive merely in the sense that at least some things have 
primitive thisness. Haecceitism is silent about whether the 
relation of identity, as a piece of ideology, can be somehow 
analysed in further terms.  
Second, it is not obvious that accepting PII is part and parcel of 
one’s best possible strategy towards an analysis of the identity 
relation.  
Third, even supposing that PII and its converse are both true, 
it is far from clear that they can provide an analysis of the 
identity relation. In other words, the following might be nothing 
more than a very interesting universal generalization:  
 
"x "y (x=y « "F (Fx « Fy))  
 
And even if it were to give us an analysis, it would not be 
obvious that what is on the left of the main biconditional would 
have to be the analysandum instead of the analysans.  
Finally, it is not the case that every form of anti-Haecceitism 
allows for an analysis of the identity relation. For instance, facts 
of numerical identity and difference are explicitly taken to be 
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fundamental under Dasgupta’s Algebraic Generalism (cf. 
Shumener 2016). 
 
2. Versions of Haecceitism that accept that some Ks have 
strongly primitive thisness entail that there are brute 
facts of individuation for such things.  
 
By itself, this merely restates the view of the Haecceitist who 
holds that at least some Ks have strongly primitive thisness. In 
order to advance a proper objection on this basis, the anti-
Haecceitist will have to set forth an argument to the effect that 
one among the following options is more palatable than 
defending that view:  
 
- claiming that all the Ks are ultimately individuated in 
terms of their qualitative profiles;  
- claiming that all the Ks are individuated in non-trivial, 
albeit non-qualitative, terms, and the series by which 
they are forms an infinite regress;  
- claiming that all the Ks are individuated in non-trivial, 
albeit non-qualitative, terms, and the series by which 
they are forms a circle.  
 
The objection will have to be evaluated once such an argument 
is set forth – that is, once it is turned into a proper objection. 
Moreover, as I said above (§ 6.2), the latter two options are 
viable for the Haecceitist about the Ks while they are not for the 
anti-Haecceitist about the Ks (see also § 5.1.3).  
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3. By denying that the qualitative character of a world is all 
that matters in determining what that world represents 
de re, the Haecceitist is committed to mysterious non-
qualitative makers of differences in de re representation.  
 
This is not an objection against any form of metaphysical 
Haecceitism. It is an objection against modal Haecceitism so as 
it was characterized by Lewis (1986). However, metaphysical 
Haecceitism about the Ks can be held together with modal anti-
Haecceitism about the Ks. Where the Ks are taken to be 
individuals, Lewis’s metaphysics itself is an instance of such a 
combination of views. For Lewis held (consistently, indeed) that:  
 
- modal representation de re for individuals works via 
counterpart theory, where every counterpart relation is 
specified in terms of qualitative similarity, and: 
- individuals do not have qualitative minimal individual 
essences (this is clear from his accepting worlds of two-
way eternal recurrence; see § 6.1 above).  
 
4. Haecceitism is metaphysically redundant in that it allows 
for haecceitistic differences, and haecceitistic differences 
are really distinctions without a difference.  
 
The significance of this claim depends on what exactly one 
means by ‘distinction without a difference’. I see three options 
in this sense. I will list them along with my replies below.   
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- The objector is assuming that ‘difference’ is just short for 
‘qualitative difference’ – or, at least, for ‘difference that is 
either qualitative or accompanied by a qualitative 
difference’. Thus, she is claiming that Haecceitism allows 
for haecceitistic differences – i.e., for distinctions without 
a difference that is qualitative or accompanied by a 
qualitative difference.   
 
If so understood, the claim is not an objection at all. The 
objector is merely restating one of the tenets of Haecceitism – 
i.e., that it is not the case that all differences need be qualitative 
or at least accompanied by a qualitative one.  
 
- The objector is not assuming that ‘difference’ is short for 
‘qualitative difference’ or at least for ‘difference that is 
either qualitative or accompanied by a qualitative 
difference’.  
 
In this case, the objection misfires: Haecceitism does not accept 
distinctions without a ‘difference’. For differences that are 
neither qualitative nor accompanied by a qualitative difference 
do qualify as differences – even according to the objector! 
 
- What the objector really means is that every difference 
whatsoever must be either qualitative or at least 
accompanied by a qualitative one. 
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If the objector does have an argument for that claim, then she 
does not need to contend that Haecceitism is metaphysically 
redundant after all. For she can argue that Haecceitism is false.  
Leibniz thought he had a powerful argument for the falsity of 
Haecceitism. Yet Leibniz’s case rests on several assumptions 
concerning God, the process of Her creating the world, the idea 
that She cannot make choices that do not maximize the best, 
et cetera.  
Arguments against Haecceitism that rely on less controversial 
grounds are typically drawn from a certain interpretation of 
contemporary physics. I will address such arguments in the 
next section.  
 
6.3.3. Haecceitism Is Not Directly Excluded by Physics  
 
As I already mentioned, quantum particles are most commonly 
taken to violate any interesting form of PII. However, it is widely 
thought that Haecceitism is incompatible with contemporary 
physics in general, and with quantum mechanics in particular.  
Diverse considerations might be taken to support the thought. 
In what follows I will focus on only one argument – the one that 
draws on issues of quantum statistics.  
The main idea is one I already mentioned above: quantum 
statistics does not take into account haecceitistic differences 
involving identical quantum particles in a system. That is, given 
an observation on a system involving two identical quantum 
particles and two possible states, both of which are in principle 
equally accessible to either particle, two possible outcomes of 
such an observation that differ merely as to which particle is in 
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which state count as only one possible outcome under quantum 
statistics. Hence, so the thought goes, quantum particles 
should be taken to be things that cannot give rise to 
haecceitistic differences – in the actual world and in worlds that 
are just like it physics-wise at least. 
More precisely, consider two classical particles and consider a 
property that can take only two values – say, up and down. For 
the two-particle system, there are four possible states:  
 
1C. first particle up, second particle up;  
2C. first particle down, second particle down;  
3C. first particle up, second particle down;  
4C. first particle down, second particle up.  
 
According to classical statistics, 3C. and 4C. count as two 
different states. Indeed, such states differ merely as to which 
particle is up and which one is down – that is, they differ 
haecceitistically.  
This is not so in the quantum case.  
In the case of a two-boson system, there are only three available 
states:246 
 
1Q. both bosons up;  
2Q. both bosons down;  
3Q. one boson up, one boson down.  
 
	
246 The case of fermions differs even more dramatically from the classical 
case, in that the only available state is the fermionic counterpart of 3Q.  
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Hypothetical cases that would mirror 3C. and 4C. are 
‘conflated’, so to speak, into one (3Q.) according to quantum 
statistics: the haecceitistic difference is ‘washed away’.  
A first answer to this is the following. A Haecceitist can allow 
for things that have qualitative minimal individual essence – 
hence, that cannot possibly give rise to haecceitistic differences. 
For instance, as I said above, one can be a Haecceitist about 
individuals such as persons, trees, and spheres while being an 
anti-Haecceitist about immanent universals. Faced with the 
argument from quantum statistics, the Haecceitist about the 
Ks (where the Ks are not quantum particles) can then simply 
accept that every quantum particle has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence, while not every K does.  
It is important to see that this is a bad answer.  
For as I said, quantum particles are widely taken to violate any 
interesting version of PII – and strong PII among them. 
In particular, when a two-boson system is in the following state 
(leaving normalization constants aside): 
 
|up>1|down>2 + |down>1|up>2 
 
it can be proved that the two bosons share all the quantum 
properties (i.e., all ‘observables’).247 
More precisely, the probability of a certain observable having a 
certain value is the same for both bosons. Hence, the two 
bosons are taken to violate PII. 
	
247 The locus classicus is French and Redhead (1988).  
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(Note that the state above is exactly the one representing case 
3Q. of quantum statistics).248   
Hence, quantum particles are widely taken not to have a 
qualitative minimal individual essence. And still they are also 
widely taken to be such that they cannot give rise to 
haecceitistic differences. Thus, the objector might contend that 
there is something wrong with the very way I framed the present 
debate.  
A number of assumptions lie behind this contention. In 
particular, for it to stand it must be the case that:  
 
a. given the way I framed the debate, things that fail to have 
a qualitative minimal individual essence possibly give 
rise to haecceitistic differences;  
b. things that possibly give rise to haecceitistic differences 
do give rise to haecceitistic differences in the actual 
world, or at least in some worlds that are like the actual 
one physics-wise;  
c. if quantum particles give rise to haecceitistic differences 
in worlds that are like the actual one physics-wise, then 
they give rise to haecceitistic differences in observational 
systems such as the one described above;  
d. if quantum particles give rise to haecceitistic differences 
in observational systems such as the one described 
above, then quantum statistics is sensitive to such 
differences.  
 
	
248 Thanks to Claudio Calosi here.  
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Among the claims above, a. is undisputable.  
b. is not: it might in principle be the case that quantum 
particles give rise to haecceitistic differences in some worlds, 
although none of the worlds where they do is either actual or 
just like the actual one physics-wise.  
However, as a Haecceitist, I would rather not defend my view 
by relying on such a consideration. I am no physicist; all I know 
about quantum particles is what I am told by people who study 
such things within the theoretical framework of a physical 
theory – i.e., quantum mechanics. For all I know, quantum 
particles are exactly the things that have the features the theory 
ascribes to them, and that behave in the way the theory 
describes them as behaving. If asked to consider a world that 
is not like ours physics-wise – in particular, one where 
quantum mechanics does not hold, or is different in certain 
ways – I simply have no grip on what can or cannot be true of 
those things in such a world. Depending on how different from 
ours the world in question is, I would not even be sure that 
quantum particles do exist in it!  
I think that c. and d. are the most contentious among the 
claims above.  
As for c., recall the case of a world of two-way eternal 
recurrence. Consider a world of eternal recurrence, w, that is 
just like our world physics-wise. There would then be two 
options for quantum particles in w. It could be that:  
 
- quantum particles recur numerically identical in every 
epoch, or:  
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- quantum particles do not recur numerically identical in 
every epoch. Each one of them exists in exactly one 
epoch, though having an indiscernible doppelganger in 
every other epoch.  
If the latter is the case, then any two indiscernible quantum 
particles that exist in two different epochs would give rise to 
haecceitistic differences. But these would not be haecceitistic 
differences within a system of the sort that is relevant for the 
argument from quantum statistics.  
We could imagine that every epoch of w is inhabited by one 
quantum particle alone. If so, then no such particle would ever 
take part in an observational system such as the ones that are 
relevant for the argument from quantum statistics. In such a 
world, quantum particles would then give rise to haecceitistic 
differences, but not to haecceitistic differences within a system 
of the relevant sort.  
Now, perhaps the world I described is not a possibility vis-à-vis 
quantum physics. If so, a further counterexample to c. will have 
to be provided.  
However, I think that the case helps appreciate a further 
important point: it is not the case that all haecceitistic 
differences involving some quantum particles whatsoever are 
incompatible with contemporary physics in the light of 
quantum statistics. Indeed, I see no reason why one cannot 
grant the argument from quantum statistics and allow for 
haecceitistic differences between quantum particles such as the 
ones that different epochs in the world described above would 
bring forth. Those would not be haecceitistic differences 
between quantum particles in an observational system of the 
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sort that is relevant for the argument from quantum statistics. 
As far as I can see, such an argument is silent about them.  
Finally, d. is not undisputable either.  
One way to resist it would be of course to take an anti-realistic 
stance towards quantum mechanics – in particular, about the 
quantum state. For instance, according to Harrigan and 
Spekkens (2010) quantum states do not inform us about 
reality, but merely about our knowledge of reality.   
And there are strategies that do not rely on anti-realism at all. 
The one that was recently defended by Matteo Morganti is 
particularly interesting in this context, since it explicitly 
endorses the idea that quantum particles have strongly 
primitive thisness. Orthodoxy has it that such a stance plainly 
contradicts quantum physics because things that have strongly 
primitive thisness are apt to give rise to haecceitistic 
differences, and quantum statistics is insensitive to such 
differences (as occurring in the relevant observational systems 
at least). Morganti’s strategy explains away such a contention 
by appealing to the workings of quantum theory itself.  
The thought is that there is something about the inner workings 
of quantum mechanics that ‘hides’, so to speak, haecceitistic 
differences involving identical particles in a system. 
This has to do, crucially, with the way quantum mechanics 
treats many-particle systems and their properties.  
In particular, according to Morganti, for “quantum many-
particle systems of identical particles (…) the statistics only 
describes what measurement results are possible for what 
systems. And, crucially, this description concerns inherent, 
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pre-measurement holistic (…) properties that contain no 
information about the individual particles”.249 
Inherent properties of the total system would be those that are 
“irreducible (…) to a ‘sum’ of properties of the system’s 
component parts” – in this case, of the particles.250 
Since this is all that quantum statistics describes, there is no 
reason to expect it to encode differences in the identity of the 
particles. As Morganti goes on to explain, “for (…) many-particle 
systems and state-dependent properties particle exchanges do 
not give rise to new arrangements (i.e., the identities of the 
particles are not statistically relevant) not because particles (…) 
do not have well-defined identities”, so that it makes no sense 
to ask ‘which is which’. The reason is, rather, that “the particles’ 
identities do not play any role in the determination of the states 
that are described by the statistics”.251 
 
6.3.4. Haecceitism Does Not Exclude Individuality  
 
Some think that a metaphysics such as the one I endorse – one 
where nothing whatsoever has a qualitative minimal individual 
essence – cannot allow for there being individuals.  
(The remark was made to me in conversation, but the idea 
seems to be among the assumptions of Ujvári, 2013).  
The thought would be, roughly, that while particulars may fail 
to have qualitative individual essences, individuals in a 
somehow more robust sense cannot.  	
249 Morganti (2009): 228.  
250 Ibid.: 227. The technical term was introduced by Paul Teller; see Teller 
(1986); (1989).  
251 Morganti (2009): 228.  
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As it stands, the remark is unclear: one should spell out what 
one is meaning by ‘individual’. As far as I can see, two main 
options are relevant here:  
 
- what one is meaning by ‘individual’ is really ‘Leibnizian 
individual’ (i.e., roughly, ‘what counts as an individual 
substance under Leibniz’s characterization in the 
Discourse’);  
- what one is meaning by ‘individual’ is not ‘Leibnizian 
individual’ in the sense above, but something broader or 
in any case different.  
 
If the former is the case, then this is no objection at all: the 
objector is merely restating my view. For Leibniz characterizes 
an ‘individual substances’ in the Discourse exactly as a thing 
that has a complete individual concept, where such an 
individual concept conveys a qualitative minimal individual 
essence of the substance at issue.  
By contrast, if the latter is the case, the objector still has to 
specify what she does mean by ‘individual’. For her contention 
to stand still, it must be the case that having a qualitative 
minimal individual essence is a necessary condition for being 
an individual in the relevant sense. And still the notion of 
individuality the objector is assuming would better convey 
something more than that – otherwise, she would be either just 
restating my view again or begging the question.  
I know of no such notion. As I said, I am content with endorsing 
a metaphysics of concrete particulars. While I am happy to call 
such things ‘individuals’, I would not mind too much dropping 
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the term if provided a reason for so doing. As things stand, I do 
not see any.  
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Conclusions 
 
I introduced the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism and argued 
that the extant characterizations of such a topic suffer from 
serious difficulties. In particular, I provided reasons to think 
that the issue would better be approached by defining anti-
Haecceitism about the entities of a certain class (the Ks) first, 
and then stating Haecceitism about the Ks as the denial of such 
a thesis.  
In order to properly ascertain what anti-Haecceitism about the 
Ks commits one to, I considered two arguments that I take to 
be emblematic of the typical rationale behind such a stance. 
Such a rationale, I argued, consists in the aim to rule out what 
I have called cases of haecceitistic differences involving the Ks. 
Diverse forms of anti-Haecceitism about the Ks, I said, may be 
classified with respect to whether or not they satisfy two 
desiderata that I labelled ‘distributiveness’ and ‘identity-
explanation’.  
A metaphysics that does justice to the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism about the Ks by satisfying both desiderata, I 
contended, must rule it out that any of the Ks has primitive, 
non-qualitative thisness. The claim that none of the Ks has 
primitive thisness in the relevant sense entails that each one of 
the Ks has a minimal individual essence that is purely 
qualitative.  
Claiming that a has a qualitative minimal essence is to claim 
that (roughly) there is a certain qualitative profile such that 
having that qualitative profile is a condition that is necessarily 
both necessary and sufficient for being a.  
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It follows that if I am right then the anti-Haecceitist about the 
Ks must hold that all of the Ks respect a strong form of the 
Identity of Indiscernibles – that is, that no two of them can 
possibly be qualitatively just alike. As I said, I take Leibniz’s 
views about individual substances to be an example of anti-
Haecceitism as I conceive of it.  
As I pointed out, some anti-Haecceitists have attempted to 
phrase the issue otherwise. A major aim of such attempts is 
exactly that of avoiding the commitments that anti-Haecceitism 
about the Ks so as I characterize it incurs – most notably, the 
one to strong PII for the Ks. In line with the general picture I 
provided, the versions of anti-Haecceitism thus phrased must 
fail to satisfy at least one of the desiderata I mentioned above.  
By focusing on Dasgupta’s proposal in terms of grounding, I 
argued that such attempts have significant shortcomings. As 
they stand, and interestingly enough, they share with certain 
traditional, rough takes on the present debate some 
assumptions that I proved to be wrong-headed. Against such 
assumptions, I contended that:  
1. the issue of metaphysical Haecceitism is not the issue of 
whether or not only qualities are fundamental existents, 
so that the existence of individuals is in some sense 
derivative on the existence of qualities;  
2. it is not the case that individuals – as opposed to entities 
of some other sort – need offend against the anti-
Haecceitist’s credo. Nor is it the case that individuals 
need do so in case they are taken to be fundamental 
existents.  
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1. teaches us, among other things, that a commitment to a 
fundamental ontology of properties cannot be motivated by 
appeal to an alleged need to defend anti-Haecceitism. By 
arguing the point, I also contended that the present debate 
should be one that may be approached by realists and 
nominalists about properties alike. My account, as opposed to 
most others, is one that fulfils such a desideratum.  
While dispelling the consequences of 2., I argued that the only 
entities that really need offend against the anti-Haecceitist’s 
rationale are those things that have primitive thisness. And as 
I showed, a thing that fails to have primitive thisness in the 
relevant sense is a thing that has a qualitative minimal 
individual essence. Hence, it is a thing that fulfils strong PII.  
Dasgupta’s strategy has it that one might avoid taking a stance 
about such things altogether and make a claim about some 
propositional-like entities instead – in the case of his view, 
about facts. But I argued that such a strategy either relies on 
assumptions that contradict 2. or turns anti-Haecceitism into 
a form of Ontological Nihilism (or at least into a stuff ontology 
of some sort).  
Given that the case for anti-Haecceitism does not support either 
of said views, and given my case for 2., I concluded that anti-
Haecceitism about the Ks is indeed committed to strong PII 
about the Ks.  
I then characterized the form of Haecceitism I hold to be true 
about at least some Ks and defended it from some foreseeable 
objections.  
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As any view that holds that at least some Ks have primitive 
thisness and that none of the Ks has a haecceity, my view is a 
form of what I call ‘Austere Haecceitism’.  
 
As I mentioned, the following is, in a nutshell, my main point 
for Austere Haecceitism:  
 
1. anti-Haecceitism about the Ks is committed to the idea that the 
Ks fulfil strong PII; 2. unless the Ks are universals, the claim that 
they fulfil strong PII is, at best, very controversial; 3. at least the 
fundamental things should respect strong PII if the anti-
Haecceitist is to satisfy the general rationale for her own view; 
4. the rationale for anti-Haecceitism does not strictly speaking 
support the claim that all fundamental things are universals.  
 
Further tenets of my own view that I did not defend in the 
present work are: (i.) the claim that nothing whatsoever has a 
qualitative minimal individual essence – hence, that every 
possible thing has primitive thisness, and (ii.) the claim that in 
every possible world at least some things have strongly 
primitive thisness.  
 
Given the general framework I provided, several ‘first-order’ 
questions about metaphysical (anti-)Haecceitism may now be 
addressed in prospective research. I will conclude by 
mentioning a few of them below.  
 
i. I defined Haecceitism and anti-Haecceitism about the 
Ks – without focusing on any class of things in 
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particular. There seems to be a partial consensus on 
the idea that anti-Haecceitism about universals is less 
problematic than anti-Haecceitism about individuals. 
However, the point is somewhat vague. As I pointed 
out, it seems that this opinion and related ones do not 
even rest on an agreement as to what should be meant 
by ‘individual’. The notion of a universal seems to be 
less problematic, but one may challenge some 
assumptions about it, such as the idea that there 
cannot be indiscernible universals. It would be 
interesting to figure out what the grounds of said 
consensus are, and whether extant notions of what an 
individual and a universal are, respectively, do 
support the opinion.  
ii. I said that an anti-Haecceitistic metaphysics must 
take at least the fundamental entities to have 
qualitative minimal individual essences. It is not clear, 
though, that the latter claim can do justice to specific 
cases for anti-Haecceitism. Consider, for instance, the 
aim to rule out haecceitistic differences involving any 
entity whatsoever. The claim that every single entity 
has a qualitative minimal individual essence would 
certainly result in ruling out all such differences. 
However, it is an extremely strong claim. It would be 
worth enquiring whether one could get to the same 
result by taking some less demanding strategy.  
iii. A lot has been said about the difficulties that Algebraic 
Generalism faces. It would be important to figure out 
whether some different claim in terms of grounding 
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can still do justice to the rationale for anti-
Haecceitism. 
iv. Some think that Weak Discernibility vindicates strong 
PII. However, if what I said in § 5.1.2 (and what B says 
in Black, 1952) is correct, it does not: the machinery 
of Weak Discernibility can only discern between the 
two spheres in Black’s dialogue by appealing to their 
non-qualitative features. Inasmuch as it appeals to 
their qualitative ones alone, it can indeed formally 
prove that there are two, but it cannot show they are 
discernible. The debate about this point seems to be 
at a stalemate, and it would be highly desirable to set 
forth a way to revive the discussion about it.   
v. A form of Haecceitism that takes some things to have 
strongly primitive thisness clearly seems to be 
consistent. Yet it is not easy to see which things could 
be thought to have strongly primitive thisness indeed. 
This point, too, seems worth exploring.  
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Appendix 
 
A case of primitive identity.  
A case in which there is a fact of the matter as concerns 
the identity of the entities involved in some given 
situation, and such a fact of the matter cannot be made 
to rest on further features of reality that may as well be 
characterized without making reference to the identity of 
any entity at all. 
 
Haecceitistic difference.  
Situation S1 and situation S2 differ haecceitistically =df 
S1 and S2 differ merely as concerns the identity of some 
of the entities they involve, respectively.   
 
Desiderata that a form of Anti-Haecceitism about the Ks may 
satisfy or fail to.  
Distributiveness. There are no cases of primitive identity 
involving some Ks because each and every ‘which is 
which’-issue concerning a K is settled by the qualitative 
reality. Hence, not only all cases of primitive identity are 
excluded: they are excluded one by one – i.e., each one of 
them is.    
 
Identity-explanation. There are no cases of primitive 
identity involving some Ks because the Ks are 
individuated by the way they are, qualitatively. As a 
result, a situation’s involving some Ks in particular is 
always a matter of how the Ks involved in that situation 
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qualitatively are. That is why ‘which is which’-issues 
concerning the Ks are always settled by the qualitative 
reality.   
 
Qualitative and non-qualitative properties.  
P is a non-qualitative property =df For some things b1, 
b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary relation R, the property 
lx Px is identical to the property lx R(x, b1, …, bn).  
Every property that is not non-qualitative is qualitative.  
 
Qualitative and non-qualitative ways for something to be.  
P is a non-qualitative way for something to be (or, 
formally: FP, where ‘F’ is an operator that takes a 
predicate to form a sentence) =df  For some things b1, b2, 
…, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary R, P @	is R-related to b1, 
b2, …, bn (in this order).  
(Where: ‘R’ is a second-order variable; ‘F’ is a third-order 
operator; ‘for some n+1-ary R’ is a non-objectual second-
order quantifier; ‘P’ is a non-committal second-order 
predicate; ‘@’ is an equivalence operator that takes a pair 
of predicates to make a sentence. The intuitive meaning 
of ‘F @ G’ is that ‘F’ and ‘G’ express the same way for 
something to be).  
Every way for something to be that is not non-qualitative 
is qualitative.  
 
Qualitative and non-qualitative predicates.  
P is a non-qualitative predicate =df For some 
designators b1, b2, …, bn, n ³ 1, and some n+1-ary 
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predicate R, the predicate P and the predicate R_, b1, …, 
bn are synonymous.  
Every predicate that is not non-qualitative is qualitative.  
 
Primitive, non-qualitative thisness.  
a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisness* =df It is 
not the case that there is some qualitative property F 
such that for something to be a is for it to have F. 
 
a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisness =df It is 
not the case that $F such that Q(F) and for something x 
to be a is for it to be the case that Fx.  
(Where ‘F’ is a second-order variable, Q is a third-order 
condition that captures qualitativeness, and the second-
order existential quantifier must be read as non-
objectual). 
 
a has primitive (i.e., non-qualitative) thisnesspred. =df 
It is not the case that for something to be a is for it to 
satisfy ‘F’, where ‘F’ is a qualitative predicate.   
 
Strongly primitive thisness.  
a has strongly primitive thisness* =df It is not the case 
that for some F such that Ψ(F), for something to be 
identical to a is for it to have F (for Ψ a condition such 
that Ψ(F) just in case: (i.*) F is not the same property as 
being identical to a (under the relevant conditions for 
property sameness) (ii.*) there is no P such that for 
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something to have F is for it to be identical to a and have 
P). 
 
a has strongly primitive thisness =df It is not the case 
that $F such that Ψ(F) and for something to be identical 
to a is for it to be the case that Fx (for Ψ a condition such 
that Ψ(F) just in case: (i.) it is not the case that F @ is 
identical to a, and (ii.) it is not the case that $G such that 
F @ (G & is identical to a)).  
(Where: ‘F’ is a second-order predicate; Ψ is a third-order 
condition; the second-order existential quantifier must 
be read as non-objectual; ‘@’ is an equivalence operator 
that takes a pair of predicates to make a sentence. The 
intuitive meaning of ‘F @ G’ is that ‘F’ and ‘G’ express the 
same way for something to be).  
 
a has strongly primitive thisnesspred. =df It is not the 
case that for something to be identical to a is for it to 
satisfy ‘F’ (where (i.) ‘F’ is not synonymous with ‘is 
identical to a’, and (ii.) ‘F’ is not a conjunctive predicate 
of the form ‘G and H’, where ‘G’ is synonymous with ‘is 
identical to a’).  
 
Individual essence.  
F is an individual essence of a =df F is a property of a, or 
a collection thereof, that (i.) is essential to a and (ii.) 
necessarily, for any x, if x has F then x=a.   
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Minimal individual essence.  
F is a minimal individual essence of a =df Necessarily, 
for any x, x has F if and only if x=a. 
 
Qualitative individual essence.  
a has a qualitative individual essence* =df For some 
qualitative property or collection of qualitative properties 
F, (i.) F is essential to a, and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, if 
x has F then x=a.  
 
a has a qualitative individual essence =df $F such that 
(i.) F is a qualitative way for something to be, (ii.) it is 
essential to a that Fa is the case, and (iii.) necessarily, for 
any x, if Fx then x=a.  
(Where ‘F’ is a non-committal second-order predicate and 
the second-order existential quantifier is to be read as 
non-objectual). 
 
a has a qualitative individual essencepred. =df For some 
qualitative predicate ‘F’, (i.) satisfying ‘F’ is essential to a, 
and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, if x satisfies ‘F’ then x=a.  
 
Qualitative minimal individual essence.  
a has a qualitative minimal individual essence* =df For 
some qualitative property or collection of qualitative 
properties F, necessarily, for any x, x has F iff x=a. 
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a has a qualitative minimal individual essence =df $F 
such that (i.)  F is a qualitative way for something to be, 
and (ii.) necessarily, for any x, Fx iff x=a. 
(Where ‘F’ is a non-committal second-order predicate and 
the second-order existential quantifier is to be read as 
non-objectual). 
 
a has a qualitative minimal individual essencepred. =df 
For some qualitative predicate ‘F’, necessarily, for any x, 
Fx iff x=a. 
 
Austere Haecceitism about the Ks.  
Any view that holds that (i.) some of the Ks have primitive 
thisness and (ii.) none of the Ks has a haecceity.  
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